Global Financial Stability Report
Fostering Stability in a Low-Growth, Low-Rate Era
October 2016
The current report finds that short-term risks to global financial stability have abated since April 2016, but that medium-term risks continue to build. Financial institutions in advanced economies face a number of cyclical and structural challenges and need to adapt to low growth and low interest rates, as well as to an evolving market and regulatory environment. Weak profitability could erode banks’ buffers over time and undermine their ability to support growth. A cyclical recovery will not resolve the problem of low profitability. More deep-rooted reforms and systemic management are needed, especially for European banks. The solvency of many life insurance companies and pension funds is threatened by a prolonged period of low interest rates. Corporate leverage in emerging market economies remains elevated in some countries, but the current favorable external environment presents an opportunity for overly indebted firms to restructure their balance sheets. The political climate is unsettled in many countries. A lack of income growth and a rise in inequality have opened the door for populist, inward-looking policies. These factors make it even harder to tackle legacy problems and further expose economies and markets to shocks. A potent and more balanced policy mix is needed to deliver a stronger path for growth and financial stability, and avoid slipping into a state of financial and economic stagnation. The report also examines how the rise of nonbank financing has altered the impact of monetary policy and finds that fears of a decline in the effectiveness of monetary policy are unfounded. It appears that the transmission of monetary policy is, if anything, stronger in economies with larger nonbank financial sectors. Finally, the report examines the link between corporate governance, investor protection, and financial stability in emerging market economies. It finds that the improvements over the past two decades have helped bolster the resilience of their financial systems. These benefits strengthen the case for further reform.
Front Matter
- Assumptions and Conventions
- Further Information and Data
- Preface
- Executive Summary
- IMF Executive Board Discussion Summary
Chapter 1: Financial Stability Challenges in a Low-Growth, Low-Rate Era
Chapter 1 finds that short-term risks to global financial stability have abated since April 2016, but that medium-term risks continue to build. Financial institutions in advanced economies face a number of cyclical and structural challenges and need to adapt to low growth and low interest rates, as well as to an evolving market and regulatory environment. Weak profitability could erode banks’ buffers over time and undermine their ability to support growth. A cyclical recovery will not resolve the problem of low profitability. More deep-rooted reforms and systemic management are needed, especially for European banks. The solvency of many life insurance companies and pension funds is threatened by a prolonged period of low interest rates. Corporate leverage in emerging market economies remains elevated in some countries, but the current favorable external environment presents an opportunity for overly indebted firms to restructure their balance sheets. The political climate is unsettled in many countries. A lack of income growth and a rise in inequality have opened the door for populist, inward-looking policies. These factors make it even harder to tackle legacy problems and further expose economies and markets to shocks. A potent and more balanced policy mix is needed to deliver a stronger path for growth and financial stability, and avoid slipping into a state of financial and economic stagnation.
Financial Stability Overview | |||||
Medium-Term Risks Rising | |||||
Emerging Market Economies: A Smooth Deleveraging? | |||||
Global Stability Challenges in the New Era | |||||
Boxes | |||||
Chart Chart |
Data Data |
1.1 Impact of Brexit | |||
1.2 The Basel Committee Agenda: Achieving Certainty without Compromising Integrity | |||||
Figures | |||||
Chart |
Data | 1.1 Global Financial Stability Map: Risks and Conditions | |||
Chart | Data | 1.2 Global Financial Stability Map: Assessment of Risks and Conditions | |||
Chart | Data | 1.3 Brexit’s Impact on Financial Markets | |||
Chart | Data | 1.4 Decomposition of Equity Market Performance | |||
Chart | Data | 1.5 Policy Uncertainty | |||
Chart | Data | 1.6 Global Growth Momentum and Interest Rates | |||
Chart | Data | 1.7 Sovereign Bond Yields and Term Premiums in Advanced Economies | |||
Chart | Data | 1.8 Drivers of Government Bond Yields | |||
Chart | Data | 1.9 Effects on Credit Growth of Shocks to Equity Prices | |||
Chart | Data | 1.10 Developed and Emerging Market Economy Banks: Capital and Liquidity Indicators | |||
Chart | Data | 1.11 Price-to-Book and Return on Equity Decomposition, 2006–15 | |||
Chart | Data | 1.12 Advanced Economies: Trends in Bank Profitability | |||
Chart | Data | 1.13 Bank Performance in a “Cyclical Recovery” Scenario, by Region | |||
Chart | Data | 1.14 Stylized Net Capital Impact of Nonperforming Loan Disposal at Euro Area Banks | |||
Chart | Data | 1.15 European and U.S. Banks—Operating Efficiency and Cost Rationalization | |||
Chart | Data | 1.16 European Banks’ Elevated Cost of Funding | |||
Chart | Data | 1.17 European Bank Profitability in a “Structural Reform” Scenario | |||
Chart | Data | 1.18 Japanese Banks and Foreign Exchange Funding | |||
Chart | Data | 1.19 Low Interest Rates and Insurance Companies | |||
Chart | Data | 1.20 U.S. Pension Fund Discount Rate | |||
Chart | Data | 1.21 Pension Funding Shortfalls in the United States and the United Kingdom | |||
Chart | Data | 1.22 Portfolio Flows to Emerging Market Economies and Asset Prices | |||
Chart | Data | 1.23 Corporate Borrowing: Stabilized, but at a High Level | |||
Chart | Data | 1.24 Scenarios for Deleveraging in Emerging Market Firms and Default Rates | |||
Chart | Data | 1.25 Sensitivity of Emerging Market Economy Assets to Global Policy Uncertainty | |||
Chart | Data | 1.26 China: Credit Overhang and Shadow Credit | |||
Chart | Data | 1.27 China: Bank Linkages to the Structured Investment Complex | |||
Chart | 1.28 Financial Stagnation and Protectionism Scenario: Simulated Peak Effects | ||||
Annex Figures | |||||
Chart | 1.1.1 Financial Stagnation and Protectionism Scenario |
Chapter 2: Monetary Policy and the Rise of Nonbank Finance
Chapter 2 studies how nonbank financial institutions may shape the transmission of monetary policy. It finds that nonbanks, if anything, have strengthened the transmission of monetary policy. Nonbanks may amplify the effects of monetary policy on real economic activity because their incentives to take risks are particularly sensitive to changes in monetary policy. However, banks still matter for the transmission of monetary policy because even large firms have limited ability to move away from bank loans and into bond financing after a monetary contraction. Policymakers must continue to adapt the conduct of monetary policy to changes in the composition of financial systems and to be mindful of the implications of monetary policy on financial stability. In this context, the provision of data on nonbank financial intermediaries needs to continue to be enhanced.
Summary | |||
Introduction | |||
Trends in the Transmission of Monetary Policy | |||
Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission | |||
Empirical Evidence on the Transmission of Monetary Policy | |||
Policy Discussion | |||
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations | |||
Boxes | |||
Chart | Data | 2.1 Monetary Policy and the Stock Returns of Banks and Nonbanks | |
Chart Chart |
Data | 2.2 Exchange Rate Volatility, Monetary Policy, and Nonbanks | |
Figures | |||
Chart | Data | 2.1 The Relative Importance of Nonbank Financial Intermediaries | |
Chart | Data | 2.2 Trends in the Transmission of Monetary Policy | |
Chart | 2.3 Transmission of Monetary Policy through the Reaction of Financial Intermediaries | ||
Chart | Data | 2.4 Marked-to-Market Assets by Sector | |
Chart | Data | 2.5 Value at Risk in Risk Management by Asset Class and Year | |
Chart | Data | 2.6 Transmission of Monetary Policy and Size of Nonbank Financial Sector | |
Chart | Data | 2.7 Response to a Monetary Policy Contraction | |
Chart | Data | 2.8 Risk Taking and Monetary Policy in the United States | |
Chart | Data | 2.9 Monetary Policy and Total Assets Owned by Financial Intermediaries | |
Chart | Data | 2.10 Bank Regulation, Monetary Policy, and Total Assets Owned by Financial Institutions | |
Chart | Data | 2.11 Risk Taking by Mutual Funds and Monetary Policy | |
Chart | Data | 2.12 Bond Finance around the World | |
Chart | Data | 2.13 Bond Financing and Monetary Policy | |
Annex Figures | |||
Chart | Data | Annex Figure 2.1.1 Trends in the Transmission of Monetary Policy—Robustness | |
Chart | Data | Annex Figure 2.2.1 Summary Statistics | |
Chapter 3: Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial Stability in Emerging Markets
Chapter 3 focuses on the links between corporate governance, investor protection, and financial stability across emerging market economies. The chapter finds that corporate governance and investor protection have generally improved in emerging market economies over the past two decades. The analysis supports the notion that stronger corporate governance and investor protection frameworks enhance the resilience of emerging market economies to global financial shocks. The results show that corporate governance improvements foster deeper and more liquid capital markets, allowing them to absorb shocks better. Corporate governance improvements also enhance stock market efficiency, thereby making equity prices less sensitive to external shocks and less prone to crashes. Emerging market economies with better corporate governance and investor protections generally have stronger corporate balance sheets. The financial stability benefits associated with improved corporate governance strengthen the case for further reform. Policies to further bolster the rights of outside investors (especially minority shareholders), bring disclosure requirements fully in line with international best practice, and promote greater board independence are likely to yield financial stability benefits.
Summary | |||||
Introduction | |||||
Nexus between Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial Stability | |||||
The Evolving Nature of Corporate Governance and Investor Protection | |||||
Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial Stability | |||||
Conclusions and Policy Implications | |||||
Boxes | |||||
3.1 Examples of Corporate Governance Reforms in Selected Emerging Market Economies | |||||
Chart Chart |
Data | 3.2 Strengthening Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprises in China | |||
Figures | |||||
Chart | Data | 3.1 Corporate Governance and Equity Returns | |||
Chart | Data | 3.2 Corporate Governance and Volatility of Stock Market Returns in Emerging Market Economies | |||
Chart | Data | 3.3 Ownership Structure and Closely Held Shares | |||
Chart | Data | 3.4 Minority Shareholder Protection | |||
Chart | Data | 3.5 Country-Level Corporate Governance and Investor Protection | |||
Chart | Data | 3.6 Emerging Market Firm-Level Governance Index | |||
Chart | Data | 3.7 Corporate Governance and Firm-Level Valuation | |||
Chart | Data | 3.8 Firm-Level Governance and Valuation | |||
Chart | Data | 3.9 Corporate Governance and Market Liquidity | |||
Chart | Data | 3.10 Stock Return Comovement | |||
Chart | Data | 3.11 Stock Market Comovement (R2) over Time | |||
Chart | Data | 3.12 Crash Risk | |||
Chart | Data | 3.13 Event Study: Firm-Level Governance and Equity Returns | |||
Chart | Data | 3.14 Impact of Global Financial Shocks on Equity Returns | |||
Chart | Data | 3.15 Corporate Governance and Selected Balance Sheet Indicators | |||
Chart | Data | 3.16 Firm-Level Governance and the Bond Market | |||
Chart | Data | 3.17 Firm-Level Governance and Solvency | |||
Chart | Data | 3.18 Country-Level and Firm-Level Governance and Short-Term Debt |