To "B" or Not to "B": A Welfare Analysis of Breaking Up Monopolies in an Endogenous Growth Model
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Summary:
This paper studies the welfare consequences of a government regulation that forces a patented equipment to be supplied by a number of independent producers. On the one hand, such a regulation hurts the value of a patent and therefore reduces activities in the R&D sector. On the other hand, the enhanced competition for the equipment improves efficiency in the manufacturing sector. Should monopolies protected by intellectual property rights be broken up? The answer is “no” in a Romer-type growth model, but there is sufficient reason to believe that the answer could be “yes” in a model advocated by Jones (1995).
Series:
Working Paper No. 2000/189
Subject:
Economic sectors Financial services Human capital Labor Manufacturing Real interest rates
English
Publication Date:
November 1, 2000
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451859607/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA1892000
Pages:
18
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