Working Papers

Page: 31 of 897 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

2023

August 18, 2023

Reported Social Unrest Index: August 2023 Update

Description: This paper is the second update of the Reported Social Unrest Index (Barrett et al. 2022), outlining developments in global social unrest since March 2022. It shows that the fraction of countries experiencing major social unrest events has been stable. Reasons for social unrest can be broadly categorized as stemming from sdebate over constitutional issues, protests connected to specific policies, and other generalized disorder.

August 11, 2023

How Nations Become Fragile: An AI-Augmented Bird’s-Eye View (with a Case Study of South Sudan)

Description: In this study we introduce and apply a set of machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques to analyze multi-dimensional fragility-related data. Our analysis of the fragility data collected by the OECD for its States of Fragility index showed that the use of such techniques could provide further insights into the non-linear relationships and diverse drivers of state fragility, highlighting the importance of a nuanced and context-specific approach to understanding and addressing this multi-aspect issue. We also applied the methodology used in this paper to South Sudan, one of the most fragile countries in the world to analyze the dynamics behind the different aspects of fragility over time. The results could be used to improve the Fund’s country engagement strategy (CES) and efforts at the country.

August 11, 2023

Coping with Climate Shocks: Food Security in a Spatial Framework

Description: We develop a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model with heterogeneous house-holds and multiple locations to study households’ vulnerability to food insecurity from cli-mate shocks. In the model, households endogenously respond to negative climate shocks by drawing-down assets, importing food and temporarily migrating to earn additional income to ensure sufficient calories. Because these coping strategies are most effective when trade and migration costs are low, remote households are more vulnerable to climate shocks. Food insecure households are also more vulnerable, as their proximity to a subsistence requirement causes them to hold a smaller capital buffer and more aggressively dissave in response to shocks, at the expense of future consumption. We calibrate the model to 51 districts in Nepal and estimate the impact of historical climate shocks on food consumption and welfare. We estimate that, on an annual basis, floods, landslides, droughts and storms combined generated GDP losses of 2.3 percent, welfare losses of 3.3 percent for the average household and increased the rate of undernourishment by 2.8 percent. Undernourished households experience roughly 50 percent larger welfare losses and those in remote locations suffer welfare losses that are roughly two times larger than in less remote locations (5.9 vs 2.9 percent). In counterfactual simulations, we show the role of better access to migration and trade in building resilience to climate shocks.

August 11, 2023

The Elasticity of Substitution Between Skilled and Unskilled Labor in Developing Countries: A Directed Technical Change Perspective

Description: We develop a model of endogenous skill-biased technical change in developing countries. The endogenous response to a rise in skill supply counters the traditional substitution effect and dampens its role in reducing wage inequality. The model re-enforces consensus estimates of the elasticity of substitution between more/less educated workers by reconciling dispersed existing estimates. It also rationalizes estimates that were hitherto deemed implausible or model-inconsistent. We produce new estimates for developing countries with a novel global panel (finding values at or just above 2) and with Latin American data that facilitates analysis of dynamics (which reduce estimates to 1.7-1.8). We therefore shed new light on a parameter that is crucial for inequality, growth, and other key macroeconomic questions.

August 11, 2023

The Dominant Currency Financing Channel of External Adjustment

Description: We provide evidence of a new channel through which exchange rates affect trade. Using a novel identification strategy that exploits firms’ maturity structure of foreign currency debt around a large depreciation in Colombia, we show that firms experiencing a stronger debt revaluation of dominant currency debt due to a home currency depreciation compress imports relatively more while exports are unaffected. Dominant currency financing does not lead to an import compression for firms that export, hold foreign currency assets, or are active in the foreign exchange derivatives markets, as they are all hedged against a revaluation of their debt. These findings can be rationalized through the prism of a model with costly state verification and foreign currency borrowing. Quantitatively, the dominant currency financing channel explains a significant part of the external adjustment process in addition to the expenditure switching channel. Pricing exports in the dominant currency, instead of the producer’s currency, mutes the effect of dominant currency financing on trade flows.

August 4, 2023

The Crypto Cycle and US Monetary Policy

Description: We examine fluctuations in crypto markets and their relationships to global equity markets and US monetary policy. We identify a single price component—which we label the “crypto factor”—that explains 80% of variation in crypto prices, and show that its increasing correlation with equity markets coincided with the entry of institutional investors into crypto markets. We also document that, as for equities, US Fed tightening reduces the crypto factor through the risk-taking channel—in contrast to claims that crypto assets provide a hedge against market risk. Finally, we show that a stylized heterogeneous-agent model with time-varying aggregate risk aversion can explain our empirical findings, and highlights possible spillovers from crypto to equity markets if the participation of institutional investors ever became large.

August 4, 2023

Revisiting Covid Scarring in Emerging Markets

Description: The Covid-19 pandemic is expected to result in large and persistent losses in economic output, known as scarring. These losses were expected to be more severe in Emerging Markets than in Advanced Economies. This paper examines the impact of Covid on output in Emerging Markets so far and its implications for projections of economic scarring. While Covid has had a material impact on activity, the recovery has been stronger than initially expected. We find that these positive data surprises have over time been treated increasingly as transitory rather than a signal for the state of scarring. Second, we show that the composition of output losses has been qualitatively different from past last shocks. History suggests that the main driver of scarring is weak productivity. Covid losses, however, have so far been more skewed to employment with a smaller than usual impact on productivity. We argue that these findings suggest that scarring, while substantial, may be ultimately less severe than initially feared, at least over the medium term. We provide alternative sets of medium-term projections to indicate potential magnitudes.

August 4, 2023

Integrated Monetary and Financial Policies for Small Open Economies

Description: We develop a tractable small-open-economy framework to characterize the constrained efficient use of the policy rate, foreign exchange (FX) intervention, capital controls, and domestic macroprudential measures. The model features dominant currency pricing, shallow FX markets, and occasionally-binding external and domestic borrowing constraints. We characterize the conditions for the “traditional prescription”—relying on the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility—to be sufficient, even if externalities persist. The conditions are satisfied for world interest rate shocks if FX markets are deep. By contrast, we show that to manage non-fundamental inflow surges and taper tantrums related to local currency debt, capital inflow taxes and FX intervention should be used instead of the policy rate and exchange rate flexibility. In the realistic case where countries face both shallow FX markets and external borrowing constraints, we establish that some kinds of FX mismatch regulations may reduce the external debt limit friction but worsen FX market depth. Finally, we show that capital controls and domestic macroprudential measures cease to be perfect substitutes if there is a risk that the domestic borrowing constraint binds as a result of the transmission of the global financial cycle.

August 4, 2023

Not All Energy Transitions Are Alike: Disentangling the Effects of Demand and Supply-Side Policies on Future Oil Prices

Description: We use structural scenario analysis to show that the climate policy mix—supply-side versus demand-side policies—can lead to different oil price paths with diverging distributional consequences in a netzero emissions scenario. When emission reduction is driven by demand-side policies, prices would decline to around 25 USD per barrel in 2030, benefiting consuming countries. Vice versa, supply-side climate policies aimed at curbing oil production would push up prices to above 130 USD per barrel, benefiting those producing countries that take the political decision to keep on producing. Consequently, it is wrong to assume that oil prices will necessarily decline due to the clean energy transition. As policies are mostly formulated at the country level and hard to predict at the global level, the transition will raise uncertainty about the price outlook.

August 4, 2023

International Tax Spillovers and Tangible Investment, with Implications for the Global Minimum Tax

Description: This paper articulates and, using newly-assembled data, explores how international taxation affects aggregate tangible cross-border investment. Spillovers from statutory tax rates abroad seem: As sizable as effects from the host’s rate; larger than previous consensus values (attributed to a systematic bias from FDI data); and consistent with ‘implicit’ profit shifting through real investment (rather than ‘paper’ profit shifting). Contrary to much policy discussion, the results also imply that: Host countries’ marginal effective tax rates have at best a weak effect on real investment; those elsewhere have none; and, applied to the prospective global minimum tax, inward tangible investment in most sample countries will increase.

Page: 31 of 897 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35