Controlling Fiscal Corruption

August 1, 1997

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Sheetal K. Chand, and Karl Ove Moene. Controlling Fiscal Corruption, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 1997) accessed September 27, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.

Subject: Bonuses, Civil service, Corruption, Crime, Income and capital gains taxes, Labor, Revenue administration, Tax administration core functions, Tax evasion

Keywords: Bonuses, Civil service, Clearance certificate, Constituted revenue authority, Corruption, Fiscal performance, Ghana, Incentives, Revenue improvement, Tax administration core functions, Tax authority, Tax collector, Tax collectors choice, Tax collectors increase, Tax evasion, Tax income, Tax officer, Tax ratio, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

17
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 1997/100
Stock No:

WPIEA1001997
ISBN:

9781451852363
ISSN:

1018-5941

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