Sanctions and Civil Conflict

Author/Editor:

Dmitry Gershenson

Publication Date:

May 1, 2001

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2001/066

Subject:

Consumption Defense spending Expenditure Labor National accounts Personal income Wages

English

Publication Date:

May 1, 2001

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451848793/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0662001

Pages:

37

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