When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil

August 27, 2021

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Moya Chin. When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2021) accessed November 21, 2024

Disclaimer: IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary

Electoral rules determine how voters' preferences are aggregated and translated into political representation, and their design can lead to the election of representatives who represent broader or narrower constituencies. Relying on a regression discontinuity design, I contrast single- and two-round elections in Brazilian municipal races. Two-round elections use two rounds of voting to elect a winner, ensuring that the eventual winner obtains at least 50% of the vote. Theoretically, this can provide incentives for candidates to secure a broader base of support. Consistent with this, I show that in two-round elections, candidates represent a more geographically diverse group of voters, public schools have more resources, and there is less variation in resources across public schools. Effects appear to be driven by strategic responses of candidates, rather than differential entry into races. These results suggest that two-round elections can lead candidates to secure broader bases of support and to distribute public goods more broadly.

Subject: Budget planning and preparation, Education, Income, Infrastructure, National accounts, Population and demographics, Public financial management (PFM)

Keywords: Appendix C. theory appendix, Budget planning and preparation, Candidate maximization problem, Concentration of voter, Education resources, Electoral institutions, Income, Infrastructure, Political favoritism, Political responsiveness, Swingable voter, Two-round election, Voter threshold, Voting theory

Publication Details

Pages:

72
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2021/227
Stock No:

WPIEA2021227
ISBN:

9781513595795
ISSN:

1018-5941

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