Search in the Labor Market under Imperfectly Insurable Income Risk
Electronic Access:
Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file
Summary:
This paper develops a general equilibrium model with unemployment and noncooperative wage determination to analyze the importance of incomplete markets when risk-averse agents are subject to idiosyncratic employment shocks. A version of the model calibrated to the U.S. shows that market incompleteness affects individual behavior and aggregate conditions: it reduces wages and unemployment but increases vacancies. Additionally, the model explains the average level of unemployment insurance observed in the U.S. A key mechanism is the joint influence of imperfect insurance and risk aversion in the wage bargaining. The paper also proposes a novel solution to solve this heterogeneous-agent model.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2009/188
Subject:
English
Publication Date:
September 1, 2009
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451873351/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA2009188
Pages:
37
Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org