IMF Working Papers

Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System

By Sven Jari Stehn, Annalisa Fedelino

June 1, 2009

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Sven Jari Stehn, and Annalisa Fedelino. Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2009) accessed November 21, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

Does reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings.

Subject: Expenditure, Fiscal policy, Fiscal sustainability, Output gap, Revenue administration

Keywords: Budget deficit, Federal government, Net-recipient Länder, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    29

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2009/124

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2009124

  • ISBN:

    9781451872712

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941