Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?

By Helge Berger, Tonny Lybek, Volker Nitsch

December 1, 2006

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Helge Berger, Tonny Lybek, and Volker Nitsch. Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2006) accessed September 18, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Subject: Banking, Central bank autonomy, Central bank organization, Exchange rate arrangements, Floating exchange rates

Keywords: Exchange rate, Implementation board, Monetary policy, MPC member, MPC size, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

46
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2006/281
Stock No:

WPIEA2006281
ISBN:

9781451865417
ISSN:

1018-5941

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