IMF Working Papers

Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean

By Luis Ignacio Jácome, Francisco F. Vazquez

April 1, 2005

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Luis Ignacio Jácome, and Francisco F. Vazquez Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2005) accessed November 21, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This paper reviews central bank legislation in 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1990s. Using panel regressions, we find a negative relationship between legal central bank independence (CBI) and inflation. This result holds for three alternative measures of CBI and after controlling for international inflation, banking crises, and exchange regimes. The result is also robust to the inclusion of a broader indicator of structural reforms that usually go along with changes in central bank legislation, illustrating the complementary nature of various aspects of economic reform. The paper fails, however, to find a causal relationship running from CBI to inflation.

Subject: Banking, Central bank autonomy, Inflation, Legal support in revenue administration, Structural reforms

Keywords: Inflation in the sampled country, Inflation performance, Least squares, Reform country, Structural reform, World inflation, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    41

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2005/075

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA2005075

  • ISBN:

    9781451860948

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941