What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?

Author/Editor:

Alex Mourmouras ; Anna Ivanova ; George C. Anayiotos ; Wolfgang Mayer

Publication Date:

January 1, 2003

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

This paper assesses the implementation of IMF-supported programs using measures of program interruptions, compliance with conditionality, and the share of committed funds disbursed. The econometric model allows an evaluation of the importance for program implementation of political conditions in borrowing countries, IMF effort, conditionality, as well as initial and external conditions. The paper concludes that program implementation depends primarily on borrowing countries' domestic political economy. Strong special interests, political instability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion, and ethno-linguistic divisions weaken program implementation. IMF effort, the extent and structure of conditionality, and initial and external conditions do not materially influence program prospects.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2003/008

Subject:

English

Publication Date:

January 1, 2003

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451842531/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA0082003

Pages:

47

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