The Rule of Law and the Pattern of Environment Protection
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Summary:
We develop and test a theory of the rule of law and environmental policy formation. In our model an increase in the degree of rule of law has two opposing partial effects on environmental policy: first, a greater share of policy decisions are implemented according to law; second, industry bribery efforts increase because more is at stake. Moreover, we find that an increase in corruptibility of policymakers lowers the stringency of environmental policy. The empirical findings suggest that a greater degree of rule of law raises environmental policy stringency, but the effect is lower where corruptibility is high.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2002/049
Subject:
Corruption Environment Environmental policy Environmental taxes Labor
English
Publication Date:
March 1, 2002
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451846850/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA0492002
Pages:
27
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