Seductions of an Underdevelopment Trap: Systemic Impediments to Agricultural Reform in Russia

Author/Editor:

Dmitry Gershenson ; Maria Amelina

Publication Date:

July 1, 2002

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

Despite ambitious agricultural reforms initiated by the federal government, inefficient and unprofitable producers predominate in post-Soviet Russia. However, in some regions a more robust restructuring has taken place. Observing two Russian regions-one with substantially restructured agricultural production, and one in which Soviet-style coordination predominates-we develop a model of the interactions between political and economic incentives that lead to these divergent outcomes. The model identifies region- and sector-specific characteristics that encourage some regional governments to maintain Soviet-style redistribution structures and make producers forsake more efficient outcomes as more costly, while encouraging other regions to pursue reform.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2002/126

Subject:

Agricultural policy Agricultural production Agricultural sector Economic sectors Expenditure Government subsidies National accounts Personal income Production

English

Publication Date:

July 1, 2002

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451854916/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA1262002

Pages:

35

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