Prudential Responses to De Facto Dollarization

April 1, 2004

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Alain Ize, and Andrew Powell. Prudential Responses to De Facto Dollarization, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2004) accessed November 21, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

We develop a theoretical framework that encompasses four distinct motives for dollarization and discuss appropriate policy responses to help contain dollarization and its attendant risks. "Moral hazard" dollarization provides a clear case for prudential policy activism. However, prudential reform will have only a limited impact on dollarization when the main culprits are fear of floating and lack of monetary credibility. In such cases, a concerted and comprehensive reform agenda, including market-oriented and institutional reforms, would be needed to shift the balance of risks in favor of the domestic currency. While quantitative limits on dollarization could also be used to speed up de-dollarization, risks could be high.

Subject: Banking, Credit risk, Currencies, Dollarization, Real exchange rates

Keywords: Exchange rate, Monetary policy, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

41
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2004/066
Stock No:

WPIEA0662004
ISBN:

9781451848823
ISSN:

1018-5941

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