IMF Working Papers

Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis Two Years of Living Dangerously 1997–99

By Arto Kovanen, Olivier M Frecaut, Barbara E Baldwin, Charles Enoch

May 1, 2001

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Arto Kovanen, Olivier M Frecaut, Barbara E Baldwin, and Charles Enoch. Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis Two Years of Living Dangerously 1997–99, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2001) accessed November 21, 2024
Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges. This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges. This study looks at the first two years of the banking crisis that erupted in Indonesia in late 1997. It finds that the banking sector was weak at the outset, and that governance problems intensified the crisis and seriously delayed its resolution. Although a strategy was put in place over the initial months, protracted delays in implementation led to an explosion in the costs of resolution. By end-1999, the critical elements to reconstruct the banking system were in place, and the political transition seemed completed; but, in a continuing unsettled environment, the new authorities still faced daunting challenges.

Subject: Asset and liability management, Bank resolution, Banking, Banking crises, Commercial banks, Financial crises, Financial institutions, Foreign banks, Liquidity

Keywords: Bank closure, Bank management, Bank Mandiri, Bank resolution, Bank restructuring, Banking crises, Banking crisis, Banking sector, Banking supervision, Banking system, Blanket guarantee, BTO bank, Central Asia, Central bank, Commercial banks, Economic crisis, Financial condition, Foreign banks, Interest rate, Joint-venture bank, Lender of last resort, Liquidity, Liquidity situation, Money market, Problem bank, Restructuring process, Taken-over bank, WP

Publication Details

  • Pages:

    139

  • Volume:

    ---

  • DOI:

    ---

  • Issue:

    ---

  • Series:

    Working Paper No. 2001/052

  • Stock No:

    WPIEA0522001

  • ISBN:

    9781451847253

  • ISSN:

    1018-5941