Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union

Author/Editor:

Hershel I. Grossman ; Dmitry Gershenson

Publication Date:

December 1, 2000

Electronic Access:

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Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary:

The Soviet ruling elite, the nomenklatura, used both cooption and political repression to encourage loyalty to the communist regime. Loyalty was critical both in defusing internal opposition to the rule of the nomenklatura and in either deterring or defeating foreign enemies of the Soviet Union. We assume that the nomenklatura determined the extent of cooption and the intensity of political repression by equating their perceived marginal benefits and marginal costs. We use this assumption to construct an account of the historical evolution of policies of cooption and political repression in the Soviet Union.

Series:

Working Paper No. 2000/201

Subject:

Administration in revenue administration Income distribution National accounts Population and demographics Revenue administration

English

Publication Date:

December 1, 2000

ISBN/ISSN:

9781451874341/1018-5941

Stock No:

WPIEA2012000

Pages:

22

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