The Case for Depositor Preference

By Marc C Dobler, Ender Emre, Alessandro Gullo, Deeksha Kale

December 22, 2020

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Format: Chicago

Marc C Dobler, Ender Emre, Alessandro Gullo, and Deeksha Kale. The Case for Depositor Preference, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2020) accessed November 21, 2024

Disclaimer: This Technical Guidance Note should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Note are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.

Summary

This technical note and manual (TNM) addresses the following issues: advantages and disadvantages of different types of depositor preference, international best practice and experience in adopting depositor preference, and introducing depositor preference in jurisdictions with or without deposit insurance.

Subject: Bank deposits, Bank resolution, Bank resolution framework, Deposit insurance, Financial crises, Financial sector policy and analysis, Financial sector stability, Financial services

Keywords: Bank, Bank deposits, Bank resolution, Bank resolution framework, Creditor Hierarchy, Deposit Insurance, Deposit insurance limit, Deposit liability, Deposit preference, Depositor confidence, Depositor contagion, Depositor preference, Depositor reimbursement, Financial sector stability, Forms of depositor preference, Global, Insured depositor, Preference arrangement, Preference regime, Tiered depositor preference, TNM

Publication Details

Pages:

28
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Technical Notes and Manuals No. 2020/002
Stock No:

TNMEA2020002
ISBN:

9781513557397
ISSN:

2075-8669

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