The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve
May 27, 2011
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Disclaimer: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. Staff Discussion Notes are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
Summary
Subject: Bank resolution framework, Banking, Financial crises, Financial institutions, Financial sector policy and analysis, Moral hazard, Systemic risk, Systemically important financial institutions
Keywords: Bail-in, Bank, Bank capital, Bank funding, Bank resolution framework, Bank risk-management system, Basel, Basel capital requirement, Capital base, Capital surcharge, Contingent capital, Equity capital, Externalities SIFIs, Financial crises, Financial regulation, Financial stability, Financial stability forum, FSB recommendation, Global, Market, Market discipline, Moral hazard, Nonbank SIFIs, Nonviable SIFIs, Resolution, SDN, SIFIs, Supervision, Systemic risk, Systemically important financial institutions, Too big to fail, Too important to fail
Publication Details
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Pages:
32
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Volume:
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DOI:
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Issue:
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Series:
Staff Discussion Notes No. 2011/012
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Stock No:
SDNEA2011012
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ISBN:
9781463926588
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ISSN:
2617-6750
