Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund
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Summary:
This paper argues that many developing countries may find it difficult to buttress disinflation programs purely through the adoption of traditional credibility-enhancing devices (such as monetary anchors and central bank independence), owing to “technical problems” (for example, high instability of money demand, increased capital mobility) and an insufficient endowment of credibility in the political institutions. In these cases, borrowing credibility from an outside agency like the International Monetary Fund may be the most effective solution. The paper discusses the different options that would allow the Fund to support programs aimed not at external adjustment—the Fund’s traditional role—but at disinflation.
Series:
Policy Discussion Paper No. 1998/012
Subject:
Balance of payments Balance of payments need Disinflation Inflation Inflation targeting Monetary policy Price stabilization Prices
English
Publication Date:
September 1, 1998
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451969337/1564-5193
Stock No:
PPIEA0121998
Pages:
26
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