


Second pillars: they should not be broken promises



Gregorio Impavido
Vienna, March 18th 2013

Outline




- Two key challenges with mandatory decentralized DC pensions (second pillars)
- Select institutional design failure of the accumulation phase
- Policy priorities for the post-crisis period

Consumption smoothing, capital formation and macro risk sharing




Private pension funds savings
(Percent of GDP, 2011)




Sources: Various supervisory authorities, Impavido *et al.* (2010), OECD, World Bank, IMF WEO and staff calculations.

1st challenge: “mandatory” = market power




- Pension (quasi) markets have high barriers to entry with large sunk costs and economies of scale
- The mandatory element generates a highly inelastic demand and heuristic consumer behavior
- Yielding excessive market power, no within market competition and welfare loss to participants

The consequences of market power





Market power and social welfare




Sources: SBS and staff calculations.

Marketing expenses have low educational value




Source: page 46 of Impavido et al. *New Policies for Mandatory Defined Contribution Pensions : Industrial Organization Models and Investment Products*. (The World Bank, DC). <http://go.worldbank.org/TW6TW4NMU0>

Current tools have varied impact on market power




- “Soft” interventions
 - Uniform rate regulation, bundling, simpler fee structures, centralization of high sunk cost functions
- “Hard” interventions
 - Caps on fees, restrictions/bans on switches or marketing expenses, monopsony agreements
- Procurement
 - Public procurement, hybrid I/O models, assignation rules (flow, stock, undecided).

2nd challenge: “DC and funded” = investment risk




Investment rules favor cash and government bonds

(Portfolio share, percent 2011)




Notes: Values are underestimated due to difficulties in identifying government debt in mutual funds and foreign investments.
Sources: World Bank from various supervisory authorities.

Managers have a short-term horizon




Real gross return-wage growth differential

(Percentage points, 2002-11)




Sources: Various supervisory authorities, Haver, IMF WEO, World Bank, and staff calculations.


Contributors have a long-term horizon



- Expected replacement rate benchmarks (and human capital considerations) would yield strategic asset allocations aligned with the preferences of consumers




Conclusions: market power



- Maintain a decentralized I/O
 - Regulate like utilities
 - Eliminate incentives for marketing
 - More procurement: competition for the market

- Move to a centralized I/O
 - Strong governance
 - Procure passive investment in few global indices

Conclusions: investment risk



- Modify investment rules and products to:
 - Promote international diversification
 - Introduce deferred real annuities
 - Introduce long duration real fixed income instruments
 - Minimize investment options
- Require performance disclosure on the basis of long term benchmarks



Thank you!