I. |
Introduction |
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II. |
Quotas and Voting Power in the IMF: A System That Calls
for Greater Equity |
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Role of Quotas and the Debate on the Quota Formula |
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Further Work Toward Correcting Distortions and Enhancing
Equity in Voting Power |
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III. |
Checks and Balances in the Governance of the IMF |
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The Executive Board |
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The Managing Director |
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The Staff |
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III. |
Consensus Decision Making in a Cooperative Institution |
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Size and Composition of the Board: A Global Roundtable |
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General Approach to Consensus Building in the Board |
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Consensus Building and Decision Making in Practice |
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Protecting the Consensus Model and Safeguarding the
Rights of Minority Shareholders in the IMF |
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V. |
Enhancing Political Oversight of the International
Monetary System |
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The Interim Committee: A Mixed Leadership Record |
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The International Monetary and Financial Committee:
Toward More Effective Systemic Oversight? |
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The Intergovernmental Group of 24: Cohesion
Weakened by Diverging Interests of Members |
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The Group of Five and the Group of Seven:
Leading or Overbearing? |
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Competing Interests: The United States, Western Europe,
and Japan and the Asian Region |
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VI. |
IMF Governance in a Crisis: Mexico, 1994–95 |
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VII. |
Implications for IMF Governance of the Financial
Climate of the 1990s |
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Distinctive Features of the Crises, 1997–99 |
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Strengthening the Financial Architecture |
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Collaboration Between Civil Society and the IMF |
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The Pursuit of IMF Transparency |
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The Task of Refocusing the IMF |
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VIII. |
An Appraisal of IMF Governance |
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Appendix I. Voting Majorities in the
IMF |
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Appendix II. IMF Executive Directors
and Voting Power |
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Bibliography |