

#### Household Indebtedness and Financial Fragility

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#### Household Indebtedness and Financial Fragility

by Tullio Jappelli, Marco Pagano, and Marco di Maggio

Discussion by Enrica Detragiache Annual Research Conference 2008



- Most research on financial sector and macro does not distinguish between household credit and enterprise credit
- Do we need to draw this distinction?
- Why?



- Financial development and growth:
  - Not clear why more credit should foster long-run growth if it goes to finance consumption. Mortgage lending may foster growth in the real estate sector, maybe...
  - In addition, more HH credit may lower aggregate savings, which may *reduce growth* if international capital markets are segmented
  - If international capital markets are segmented, more HH credit may crowd out enterprise credit. This may *reduce growth*



- Determinants of financial development:
  - Macroeconomic conditions
  - Basic institutions
  - Contractual institutions
  - Financial sector policies
- Do these factors play different roles in the development of HH credit markets than entreprise credit markets?



Financial fragility:

- Is credit to HHs a particular source of stability or instability?
- Ex. Credit booms can be associated with sharp downturns and bursting bubbles. Are booms involving lending to HHs more likely to end in tears?



This paper

- –Part I: Determinants of HH credit
- Part II: Determinants of arrears on HH credit in EU
- –Part III: Determinants of HH insolvencies in UK, US, Germany



- Part I: Determinants of HH credit
- Cross-section of 45 countries—2005
- Main findings:
  - HH credit is larger in countries with
    - » High GDP per capita
    - » Efficient judiciary
    - » Well-developed credit registries/bureaus



- Suggestions:
  - Discuss magnitudes:
    - » Example: if Italy's judicial efficiency was at the sample mean, HH credit-to-GDP would increase by about 10 percentage points. This is large!
  - Compare results with literature on private credit: are the determinants different?
  - Try to get data on creditor rights in personal bankruptcy (LLSV data are on *corporate* bankruptcy)
  - Control for inflation
  - Control for property rights institutions
  - Control for foreign bank presence
  - Forget the Gini coefficient



- Part II: Determinants of arrears on HH credit in EU countries
  - –Data are from HH survey. Fraction of HHs is arrears relative to HHs in survey:
    - »Could the increase of the % in arrears simply reflect an increase in the number of HHs with outstanding debt?
    - »Can this be corrected by using survey information?

- Determinants of arrears on HH credit in EU countries
  - -Findings (after controlling for country fixed effects):
    - »More HHs are in arrears when unemployment is high and when the aggregate stock of HH debt is high



- Comments:
  - Hard to draw policy conclusions, as in all papers on loosening lending standards:
    - Do more arrears mean that there should have been less lending in the first place?
    - Any expansion in the market is likely to entail lending to more "marginal" customers. Where should the line be drawn?
    - To get at financial fragility we may have to look at the effects on the lenders....

- Part III: Determinants of HH insolvencies in UK, US, Germany
  - Findings:
  - -A larger stock of HH debt is associated with more insolvencies
  - -Reforms that make it less costly for borrowers to discharge debt in bankruptcy lead to more insolvencies



- Comment: To evaluate the effects of bankruptcy reforms:
  - a) need to allow for a sufficient lag so that lending policies can adjust
  - b) need to consider the effect on lending volume as well as insolvency rates: if pro-debtor reforms are followed by an increase in lending, hard to argue they are bad....

