Corruption, Competition, and Contracts: A Model of Vote Buying
Electronic Access:
Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file
Summary:
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome. We find that vote buying is cheaper when what can be contracted upon coincides with what voters care about. Vote buying becomes extremely costly, or even impossible, when there is no such coincidence. Finally, vote buying is extremely cheap, or even free, when contracts can be contingent upon both individual votes and vote shares.
Series:
Working Paper No. 2006/011
Subject:
Competition Corruption Crime Financial markets Tax incentives
English
Publication Date:
January 1, 2006
ISBN/ISSN:
9781451862713/1018-5941
Stock No:
WPIEA2006011
Pages:
23
Please address any questions about this title to publications@imf.org