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The following symbols have been used throughout this volume:

- . . . to indicate that data are not available;
  - to indicate that the figure is zero or less than half the final digit shown, or that the item does not exist;
  - between years or months (for example, 1997–99 or January–June) to indicate the years or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months;
  - / between years (for example, 1998/99) to indicate a fiscal or financial year.
- “Billion” means a thousand million; “trillion” means a thousand billion.
- “Basis points” refer to hundredths of 1 percentage point (for example, 25 basis points are equivalent to 1/4 of 1 percentage point).
- “n.a.” means not applicable.

Minor discrepancies between constituent figures and totals are due to rounding. As used in this volume the term “country” does not in all cases refer to a territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and practice. As used here, the term also covers some territorial entities that are not states but for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.