Can FinTech Reduce Disparities in Access to Finance? Evidence from the Paycheck Protection Program

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September 2021

COVID-19 Crisis and the PPP

- 1/3 of small businesses shut down (State of Small Business Report)
- Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) created to support small businesses
 - First two phases: 5.1 million loans (\$525 billion), passed through 5,460 financial institutions;
 - Forgiveable loans, no credit risk; supported 51 million jobs!
- SBA made last-minute decision to include FinTechs as eligible lenders
 - Traditional banks known to be sometimes inefficient and inequitable in financial services supply (Philippon, 2015); PPP is no exception (Granja et al, 2020)
 - FinTech's role increasing in credit markets, but remains controversial

Do FinTechs Act Differently Than Banks?

Our key questions:

- Do FinTechs lend more in areas where there is more economic need?
- Do FinTechs serve under-banked small businesses?
 - Is there evidence of substitution between traditional banks and FinTechs?

Why?

- Important implications for policy: Should FinTech lenders participate in other government loan programs?
- Context of PPP: Not a standard credit provision as the lenders do not take credit risk, but isolates a component of inclusion

How We Answer These Questions

- FinTechs lend more where it is needed.
 - FinTechs lend more where the crisis is more severe, as measured by unemployment claims and COVID cases.
- FinTechs serve under-banked borrowers.
 - FinTech share of lending is higher in ZIP codes with less access to finance (within county): with fewer bank branches, lower incomes, and larger share of the minority population.
 - Study differences in financial access by ZIP code. Measure FinTech *share* of lending by region to control for overall PPP demand.
 - FinTech share of lending is also higher for borrowers with poor bank ties.
- FinTechs substitute for banks, but not much.
 - A Bartik-type instrument for bank lending shows some substitution.

Literature Summary

- Paycheck Protection Program (PPP):
 - Autor et al. (2020), Bartik et al. (2020), Cororaton and Rosen (2020), Granja et al. (2020), Faulkender et al. (2020), Li and Strahan (2020), Balyuk et al. (2021), Lynch (2021), Chernenko and Sharfstein (2021), ...
- Financial Inclusion for small businesses
 - Beglet et al. (2020), Blanchflower et al. (2003), Chatterji and Seamans (2012), ...
- Role of FinTech/Nonbanks in Credit Provision:
 - Buchak et al. (2018), Di Maggio and Yao (2018), Chernenko et al. (2019), Vallee and Zeng (2019), Gopal and Schnabl (2020), ...
- Growth in FinTechs: Mills (2018), Stulz (2019); Why?
 - Insufficient access to bank credit: Butler et al. (2016), Cole et al. (2019);
 - Convenience and speed of service: Buchak et al. (2018), Fuster et al. (2019);
 - Loan terms: Carlin et al. (2020); Higher rates on deposits by Online Banks: Abrams (2019); Limitations: Balyuk et al. (2020), ...

Main Data: SBA Release of PPP Loans

- Loan-level Information:
 - ZIP Code, Date, Borrower Industry (6-digit NAICS), Lender names,...
- Hand-classify lenders as FinTechs.

FinTech Lenders

- Unregulated Nonbanks (6%)
 - Non-depository financial institutions (e.g., Kabbage with more than 150,000 direct loans)
- Regulated Online Banks (9%)
 - Deposit-taking banks but with one administrative branch only; rely on FinTech for both their lending and deposit taking.
 - E.g., Cross River Bank and Celtic Bank partnered heavily with FinTech firms and extended almost 350,000 PPP loans in total.
- Various alternative/robustness checks to classifications

15% of PPP loans are by FinTechs!

	Mean	Mean Std. Dev Media		Count	
FinTech Indicator	.15	.36	0	5,114,448	
Non-bank Indicator	.063	.24	0	$5,\!114,\!448$	
Online Bk Indicator	.089	.28	0	$5,\!114,\!448$	
Single Person	.33	.47	0	$5,\!114,\!448$	
Jobs (All)	12	33	4	$5,\!114,\!379$	
Jobs (Traditional)	13	35	4	$4,\!339,\!037$	
Jobs (FinTech)	5	16	1	$775,\!342$	
Amount (All)	$102,\!697$	$353,\!776$	$23,\!125$	$5,\!114,\!379$	
Amount (Traditional)	$113,\!803$	$376{,}543$	$27,\!331$	$4,\!339,\!037$	
Amount (FinTech)	$40,\!545$	$166,\!000$	$15,\!835$	775,342	

FinTechs More Responsive in Phase 1; More Numerous in Phase 2:

Measured as association between crisis severity and total lending

	(1) Log PPP FinTech	(2) Log PPP Trad. Bk	(3) Log PPP FinTech	(4) Log PPP Trad. Bk
	Phase 1	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 2
Avg Case Rate	$\begin{array}{c} 0.016 \\ (0.26) \end{array}$	-4.06^{***} (0.23)	$\begin{array}{c} 4.72^{***} \\ (0.19) \end{array}$	0.48^{***} (0.080)
Unemp. Chg	0.057^{***} (0.0072)	-0.070*** (0.0056)	0.13^{***} (0.0084)	0.028^{***} (0.0023)
Log Establishments	1.04^{***} (0.015)	$\frac{0.89^{***}}{(0.0066)}$	1.08^{***} (0.0087)	0.96^{***} (0.0033)
Observations \mathbb{R}^2	$6269 \\ 0.558$	$\begin{array}{c} 14668 \\ 0.747 \end{array}$	10658 0.723	$15539 \\ 0.917$

Higher FinTech Share in ZIPs With Fewer Branches

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	FinTech PPP Fraction	FinTech PPP Fraction (Alt Defn)	FinTech PPP Fraction	FinTech PPP Fraction (Alt Defn)
Log Branches	-0.017^{***} (0.00094)	-0.016*** (0.00090)	-0.020*** (0.0012)	-0.019*** (0.0011)
Log Med. Inc			-0.017^{***} (0.0032)	-0.018*** (0.0031)
Frac Commute 45+m			$\frac{0.14^{***}}{(0.013)}$	0.14^{***} (0.012)
Frac White			-0.17^{***} (0.0082)	-0.15^{***} (0.0079)
Log Population			0.026^{***} (0.0011)	0.026*** (0.0010)
Establishments Per Cap.			-0.00022 (0.0036)	-0.00046 (0.0033)
Frac Estabs ${<}10~{\rm Emp}$			0.17^{***} (0.010)	0.16^{***} (0.0098)
Frac Estabs $<500 \text{ Emp}$			-0.16^{***} (0.0099)	-0.16*** (0.0093)
Observations	35543	35543	28577	28577
R^2	0.695	0.663	0.806	0.786
County FEs	Х	Х	Х	Х

Economically-significant results:

Halving the number of bank branches in a ZIP code is associated with an increase in the FinTech share of about 13.3% of the median.

Robust to using loan-level regressions with NAICS FEs (see the Appendix Table A3).

FinTech Lending and Banking Relationships

	(1) FinTech PPP Loan	(2) FinTech PPP Loan	(3) FinTech PPP Loan	(4) FinTech PPP Loan	(5) FinTech PPP Loan
Log(PPP/SBA 7a)	$\begin{array}{c} 0.030^{***} \\ (0.011) \end{array}$				
Industry Emp. Growth		-0.33^{***} (0.084)			
One-Pers. Firm			$\begin{array}{c} 0.11^{***} \\ (0.0076) \end{array}$		
Log Jobs Supported				-0.048^{***} (0.0025)	
Log Approved Amt					-0.036^{***} (0.0018)
Observations R^2 Zip FEs	4768973 0.124 X	3954530 0.133 X	4979333 0.201 X	4979117 0.205 X	4979316 0.199 X
NAICS2 FEs NAICS6 FEs	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х

Table 6: FinTech Lending and Firm Relationships

FinTech...

- ... provided more PPP loans to areas with a worse economic shock while traditional banks failed to do in Phase 1.
- ... is disproportionately used in ZIP codes with fewer bank branches, lower incomes and a larger minority share of the population.
- ... provided more loans to borrowers with weak financial system access.

Is There Bank-FinTech Substitution?

- FinTechs serve an entirely new market or substitute for traditional banks?
- Strategy: Predict which regions get little bank lending
 - Some banks more likely to make PPP loans than others (better IT systems, less regulated, etc)

How We Predict Bank Lending by ZIP (akin to a shift-share ("Bartik") design)

1. For each bank, calculate PPP loans per branch nationally: This is the measure of a **bank's responsiveness** to the PPP.

2. In each ZIP, calculate the average responsiveness of banks located there, assuming local branches act like their parent company -i.e., each branch's *predicted* loans equal its parent's loans-per-branch.

Get *predicted traditional bank lending* in the ZIP code, an instrument for the supply of PPP loans by ZIP code, independent of COVID-19 related demand

Substitution happens, but...

- It is rather small economically: The number of FinTech loans that are made as a result of this substitution is **about 27%** of the decrease in traditional bank lending.
 - Evidence that substitution happens from Phase 1 to Phase 2
- Evidence that FinTech and traditional banking markets are segmented...


Conclusion: FinTechs Serve Underserved Markets

- An unprecedented demand shock to financial services \rightarrow PPP
 - Find that Traditional Banks allocate poorly, FinTechs do better.
- FinTechs serve:
 - Areas with fewer branches, more minority and lower income borrowers
 - Businesses with weaker ties to the banking system

In banking markets, FinTechs substitute for banks much less than one-forone.

Additional Tables

Predicted Bank Lending and Overall Lending



Relationships, Technology Use and FinTech Lending

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	FinTech	FinTech	FinTech	FinTech
	PPP Fraction	PPP Fraction	PPP Fraction	PPP Fraction
			110001011	
FinTech 7(a) Share	0.010	0.012^{**}		
	(0.0067)	(0.0050)		
Fraction w Desktop			-0.22^{***}	0.080^{***}
			(0.013)	(0.018)
Log Med. Inc		-0.018***		-0.033***
		(0.0036)		(0.0040)
Frac Commute 45+m		0.15^{***}		0.15^{***}
		(0.015)		(0.013)
Frac White		-0.17***		-0.18***
		(0.0090)		(0.0087)
Log Branches		-0.020***		-0.020***
Log Diancines		(0.0013)		(0.0012)
L Dl. (*		0.028***		0.026***
Log Population		(0.028) (0.0014)		(0.026) (0.0011)
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Establishments Per Cap.		0.0011		-0.0015
		(0.0037)		(0.0040)
Frac Estabs < 10 Emp		0.19^{***}		0.17^{***}
		(0.013)		(0.010)
Frac Estabs $<500 \text{ Emp}$		-0.17^{***}		-0.16***
		(0.027)		(0.010)
Observations	15361	14938	30976	28573
R^2	0.679	0.811	0.707	0.807
County FEs	Х	Х	Х	Х

Table 7: Local Technology Use and PPP Lending

Alternative Government Programs

	(1) Frac Applying for PPP	Applying FinTech	(3) FinTech PPP Frac	(4) FinTech PPP Frac	(5) FinTech PPP Frac	(6) FinTech PPP Frac	(7) FinTech PPP Frac
Success During COVID	-0.18***	-0.096**					
	(0.034)	(0.040)					
Pct Denied PPP			0.16^{***} (0.044)				
EIDL				$0.085 \\ (0.14)$			
SBA Forgiveness					$0.11 \\ (0.20)$		
Federal Assistance						-0.29 (0.22)	
State/Local Assistance							0.15
							(0.32)
Observations	863	863	860	863	863	863	863
R^2	0.361	0.833	0.851	0.847	0.847	0.847	0.847
Week FEs	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
Shock Ctrls			Х	Х	Х	Х	Х

Table 8: Demand for Assistance Programs and FinTech PPP Fraction