The Role of FinTech in Small Business Lending

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
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Introduction

The Emergence of FinTech in Small Business Lending

- ▶ Emergence of FinTech financing
 - ▶ Large US market: 32% of SMEs applied for FinTech financing in '19



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 - Small EU markets but fostered by regulators
 - Entry of FinTechs in French corporate loan market allowed by regulators in 2014
 - Boosted by Covid-19 crisis



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
- Does the arrival of FinTech improve SMEs' access to financing?
 - Are FinTech lenders merely substituting banks?
 - Or do they improve firms access to bank credit?

The Role of FinTech: this paper

- Novel FinTech data linked to credit registry
 - FinTech loans originated by 12 French lenders 2016-20 (80% market share)
 - Bank loans at monthly frequency
 - lending relationships, loan balances, loan type, maturity, interest rate
 - Firm-level information
 - · credit score, accounting information
 - bankruptcy, trade credit defaults

The Role of FinTech: this paper

- Comparing bank borrowers and FinTech borrowers:
 - ▶ Who? ☞ FinTech borrowers less liquidity, less tangible assets, more innovation
 - What? SF FinTech borrowers experience better subsequent access to bank credit
 - Why?



The Role of FinTech: this paper

- Comparing bank borrowers and FinTech borrowers:
 - Who? FinTech borrowers less liquidity, less tangible assets, more innovation
 - What?

 FinTech borrowers experience better subsequent access to bank credit
 - Whv?

- less information asymmetry X
- ▶ low collateral requirement ✓✓✓
- ► speed ✓

Introduction

Who borrow from FinTechs?

FinTech vs banks - Loans


- FinTech loan terms: Average size 100k, cost inclusive of fees 9%, maturity 3 years
- FinTech vs. banks loans: similar size, 5.5-p.p costlier, 2-year shorter maturity

	Loan size (Mns')	Loan size (Mns')	Maturity (yrs)	Maturity (yrs)	Rate (%)	Rate (%)	Rate (%)	Rate $(\%)$ - collateralized
FinTech	-0.15**	-0.11	-2.01***	-1.80***	5.42***	5.48***	5.43***	5.43***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Maturity						0.03***	0.02***	0.02***
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Loan size						-0.01***	-0.01**	-0.01***
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.30***	0.29***	5.06***	5.04***	1.95***	1.79***	1.85***	2.01***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
N	13,585	13,584	13,585	13,584	13,585	13,585	13,584	9,577
R-sq	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.27	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.84

FinTech vs banks - Credit ratings

Introduction

- ▶ Most FinTechs borrowers are unrated
- More likely to be "speculative-grade" than bank borrowers



Wrap-up

FinTech vs banks - Borrower characteristics

- FinTech borrowers vs. bank borrowers:
 - size, employment, investment (\sim)
 - → age (-), sales (-), tangible assets (-)
 - leverage (+), R&D output and expenditures (+)
- FinTech borrowers more likely to be under-served by banks

Introduction


How do FinTech loans impact firms?

Match FinTech and bank borrowers

- Credit dynamics driven by both demand and supply
 - use propensity score matching to control for credit demand
- For each FinTech borrower, select bank borrowers that
 - borrow from a new bank the same year (Degryse, Ioannidou and von Schedvin, 2016)
 - borrow similar amount as the FinTech borrower
 - similar credit dynamics in month -3 and -1 (total, long-term, short-term loans)
 - same industry, similar firm size, credit rating, tangible assets

FinTech borrowers experience an increase in bank credit

Total bank loan increases more for FinTech borrowers



Note: new loans at t = 0 are excluded in the graphs

Why do bank loans increase?

Introduction

FinTech loans \Rightarrow bank loans \uparrow

▶ Information channel:

Superior screening technology of FinTechs \longrightarrow successful FinTech loan grant signals good firm quality → bank loans ↑

Collateral channel:


FinTech loans are unsecured \longrightarrow allow borrowers to acquire new assets (i.e., invest) without pledging collateral \longrightarrow pledgeable assets $\uparrow \longrightarrow$ bank loans \uparrow

Speed channel:

Firms apply FinTech loans first to meet urgent liquidity needs, then use cheaper but slower bank loans to reimburse FinTech loans → bank loans ↑


Evidence against the information channel

- No evidence on the following predictions:
 - New lenders are more sensitive to the good signal in a successful FinTech loan X
 - Unrated firms benefit more from the good signal X




Evidence in favor of the collateral channel

- Larger increase in bank loans for FinTech borrowers when
 - FinTech loans are used for investments
 - matched bank borrowers are borrowing against collateral
 - the loan product typically requires more collateral (i.e., long-term loans vs. leases)




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Matched firms borrow against collateral





Matched firms borrow without collateral

Evidence in favor of the collateral channel

Introduction

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 - the loan product typically requires more collateral (i.e., long-term loans vs. leases)





Long-term loans

Leases

Introduction

Additional evidence in favor of the collateral channel

▶ **Information**: lower ex-post default rate for FinTech borrowers ×

► Collateral: higher default rates if banks' collateral requirements were justified ✓

	(1) Default on suppliers	(2) Bankruptcy procedure	(3) Liquidation
$FinTech \times Post$	0.014	0.003**	0.004*
	(0.010)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Post	0.007	0.001	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y
Industry-Year FE	Y	Y	Y
N	53,680	53,680	53,680
R-sq	0.24	0.06	0.08


Evidence on the speed channel

- Firms are more likely to use FinTech credit when facing liquidity needs
 - customer defaults on trade bills as shocks to liqudity needs

	All default motives			Customer illiquidity	Others	
$\mbox{FinTech} \times \mbox{Customer default}_q$	$0.02** \\ (0.01)$			$0.02** \\ (0.01)$	0.01 (0.01)	
Customer default $_q$	0.00 (0.00)			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	
$\mbox{FinTech} \times \mbox{Customer default}_{q-1}$	(0.00)	$0.02** \\ (0.01)$		(0.00)	(0.00)	
Customer default $_{q-1}$		-0.00 (0.00)				
FinTech × Customer default _{Before $q-2$}		(0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)			
Customer default _{Before $q-2$}			0.00 (0.00)			
N	184,690	176,295	151,110	184,690	184,690	
R-sq	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	

The speed channel alone cannot explain our results

- Very few firms repay their FinTech loans early
- Inconsistent with firms borrowing later from banks to repay expensive FinTech loans



Timing of repayment (as % of loan maturity)

The Role of FinTech lending?

- FinTech credit improves firms access to bank credit by
 - ▶ relaxing collateral constraints ✓ ✓ ✓
 - reducing information asymmetry X
- ► Faster speed help firms cope with urgent liquidity needs ✓
- Future of FinTech depends on whether high default rates are sustainable