#### Discussion of:

"Relationship Networks in Banking Around a Sovereign Default and Currency Crisis"

by: D'Erasmo, Moscoso, Olivero and Sangiacomo

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
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#### Overview

- 1 Identifying Credit Supply Shocks
  - Brief literature review
  - Where does this paper fit in?
- 2 Main Results of the Paper
  - Results on credit
  - Real effects on exports
- 3 Discussion and Policy Implications
  - The role of interest rates
  - The nature of switching frictions
  - Some policy implications


Bank lending channel to real activity

Banks finance firms' productive investment projects




Bank lending channel to real activity

 In a business cycle downturn we cannot distinguish the credit channel from the recession itself




Bank lending channel to real activity

Bank-specific shocks help with identification



Bank switching frictions

• Bank switching frictions required fo identification strategy to work



Brief literature review

Recent empirical studies using micro data matching individual banks and firms (*credit registry*)

- Klein, Peek, Rosengren (2002)
  - Experiment: Banking crisis in Japan in the 90s, affecting differently banks (different exposures to real state)
  - Financial outcome: Lending
  - Real outcome: FDI of Japanese firms
- Kwhaja, Mian (2008)
  - Experiment: Foreign exchange intervention in Pakistan 1998, affecting liquidity of banks differently
  - Outcome: Only financial variables
  - One of the very few looking at interest rates (affected negatively by liquidity exposure)

Brief literature review

- Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl (2015)
  - Experiment: 2008 capital flow reversal in Peru, affecting differently funding of banks
  - Real outcome: Firms' exports (intensive margin)
- Morais, Peydro, Roldan, Ruiz (2019)
  - Experiment: Monetary policy in country of origin affecting differently funding of foreign banks in Mexico
  - Real outcome: Employment, investment, exit
- Arellano, Bai, Bocola (2019)
  - Experiment: Different exposure of Italian banks to sovereign debt during 2008-10 debt crisis
  - Real outcome: Productivity, capital misallocation
  - Bank/firm match at the regional level

Where does this paper fit in?

- Experiment: Banks in Argentina with different exposures to sovereign debt and currency risk
  - ... affected differently by 2001 default and devaluation
- Outcomes: Lending, exports (extensive margin)
- Contributions:
  - Episode with heterogeneous response of firms (exporters and non exporters)
  - More detail on switching behavior of firms
- Limitations:
  - Not so rich data on firms' real activity
    - ... only export status  $\{0,1\}$  variable

# Main Results of the Paper

#### Results on credit

- More exposed banks (to sovereign debt and to currency risk) cut more their lending after the crisis
  - ... controlling for bank's characteristics
- Credit for firms linked to more exposed banks falls more
  ... controlling for other bank and firm's characteristics
- Credit contraction is partially mitigated by firms switching banks (new relationships)
  - ... mostly due to the behavior of exporting firms
- Even in the case of exporters, switching banks took time
  ... is it so clear?

# Main Results of the Paper

Real effects on exports

- Firms linked to banks with higher exposure (to sovereign debt and to currency risk) are less likely to be exporting after the crisis
- Conclusion: Credit supply affects the extensive margin of exports
- However:
  - No sectoral distinction: a large fraction of firms produce non-traded good, no exporting option
  - Many firms exporting after the crisis were also exporting before
- The outcome variable does not fully capture entry in export markets ... shouldn't we use a change in export status variable?

#### Discussion and Policy Implications

The role of interest rates

- What is the role of interest rates in the adjustment of the credit market?
  - None in this paper (nor in this literature)
- Do firms linked to exposed banks who obtain less credit also pay a higher price for it?
  - Not in Kwhaja, Mian (2008), but more evidence is needed
  - Caveat: heterogeneity in borrowers might imply changes in average interest rates due to composition effects
- Differences in interest rates (across banks and firms) might give us direct evidence on the value of credit for firms and the size of switching costs

#### Discussion and Policy Implications

The nature of switching frictions

- How important are bank switching costs?
  - According to this paper, low enough for exporters to switch, but high enough for non-exporters to be exposed by exposure of linked banks
- What are these switching costs?
  - Private information?
  - Rigidities in lending portfolios of banks?
- Identifying the nature of these frictions is key for policy implications

#### Discussion and Policy Implications

#### Some policy implications

- In the context of the paper, policies should reduce the incidence of switching frictions
- Is that first order? What about other margins of adjustment?
  ... as interest rates, access to bond and equity markets
- How to reduce switching costs?
  - Make private information public
    - ... could reduce incentives for banks to acquire private information
  - Subsidize credit of exposed banks
    - ... could be highly distorting
- Promoting bank competition can help to reach a market-based solution
  - ... but prudential regulation enforcement might be key