

Tax Compliance and Uncertainty of Tax Law

Does Japan Need GAAR?

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Introduction


Today's Topic

"Tax Compliance & Uncertainty of Tax Law."

[See, Kohyama(2017)]



Question



Subjective Expected Utility Model (SEU)

Comply Not Comply Comply U(I-T)No Tax (+) Not Comply Tax EU = pU(I-T-F) + (1-p)U(I)Penalties (-)(-)This model can NOT well explain a real taxpayer's

behavior.

Ellsberg's Paradox

	Blue Ball	Red Ball
Box A	50	50
Box B	100	

Question 1

Bet on Red Ball. You can choose the box.

Question 2

Bet on Blue Ball. You can choose the box.

Uncertainty Aversion

Uncertainty ≠ Risk





Choquet Expected Utility Model (CEU)

Not Comply

CEU =
$$(1 - \delta)\{pU(I - T - F) + (1 - p)U(I)\}$$

+ $\delta\{aU(I - T - F) + (1 - a)U(I)\}$

- >[I] Income, [T] Tax, [F] Penalty/Fine
- >[p] probability of the bad outcome
- \triangleright [δ] the taxpayer's extent of doubt
- >[a] the extent of taxpayer's pessimism


Strategical use of uncertainty

Uncertaintyfree but still Risky category

Uncertainty category

Increasing tax compliance

Anti-Avoidance Provisions in Tax Law



Corporate Tax Act of Japan

♦ § 34(2): Exclusion from Deductible Expenses of Remuneration for Officers

The portion of the amount of remuneration paid by a domestic corporation to its officers ... that is specified by Cabinet Order as an <u>amount which is unreasonably high</u> shall be excluded from deductible expenses, when calculating the amount of income of the domestic corporation for each business year.

♦ § 132(1): Denial of Acts or Calculation by Family Corporations, etc

In the case where the district director of the tax office makes a reassessment or determination with regard to corporation tax related to a corporation listed as follows, when it is found that any acts conducted or calculations made by the corporation will, if allowed, <u>unreasonably reduce the burden of corporation tax</u>, he/she may calculate the tax base of corporation tax related to the corporation, the amount of loss, or the amount of corporation tax, based on his/her own recognition, notwithstanding the said acts or calculation:

Implications (1)

If the degree of uncertainty averse differ depending on <u>taxpayers</u>' attributes,



- ✓ listed or family companies
- √ individuals or corporations
- ✓ high- or low-income earners

the <u>degree of uncertainty</u> might be differentiated from category to category of taxpayers.

Implications (2)

less ambiguity averse.

Family Listed **Corporations? Corporations?** Rules Standards A taxpayer who is *not* or A taxpayer who is strongly

ambiguity averse.

Implications (3)

It would NOT be desirable to increase uncertainty for ALL taxpayers.

It could be desirable to increase uncertainty only for the specific categories of taxpayers under certain conditions.

Thank you

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