

The Framework to Monitor and Assess the Systemic Risk—— China's Practice

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policy

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- Some key points about macro-prudential policy:
 - Macro-prudential policy is a complement to *micro-prudential supervision*.
 - A clear separation between "micro" and "macro" prudential is important, but very difficult in practice.
 - Macro-prudential policy is no substitute for strong prudential regulation and supervision, and sound macroeconomic policies. Therefore, financial stability is a shared responsibility among different authorities.



- In order to control the systemic risk, we need to know where the systemic risk comes from.
 - The systemic risk comes from a cumulative, amplifying mechanism that operates within the financial system, as well as between the financial system and the real economy.
 - The systemic risk is also about the distribution of risk in the financial system at a given point of time.



Systematic Risk

Time Dimension: *Procyclicality*

Instruments:


- Countercyclical Capital Buffer
- Capital Reservation Buffer

Cross-sectional Dimension: *Interconnectedness*

Instruments:

• SIFIs

All the international initiatives are fully endorsed by us and being implemented in the context of our country-specific condition.



Fallacy of composition

Actions that are appropriate for individual firms may collectively lead to, or exacerbate, system-wide problems.



The Institutional Framework for Financial Stability in China

High level regular meetings

Monetary Policy Committee Quarterly meetings between 3 supervisory authorities

Communication between the regulator and the regulated

*deposit insurance system is now under consideration




- The designing of an early warning system and having the will to act is the key for the effectiveness of the whole framework
- There is always a trade-off between Type I error and Type II error


Trade-off

Type I error: issuing alarm too late, thus missing the risk

Type II error: false alarm, may loose credibility



- Our stand: we are not afraid of making Type II error, given the current serious fallacy of composition in the financial markets. We just don't want to be the doctor after-death.
- One basic principle is to have an effective identification of risks, set incentives for the use of relevant tools and have cooperation with others.




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
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
Part III: Challenges ahead








The Proposition of Direct and Indirect Financing in China(2011)



Outstanding Credit to GDP in China(2011) in trillion RMB






China's practice--toolkits of PBOC

- Dynamically adjust the Required Reserve Ratio (RRR) according to the market condition
 - Differentiate the RRR requirement for individual institution based on the capital strength, size of the asset, macro-economic indicator (credit growth rate, GDP, CPI) and etc
- Set the ceiling of the credit growth of institutions
 - Use last year's data to run a regression model: parameters acquired will be considered as the average monthly growth rate for next year.



China's practice—toolkits of CBRC

- To pick up the most important issue and fix it.
- Priority was given to the state-owned commercial banks and rural credit cooperatives,
 - State-owned commercial banks dominant in market share
 - Rural credit cooperatives: too many and weak in corporate governance



China's Practice in the Time Dimension

Dynamic LTV requirement

YEAR	First Home		Second Home
2007	80% for <90 m ²	70% for > 90 m ²	60%
2008	80%		60%
2009	80%		60%
2010	80% for <90 m ²	70% for $> 90 \text{ m}^2$	50%
	70% after 30 Sept		50%
2011	70%		40%



China's Practice in the Time Dimension(Cont'd)

Dynamic provisioning requirement

Previously, provisioning against loss already incurred




Now a more forward-looking way: provisioning against expected loss

- Major progresses
- CBRC has been maintaining a close dialogue with the national accounting authority to get support
- ➤ By the end of June 2011, the average provisioning coverage ratio of the Chinese banks reached 249%.(150%, end of 2009)




China's Practice in the Time Dimension(Cont'd)

- Required banks to conduct securitization transactions in a prudent manner and on a trial basis.
 - > Prohibited securitization of non-performing assets since 2008.
 - > Overall scale of securitization in China has been very limited with plain vanilla structures.
- Adjusted supervisory requirements in credit policies with the deepening of the crisis in early 2009.
 - Encourage the development of small business, rural and consumer finance.
 - For SME business, the capital risk weights is declined from 100% to 75%.
 - The supervisory tolerance of NPL ratio in SME business is lifted, allowing 3 percentage higher than the average NPL ratio



China's Practice In the Cross-sectional Dimension

- Strengthening Supervision of SIFIs
 - Stricter supervisory requirements for SIFIs
 - ➤ Higher loss absorbency
 - Implemented capital surcharge of 1 percentage point for large banks since 2009
 - ➤ Other supervisory policies under discussion:
 - Liquidity surcharge
 - Stricter large exposure limit for SIFIs
 - Activity restrictions and firewalls
 - > Reduce complexity and interconnectedness




China's Practice in the Cross-sectional Dimension (Cont'd)

- Strengthening Supervision of SIFIs (Cont'd)
 - Enhancing and intensifying supervision of SIFIs
 - ➤ More emphasis on corporate governance and risk management
 - ➤ Offsite and on-site supervision
 - Increase supervisory frequency and intensity
 - Allocate more supervisory resources
 - Consolidated banking supervision
 - Both cross-sector and cross-border dimensions
 - Improving resolution regime and tools
 - > RRPs and bail-in mechanisms
 - Enhancing supervisory cooperation and coordination
 - Cross-border dimension: supervisory college, MOU
 - Cross-sector dimension: close collaboration with PBOC, CSRC and CIRC




China's Practice in the Cross-sectional Dimension (Cont'd)

- To conduct peer group comparison and horizontal review
 - Identify similar risk exposures and trends in the banking sector
 - Better understand the risk profile of an individual institution and the industry as a whole
 - Disclose relevant information if necessary
 - ➤ Help bank find its position—where they are now? where they are heading for?



China's Practice in the Cross-sectional Dimension (Cont'd)

- To issue the letter of risk alert
 - In 2011, 26 risk alerts were issued both from the CBRC head office level and CBRC Shanghai Office level
 - Those areas include:
 - ➤ Lending to the steel & iron enterprises
 - ➤ Lending to the commercial real estate
 - ➤ Management of IT outsourcing
 - Credit card
 - Large concentration in leasing companies



Other Instruments and Tools (Cont'd)

- To address the issue of 'Too-interconnected-to-fail', strength the firewall between the banking sector and outside world.
 - Prevent bank lending from financing stock trading—effectively stop the depositors' money from flowing into high speculative stock market.
 - Prohibit bank's guarantee for bond issuance
 - Closely monitor bank's off-balance sheet, especially those risky assets hidden in the trust companies or other non-bank financial institution




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Challenges Ahead


- 1. It is still hard to say how much or how little we know about the systemic risk.
- 2. How can we find the trigger point in a more accurate and timely way?
- 3. And do we have a right dash board?

So far, no clear answer for the above 3 questions.



Challenges Ahead (Cont'd)

- Systemic risk beyond supervision: as a financial regulator, we need to have a broader vision when managing it.
 - This crisis shows that, during a debt cycle, the leverage of these 4 sectors are correlated and may interact with each other.
 - After the crisis, the leverage ratio of financial sector has been closely monitored and controlled. But the other three sectors must be put in the same way!





Challenges Ahead (Cont'd)

■ To conclude by an interesting story



A well-equiped fleet can never stand a heavy Storm.

