"Both original and persuasive, this book demonstrates that we still have important lessons to learn from this devastating crisis."

MARTIN WOLF

# Anatomy of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis

### **Growing Fragility of European Banking**

'86 Single Market Act Solidified Universal Banking

• '92 Maastricht Treaty Enshrined Regulatory Competition

• '96 Market Risk Amendment Allowed Lower Capital Buffers

Led to Growing Fragility in Northern European Banks

### Structure of Euro Area Banking




Deutsche, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, ING Societe Generale, Commerzbank, Dexia, Natixis

Loans


Better Capitalized Periphery Commercial Banks


Unicredit, Santander, Intesa, BBVA

## Mega-Banks Expanded Unsustainably (Euro area bank assets as a ratio to GDP)



## Large Universal European Banks Exploited Internal Risk Models and Became More Fragile





### **Growing Fragility of US Investment Banking**


Commercial Banks Better Regulated than Investment Banks

Inflation & Deposit Caps Sent Deposits to Shadow Banking


Securitization Followed, Driven by Regulatory Arbitrage

US Banking Undermined by Shadow/Investment Banks

### Structure of US Banking in 2002



## Banks Sold Most Mortgages To Markets by 2002 (Assets as a percent of US GDP)



Source: US Flow of Funds

### 2003 SEC Decision on Repo Collateral


'03 Decision Widened Collateral in Two Important Ways

Mortgage-Based Securities, Boosted Private Securitizations


Safe Foreign Paper, Drove North Atlantic Financial Drift

Destabilized US Securitization and Linked Europe and US

## Private Mortgage Securities Surged After 2003 (Assets as a percent of US GDP)




## Core Euro Area Banks Expanded Rapidly Overseas (Assets and Liabilities as a percent of GDP)



Source: Bank for Internatinoal Settlements

### The North Atlantic Financial Boom



# Misdiagnosing The North Atlantic Economy

### The Efficient Markets Hypothesis

The Efficient Markets Hypothesis Undermined Economy by:

Allowing Internal Risk Models to be Used for Capital Buffers

Blinding Policy Makers to Domestic Financial Risks

Macro Models had No Meaningful Financial Sector

### The Great Moderation

The Great Moderation Undermined the Economy by:

Deluding Central Banks About Power of Monetary Policy

Reducing Belief in Value of Domestic Policy Coordination

Macroeconomics Became Monetary Economics

### **Benign Neglect**


• Belief in Small international Spillovers Undermined Economy by:

Creating a Flawed Euro Area Architecture


Diminishing Belief in Value of International Cooperation

Macro Models Had No Meaningful Spillovers

## Costs of Global Crises Rose With Capital Mobility (Ratio to Global GDP)



## Crisis Involved Debt Flows, Not Equity (Ratio to Global GDP)



Source: IMF WEO and IFS

### Flawed Euro Architecture

French and Germans Had Vary Different Ideas on Euro

French: A Means to Economic Integration So Need Bailouts

Germans: Only After Integration So NO Need For Bailouts

Got French Early EMU With German No Bailout Clause

### **Completing The Cure**

### **Banking Capital**

US Investment Banks Under (Tougher) Banking Regulation

• Euro Area Banks Under Higher Capital Rations but...

• Euro Area Banks Still Use Internal Risk Models Extensively...

US is dialing back on some capital requirements

### **Euro Area Architecture**


Major Banks Under ECB Supervision but...

Bank Bail-Outs Still Basically National

Financial Support for Countries in Crisis but Access Difficult

Need to Complete Banking Union and Make Support Easier

## Consumer Credit: Asset-Backed Security Stock (Ratio to GDP)



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