



# Euro Area Stresses and Policies

## Dublin Economics Workshop

October 13

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# Outline

- Euro Area Stresses
- Euro Area Growth
- Euro Area Policies
  - ▶ Architecture
  - ▶ Short-run Demand
  - ▶ Structural


# Euro Area Stresses

# Stress Remains Elevated


Credit Default Swap Spreads  
(Basis points weighted by gross debt)



# Financing Needs Increase Stress




# Sovereign Bank Links Intensify




# Public Replacing Private Funding


Net Balance with The Eurosystem (Target 2)  
(billions of euros)




# Diverging Lending Rates



# Credit and GDP Growth




# Credit and GDP Growth




# Euro Area Growth

# Outlook on Downward Path

GDP Growth for 2012:  
Consensus Forecast  
(%)




# Domestic Demand Plunging in EA




# Front-Loaded Fiscal Effort

Annual Change in EA17 Structural Balance  
(% of GDP)



# Growth Impacts Debt




# Unemployment Has Surged

2008

percent

- 0-4
- 4-8
- 8-12
- 12+




# Unemployment Has Surged

2012


percent

- 0-4
- 4-8
- 8-12
- 12+



# Reducing Unemployment Not Easy

Returning to Pre-Crisis Unemployment Rates:  
Average Growth, 2012-2016 (%)



# Potential Skills Loss

## Long-term Unemployment Rate (%)





# Euro Area Policies Architecture



# Banking Union

Common  
Deposit Insurance

Common  
Resolution



Common  
Supervision

Single  
Rulebook

# The Case for a Banking Union

- Financial Stability national → Fragmentation
- Uncertainty about banks → Adverse growth effect

## Banking union

- Severs adverse feedback loop between banks and sovereign
- Provides incentive to end financial de-integration
- Helps restore monetary policy transmission

# Elements of a Banking Union

- **Common deposit guarantee**

- ▶ Reduces dependence of banks on their sovereign
- ▶ Increases depositor confidence

- **Common bank resolution**

- ▶ Authority to bail in private sector creditors
- ▶ Facilitates orderly wind-down of failing institutions and deleveraging

- **Common supervision**

- ▶ Foster stability
- ▶ Deter fragmentation

# Fiscal Union

Fiscal Compact/  
Governance



Euro Area  
Bills/Bonds

Focus on  
Structural Balance

Larger Central  
Budget

# The Case for a Fiscal Union

- Enhance adjustment to idiosyncratic shocks
- Deal with externalities and prevent contagion
- Reduce need for costly *ex-post* bailouts
  - ▶ *Financial stability*: area-wide back stop
  - ▶ *Transfer and tax scheme*: provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks
  - ▶ *Public goods*: centrally provided, but region's relative tax contribution falls in downturn
- Need strong governance arrangements to address moral hazard
  - ▶ Limit fiscal sovereignty
  - ▶ Ensure behavior in line with common standards




# **Euro Area Policies**

## **Short-run Demand**




# Inflation low and declining




# Maastricht Criteria

## Compliance with SGP Rules




# Maastricht Criteria

## Compliance with SGP Rules



# Ambitious Fiscal Effort






# Euro Area Policies

## Structural




# Current Accounts Diverged



# South: Competitiveness Gap

Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (CPI based)  
(average 1980-1998=100)



# Conclusions

- Financial markets remain under stress
- Growth prospects are deteriorating
- Roadmap towards complete EMU can arrest decline in confidence
- Macroeconomic policy support needed in ST
- Structural reforms needed to address external imbalances



# Thank you

