

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE TO IMF STAFF ON THE 2002 CONDITIONALITY GUIDELINES

REVISED July 10, 2008

1. The 2000-02 comprehensive review of the Fund's conditionality culminated in the adoption of a new set of conditionality guidelines by the Executive Board on September 25, 2002 (<http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.htm>). The 2002 Conditionality Guidelines replace the 1979 Conditionality Guidelines and the Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality of September 18, 2000. A review of experience with the guidelines, looking at how they have been implemented and at their impact, is conducted periodically; summary statistics on conditionality will be prepared annually starting in 2008.
2. As discussed in the staff statement attached to the new guidelines, the key principles that should guide the Fund in designing and setting conditionality are: (i) national ownership of reform programs, (ii) parsimony in program-related conditions; (iii) tailoring of programs to a member's circumstances; (iv) effective coordination with other multilateral institutions; and (v) clarity in the specification of conditions. Further, the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines require that program-related conditions will generally be established only on variables and measures that are critical to achieve the program goals, critical for monitoring program implementation, or necessary for implementing specific provisions under the Articles of Agreement.
3. This note elaborates on the operational implications of these principles and the 2002 conditionality guidelines. It is not intended as a comprehensive stand-alone guidance note, but rather as an aid to the implementation of the new guidelines. The operational issues covered are grouped into three areas: (i) the process of negotiation and program design; (ii) the design of conditionality; and (iii) the presentation of conditionality in Board papers for the use of Fund resources. The 2008 revisions arise from the Board-endorsed recommendations of the IEO evaluation of structural conditionality; the Board's preferred way forward is to strengthen efforts to achieve parsimony by emphasizing criticality as well as requiring rigorous justification of conditionality.¹

I. Negotiation and Program Design Process

4. The guidelines indicate that: (i) authorities have the lead role in designing their programs; (ii) the Fund should encourage members to build broad support for sound policies; and (iii) Fund-supported programs and conditionality should be coordinated with other international institutions in countries where those institutions are also involved.

¹ See "Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs," Independent Evaluation Office, and "The Chairman's Summing Up—IEO Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs" (http://www.ieo-imf.org/eval/complete/eval_01032008.html) and "Implementation Plan in Response to Board-Endorsed Recommendations Arising from the IEO Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs" (Public Information Notice No. 08/52).

5. ***The guidelines establish the principle that the primary responsibility for the design of the program lies with a member's authorities.*** The intent is to promote ownership by ensuring an active dialogue at all stages in the process of developing, implementing, and monitoring a Fund-supported program. This approach is intended to foster greater flexibility in program design, and hence greater ownership, without weakening conditionality or the quality of Fund-supported programs, for which the Fund retains responsibility. There is no requirement that country authorities actually draft the LOI and MEFP, but staff should be responsive to the authorities' desired role in the drafting of these documents. As with other aspects of the guidelines, this may require allowing more time for program formulation. The guidelines implicitly recognize that experience in this regard will vary, and that the authorities might have limited capacity or inclination to draft program documents. Drafting technical memoranda will continue to require a high degree of collaboration between staff and country authorities.

6. ***In helping the authorities to design a Fund-supported program, staff should (i) seek early on the views of country authorities and make every effort to accommodate their preferences while ensuring that the Fund-supported program goals are achieved and (ii) follow a program preparation process that can facilitate reflection on the links between program goals, strategies, and conditionality.*** In particular:

- To develop the program goals of the Fund arrangement, staff could build on issues identified in previous discussions with the authorities, including Article IV consultations, staff visits, EPAs, or bilateral meetings. These goals are understood to represent a subset of the authorities' broader goals, or intermediate steps toward a longer term goal, and should be identified as specifically as possible. It is expected that goals that extend beyond the program period would be addressed in the context of a potential successor arrangement or in some other dialogue with the authorities, such as in the context of surveillance. Further, reforms strategies to be pursued should be identified early on, including any specific structural measures that may be required for program success. When possible, staff should also consider appropriate reform sequencing drawing on analytical work on program design, reform complementarities, and optimal sequencing of reforms that might justify the program design. Modifications to the program design, including on reform strategies and related conditionality, may be required as new information becomes available during negotiations and the authorities' views are firmed up; indeed, the guidelines emphasize the importance of flexibility to allow considerations of ownership, implementation capacity, and member's circumstances.
- The preparation process for program approval should be used to help ensure that the conditionality is parsimonious and well matched to tightly specified program goals. At the pre-brief stage, staff should sketch out the reform strategy that is viewed as necessary to achieve the goals supported by the Fund arrangement and, to the extent possible, anticipated structural conditionality should be indicated. Briefs for negotiating missions should, when possible, outline the authorities' initial proposals and the proposed staff response, including the options staff will invite the authorities to consider and the rationale for criticality of proposed conditionality. When the staff is not in a position to report the authorities' views, this should be made clear in the brief. The purpose of the above program preparation process is to define as early as possible the contours of the program, including in terms of the links

between program goals, reform strategies, and supporting conditionality. As noted above, flexibility in modifying the program design during negotiations will remain essential.

7. ***Staff should assist members in broadening support for sound policies.*** Participatory processes are a requirement in the formulation of PRSPs, which are required for PRGF- and ESF-supported programs, and have been adopted in many other program countries. Staff should support the authorities' efforts to engage in a transparent participatory process in developing a policy framework, and should continue to be prepared to assist the authorities in this process including by giving seminars, meeting with various interest or political groups (parliamentary committees, business groups, NGOs) and by being available to the media. In doing so, staff should be aware of the authorities' views on staff contact with domestic groups and, if necessary, seek their prior agreement. Resident representatives could be particularly useful in providing this assistance. Broadening political support for policies may require allowing more time for program formulation.
8. ***Explicit assessments of potential implementation difficulties should be included in briefing papers.*** Assessments should reflect specific challenges to broader ownership in a country as well as other country-specific issues such as constitutional and political structures. Such assessments take on particular importance when implementation of key measures hinges on legislative approval or on actions by lower levels of government (e.g. fiscal adjustment by sub-national governments or reforms in state-owned enterprises with significant autonomy), rather than on executive actions alone. In some instances, where implementation requires cooperation by several ministries, the positions of these ministries are relevant to the assessments. To help ascertain prospects for successful implementation, the approval of specific measures by the entity responsible for the decision (e.g., the cabinet, the Parliament, sub-national governmental bodies) may be specified as prior actions. In some cases, where there are doubts as to whether a particular critical measure would be implemented after approval, it should be made a prior action (see also paragraph 16).
9. ***Briefs should include an assessment of technical capacity, including capacity building in the program.*** Briefing papers and staff reports should explicitly identify key capacity weaknesses, explain how those weaknesses may affect the ultimate design of the program, and highlight the measures under the program to build capacity in those areas.
10. ***Collaboration with other multilateral institutions.*** The staff should consult, as needed, with the staffs of other multilateral institutions involved in the country early on in the program design process. Briefing papers should provide details of coordination in the areas of overlap, including a clear delineation of analytical responsibilities (in line with the lead agency principle). Continued close communication will be essential to adapt coordination as the Fund-supported program is being implemented (see also paragraph 26 for a discussion on Bank-Fund collaboration).

II. Designing Conditionality

11. ***Program-related conditions generally must be either critical to the achievement of program goals, to monitoring implementation, or necessary to the implementation of specific provisions under the Articles of Agreement.*** The 2002 Guidelines replace the somewhat weaker standard of macro-relevance in the earlier Interim Guidance Note on Streamlining Structural Conditionality (September 2000). Leaving aside conditions necessary for implementation of provisions under the Articles, a judgment that a condition is of critical importance means that if it was not implemented, it

is expected that the goals would not be achieved or that program monitoring would not be possible (and, conversely, all critical measures generally must have conditionality associated with them, because the Fund needs to be able to interrupt purchases or disbursements if the program is off track or if sufficient information is not being provided to adequately monitor program implementation). In judging that a condition is critical, staff affirm that, other things being equal, the expectation is that the condition should not be eliminated later. In particular, staff must avoid setting conditions on measures that may be desirable, but that are not critical for achieving the program goals or for monitoring implementation of those goals.

12. ***The criticality criterion applies to all measures—whether they are in the Fund’s core areas or outside, or whether they are or are not covered by another agency’s (e.g., the World Bank’s) conditionality.*** Recognizing that conditions that are critical to the success of Fund-supported programs are more likely to be in the Fund’s core areas than outside, the focus of structural conditionality should be primarily on core Fund competencies. For conditions outside these core areas, the guidelines require more detailed explanation of their criticality along with a strong justification. Moreover, for non-core but critical measures, the Fund will, to the extent possible, draw on the advice of other multilateral institutions, particularly the World Bank, or of bilateral donors that can provide the expertise. When the expertise in a critical area of reform is not available within other multilateral institutions and bilateral donors, including within the Fund, the authorities would need to obtain the required expert input from others with the necessary expertise. In cases where the necessary expertise from these other sources is either unavailable or judged inadequate, approving a Fund-supported program would expose the Fund to reputational and financial risk. In such circumstances, the Fund would be faced with choosing between these risks or not supporting the authorities’ program.

13. ***Staff should apply the principles of parsimony and criticality on all program-related conditions.*** Staff should refrain from introducing conditionality that is requested by donors if it is not critical for program success. To the extent that the addition of a donor-driven reform measure as a program-related condition is indispensable to ensuring program financing and thus program success, such measures should be clearly identified in the staff report and their criticality justified accordingly. As for conditions requested by the authorities, program ownership is clearly of utmost importance for program success. Nevertheless, reform measures that are not critical for achieving the program goals or for monitoring implementation but that the authorities wish to highlight could be addressed in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP). In particular, a clear distinction should be drawn between conditionality upon which Fund-financing is contingent and other elements of the authorities’ reform agenda noted in the MEFP.

14. ***Level of detail of conditions.*** Conditions should be formulated in ways that provide the authorities with clarity as to the measures on which access to Fund resources depends. Conditions formulated at a high level of detail may provide helpful guideposts to the authorities, but run the risk of being seen as micromanagement. These considerations must be balanced on a case-by-case basis.

15. ***Use of structural performance criteria and benchmarks.*** Both structural performance criteria (SPCs) and structural benchmarks (SBs) are monitoring tools for critical reforms. SPCs are to be chosen when a measure is objectively monitorable and so critical, by itself, for the achievement of program goals or for program monitoring that non-implementation warrants an interruption of purchases or disbursements under the arrangement. SBs are appropriate when the measure is not

objectively monitorable (i.e., judgment must be exercised in deciding whether the measure has been implemented) or (ii) non-implementation of the particular SB would not, by itself, warrant an interruption of purchases or disbursements. In the latter case, SBs represent key components of a broader reform measure that is judged to be critical (e.g., steps in a tax reform or privatization program), but there is no requirement that each SB must itself be judged critical. Like prior actions and SPCs, SBs should be used as parsimoniously as possible and, in particular, SBs should pass the same criticality tests described in paragraph 11—except in case (ii) above where it is the broader reform rather than the particular SB itself—that is critical.

16. ***Use of prior actions.*** A critical measure may be specified as a prior action to be completed before the scheduled date of a Board discussion to approve an arrangement, complete a review, or grant a waiver, when it needs to be implemented immediately in order to achieve program goals or monitor implementation, including when there are significant doubts that the measure would be implemented at a later date. Conditions set for the completion of future reviews are not prior actions and should not be referred to as such; rather, they are either performance criteria or benchmarks. As with other forms of conditionality, prior actions are to be applied parsimoniously and must be justified in terms of their criticality to program objectives. In assessing the use of prior actions for approval of an arrangement, staff should be guided by the experience that programs with many prior actions often show worse-than-average implementation of other subsequent measures under the program. Prior actions are often used prominently in cases of countries with weak track records of implementation, and can still play a useful role by ensuring that conditions are met and that programs meet a minimum implementation standard. However, staff needs to be mindful of the possibility that prior actions may be implemented without genuine ownership of the program, and that implementation may be nominal or temporary as a result.

17. ***Waivers of performance criteria.*** A waiver may be granted for nonobservance of a performance criterion if the Fund is satisfied that the program will nevertheless be successfully implemented—i.e., that it will achieve its goals—either because of the minor or temporary nature of the nonobservance or because of corrective actions taken by the authorities, which may include the delayed implementation of the measure at issue (e.g. as a prior action for the granting of the waiver). While the language on waivers in the guidelines does not explicitly refer to cases where the Fund considers that a measure is no longer critical (whether because circumstances have changed or because it judges that it previously erred in the design of conditionality), these could be cases where the Fund remains satisfied that the program will be successfully implemented and the deviation in such cases would be considered “minor” in terms of its impact on program goals.

18. ***The scope of reviews should be clearly specified.*** Reviews will continue to have backward- and forward-looking components. The policy areas on which the backward looking component of the review is to focus should be specified, to the extent possible, in the form of performance criteria, indicative targets and structural benchmarks. Reviews are also forward-looking, providing the opportunity to assess prospects for achievement of program objectives in light of a range of available information. This may entail modifying program objectives as new information becomes available; for example, additional adjustment is needed owing to changes in economic conditions. To limit the possibility that reviews will be used to add conditionality unless clearly justified by changes in circumstances (e.g., the existence of a new PRSP or economic developments that require a reassessment of priorities), the original program documents should give, to the extent possible, a broad sense of the uncertainties that could require additional or modified conditionality during

reviews. Moreover, conditionality added during reviews should be anchored on the initiating program document and those added in new reform areas would require a clear justification as to why the related measures had become critical to achieving the program goals. Finally, while the last program review may not always be the most opportune time to assess the outcome of a Fund-supported program, staff could use such reviews for stocktaking and, where possible, provide a preliminary assessment of stated program goals and their achievement and of the experience with program implementation.

19. ***Outcomes-based conditionality.*** The guidelines explicitly note that program-related conditions may be set on targets and objectives as well as on actions. While outcomes-based conditionality is not expected to be widely applicable, staff should be receptive to appropriate circumstances in which its use would provide greater flexibility in designing programs and in adapting them to subsequent developments. However, outcomes chosen as conditions must still be reasonably under the control of the authorities, so that exogenous shocks do not force undue use of waivers and thereby lessen assurances to the member of the availability of Fund resources. Moreover, outcomes-based conditionality should be designed to minimize the risk of situations in which targeted outcomes are achieved by means of policies that would undermine the achievement of program goals, such as reaching a higher revenue target by increasing tariffs. Even when conditions cannot be applied to outcomes, there may be scope for formulating conditions in such a manner that they may be met by implementing various measures.

20. ***Implementation timetables should be realistic but still appropriately ambitious.*** While the authorities should be free to set demanding timetables where they consider them helpful in driving their agenda forward, the staff should not press for overly ambitious timetables. Staff often face constraints in forming an accurate judgment on implementation capacity and political priorities. Overly demanding timetables have also been a major reason for frequent requests for waivers.

21. ***Floating tranches.*** The use of floating tranches is also explicitly allowed for in the Guidelines as another possible device available to staff in the design of conditionality. The availability of a floating tranche is contingent on implementation of a specific measure or measures, which has no fixed date attached, while the other purchases or disbursements are, as is normally the case, governed by conditions tied to test dates. Floating tranches may enhance ownership by giving authorities greater flexibility in choosing the timetable on which reforms, particularly structural reforms, are implemented, especially where there is some unavoidable uncertainty about the timing of the measure or where an upfront commitment on specific timing is for some reason not desirable. The internal logic of floating tranches suggests that the measures to which they are attached should satisfy two criteria: first, they must strengthen the external position over the medium term, so as to warrant the release of additional Fund resources; but they must also increase the balance of payments need in the short term—otherwise, the program would be either underfinanced without the relevant measure, or overfinanced with it. Examples of measures that could satisfy these criteria include trade liberalization and debt restructuring needs. Structural reforms that might be appropriate for floating tranche conditionality are not expected to occur in very many cases, but it is therefore all the more important that the option of using them be considered when the above criteria are met.

III. Presentation in Board Papers

22. ***Discussion of program design issues in Board papers should provide a clear explanation of the choice of conditionality, in particular the judgments of criticality supporting the inclusion of particular structural measures.*** Since the judgment of criticality depends upon program goals and the strategies adopted to achieve them, these should be set out as clearly as possible. At the time of approval of a new arrangement, the staff report should lay out the links between the program goals and reform strategies, and the corresponding structural conditionality. One option is for these links to be presented in a separate text table.² The program goals should be specified as clearly as possible. As previously noted, the staff report should avoid conflating the objectives of the Fund-supported program with the authorities' broader goals, and should clearly identify and explain the strategies, or broad areas of policy action, embodied in the program. Further, all future program modifications should be anchored in the originating program document and deviations from this document should be justified. Where possible, staff reports should convey the discussion between staff and authorities on policy options.

23. ***More detailed explanations are needed for conditions outside Fund core areas.*** Conditions may be established on measures outside the Fund's core areas of expertise, but such conditions would require detailed explanations of their criticality along with strong justification. This reflects the general presumption that measures in non-core areas are less likely to pass the test. Further, staff reports should provide the necessary information as to which institution or donor provided expert advice. When the expertise in a critical reform area is not available within other multilateral institutions and bilateral donors, including within the Fund, and staff rely on the authorities to obtain the required expert input from other sources, the risks noted in paragraph 12 should be transparently reported in staff reports.

24. ***Staff assessment of potential implementation difficulties should be discussed.*** A more candid discussion on concerns about ownership will be expected in staff reports (as noted in paragraph 8 for briefing papers). It will be important to acknowledge concerns about ownership which would increase risks to program implementation from the outset to enable the Board to make informed judgments. In these cases, staff will need to convey the rationale for going ahead, including on the basis of the implementation of key measures necessary to improve prospects for program success. Care will have to be taken to ensure that a discussion of ownership does not undermine confidence in the program.

25. ***Program conditions should be clearly identified and distinguished from other measures in program documents and staff reports.*** Tables for quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets are already required and are a standard part of Fund practice. All structural conditionality is also routinely identified in all program staff reports. An effective means of doing so is to include

² The Appendix provides two options for presenting these links; as is the case with other text tables, either of these two options would be excluded from word counts. Option 1 has been in used in some staff reports and well-received by some Executive Directors and stakeholders outside the Fund. Option 2 provides a framework for the discussion of the goals, reform strategies, and underlying conditionality. Staff are encouraged to include new editions of one of these two options when program reviews add conditionality.

tables listing all quantitative and structural performance criteria, indicative targets, prior actions and structural benchmarks. If the authorities wish to list measures that are not conditionality, these should be listed separately and identified as part of the authorities' reform agenda. These can be addressed in the text of the MEFP or in a text table attached to the MEFP, thus offering the authorities a venue for describing their broader goals, but should be clearly distinguished from conditionality on which Fund financing depends. The status of all past performance criteria, indicative targets, prior actions, and structural benchmarks should also be reported, and discussed in more detail for unmet or delayed conditions. This can also be done in tabular form. Staff reports should include clear justifications for waivers of performance criteria.

26. ***Bank–Fund collaboration.*** A discussion of collaboration with other multilaterals, in particular the World Bank, has also become a requirement of program staff reports where applicable. While much of this information should be contained in the World Bank Relations Annex, particularly relevant information should be brought into the main staff report. Staff reports should also discuss how the Bank- and Fund-supported programs have been coordinated – for example, where the Fund macro framework has been modified to accommodate Bank-supported reform programs, where reforms under a Bank-supported program have been chosen and sequenced to contribute to Fund-supported program goals, etc. Monitoring responsibilities of the multilateral institutions should be clearly delineated, while bearing in mind that the Fund bears the ultimate responsibility for establishing and monitoring its conditionality. (See the framework provided in the Joint Management Action Plan for strengthening Bank-Fund collaboration in areas of overlap.)

Appendix I—Option 1: Criticality of Program Structural Conditionality—An Illustration ^{1 2}

Structural Measure	Date	Rationale for Criticality ³
Fiscal governance (central to the PRGF arrangement's structural reform agenda)		
Submit 2008 budget law to parliament in line with understandings with the mission.	Prior action	Provide basis for a transparent and consistent fiscal policy that aims for a balanced primary position, avoidance of new arrears, and higher growth-oriented and social spending.
Implement a new framework to monitor budget execution monthly, and report data for April-June 2008 based on a new template.	Benchmark August 2007	Provide policymakers with a tool for making timely and informed spending decisions as they seek to achieve the budget objectives and mitigate the risk of fiscal slippages.
Adopt a strategy and time table for clearing domestic arrears.	Performance criterion Dec. 2007	Restore supplier confidence, facilitate the return to regular spending procedures, and allow a gradual reduction in the government's large stock of domestic arrears.
Financial sector reforms (critical to mitigate risks to macroeconomic stability)		
Initiate restructuring of Bank X, including by raising its capital through issuance of government securities.	Benchmark September 2007	Support the financial rehabilitation of country's largest bank, prepare it for privatization, and set the conditions for sound financial sector development.
Adopt an action plan for introducing regular Treasury bill auctions in 2009.	Benchmark December 2007	Develop the domestic securities market, promote financial sector development, improve treasury management, and avoid new budgetary arrears.
Public enterprises (critical for a sustainable fiscal framework, World Bank lead)		
Initiate an audit of the phosphate sector, based on the competitive selection of an audit company, in consultation with the World Bank.	Benchmark February 2008	Prepare the restructuring of the largest export sector (currently operating at only one third of capacity), including by providing options for attracting a strategic investor.
Prepare a review of the finances of the national electricity company, in consultation with the World Bank.	Benchmark December 2008	Provide information necessary for preparing energy sector reforms and deciding on 2009 budget allocations (see text ¶X for estimated quantification), as rising oil prices and region-wide electricity shortages have dampened economic growth and led to rising demands for budget support to the sector.

¹ This text table is an illustration based on the Togo program (IMF Country Report No. 08/146) and its main purpose is to provide the rationale for criticality of each condition; dates and explanations have been modified for presentation purposes. Text tables using a similar format have been used in other programs; for example, Rwanda (IMF Country Report No. 08/89), and Rwanda (IMF Country Report No. 08/222). The Rwanda staff reports are also useful for country teams interested in looking at text tables used for tracking implementation of conditionality (e.g., Table 3 of the MEFPs in the referenced Rwanda staff reports).

² The text table in not intended to become cumulative over the duration of the program. If new conditionality are introduced during program reviews, a new edition of this table with the new conditions would need to be added to the staff report to reflect the rationale for their criticality. The text tables are part of the main text of the staff report; not part of the MEFP.

³ As noted in the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines, the rationale for criticality relates to program goals; the 2002 guidelines replaced the weaker standard of macro relevance.

Appendix I—Option 2: Links Between Program Goals, Reform Strategies, and Structural Conditionality ¹

1. Goals of the Program

Sets out briefly the broad goals of the program. Goals might include, inter alia, restoration of market confidence, macroeconomic stabilization (including any underlying institutional arrangements), external stability, sustainable economic growth, or poverty reduction. It should be noted that the Fund arrangement is expected to support only a subset of the authorities' goals; thus, country teams should distinguish clearly between the Fund-supported program and the authorities' broader goals.

2. Reform Strategies Necessary to Achieve the Program Goals

Describes what reform strategies the program will pursue to achieve the goals stated above. For example, for achieving macroeconomic stabilization, the program might pursue fiscal revenue and expenditure policies, or inflation stabilization policies, or financial sector reforms. If the goal is to achieve sustainable economic growth, the strategies might include pro-growth policies such as enterprise restructuring and privatization, or financial sector reforms, or trade policies. Staff should also consider appropriate sequencing of reform strategies, for which they could draw upon analytical work on program design, reform complementarities, and optimal sequencing reforms to justify the rationale for the program design. The focus in this box should be exclusively on the structural aspects of Fund conditionality.

3. Structural Conditionality

Link the strategies described above with specific structural reform areas covered by conditionality, including explaining why the chosen conditionality are deemed critical for achieving the program goals. Also describe any reform areas shared with the World Bank (or any other multilateral institution) and any conditionality linked to these reform areas. Staff should keep parsimony and criticality as the guiding principles when designing conditionality, and ensure that structural benchmarks are accountable to the same principles—i.e., in terms of their criticality for achieving programs goals, monitoring program implementation, or implementing specific provisions of the Articles (see ¶15 of the Revised Operational Guidance Note for a discussion of SBs).

¹The purpose of this text is to provide a roadmap describing the sequencing and linkages of conditionality with the stated program goals and reform strategies. The road map should be presented in the staff report at the time of initial program request to lay out the vision of what is expected to be achieved during the period covered by the Fund-supported program. The text is not intended to become cumulative over the duration of the program. Thus, if new conditionality are introduced during program reviews, then a new edition of the table with the new conditions would need to be added to the staff report. This table is part of the main text of the staff report (not part of the MEFP) and excluded from word counts.