INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

# IMF POLICY PAPER

## REVIEW OF DATA PROVISION TO THE FUND FOR SURVEILLANCE PURPOSES

April 2024

IMF staff regularly produces papers proposing new IMF policies, exploring options for reform, or reviewing existing IMF policies and operations. The following documents have been released and are included in this package:

- A **Press Release** summarizing the views of the Executive Board as expressed during its April 1 consideration of the staff report.
- The **Staff Report**, prepared by IMF staff and completed on February 20 for the Executive Board's consideration on April 1.
- Two **Staff Supplements**, one titled *Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes—Background Paper*, and the other setting out the proposed decision.

The IMF's transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

Electronic copies of IMF Policy Papers
are available to the public from
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspx

**International Monetary Fund**
**Washington, D.C.**

PRESS RELEASE

PR 24/116

# IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Review of Data Provision to the Fund

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

- The Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes took place in the context of profound shifts in the global economy. Trends such as rising global debt levels, inflationary pressures, increasingly complex financial systems, and multi-speed growth trajectories highlight the need for adequate macroeconomic and financial data to inform analysis and policymaking.
- The Review expands the minimum set of national data that members are required to provide to the Fund for the effective discharge of its duties. This data will help enhance macroeconomic analysis and adapt policy advice to the continuously evolving economic and financial landscape.
- Enhanced data provision, together with a strengthened framework for assessing data adequacy, will support even-handedness in surveillance, reduce blind spots, and further improve the effectiveness of Fund surveillance.

**Washington, DC:** On April 1, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded a review of the policy on Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes (DPF). The review took place against the backdrop of profound shifts in the global economy, such as rising global debt levels, inflationary pressures with attendant tight monetary policies, increasingly complex financial systems, and multi-speed growth trajectories. These trends highlight the need for adequate macroeconomic and financial data to inform analysis and policymaking.

The minimum list of indicators that members are required to provide to the Fund under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Fund's Articles of Agreement was last updated by the Executive Board in 2004. Since then, Fund surveillance needs have continued to evolve given global economic developments.

Guided by the 2021 Comprehensive Surveillance Review, the DPF review introduces a substantial update to the overall envelope of data that members are required to provide to the Fund in the areas of public sector, foreign exchange intervention, and macrofinancial indicators. Most Fund members already provide these indicators voluntarily but addressing the remaining data gaps would ensure even-handedness in surveillance, reduce blind spots, and thereby further improve the effectiveness of Fund surveillance.

Effective surveillance also requires a more structured and transparent assessment of data adequacy for surveillance. This review introduced a strengthened assessment framework, which will facilitate policy dialogue with the authorities on data issues and improve prioritization of capacity development efforts. This will also enhance the integration of surveillance and capacity development activities.

The DPF's key findings and recommendations are reflected the Main Paper [insert hyperlink], while the Background Paper [insert hyperlink] elaborates on technical and legal aspects of data provision and reports results from surveys of country authorities and IMF staff.

**Executive Board Assessment[1]**

Executive Directors welcomed the conclusion of the Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes. They recalled that, during the meeting of March 2022, they had already endorsed the introduction of a more structured and transparent assessment of data adequacy for surveillance, the approach to deal with outdated data requirements, and the introduction of mandatory provision of macrofinancial indicators. Directors also recalled their recent endorsement of the use of the revised data adequacy assessment framework starting in February 2024.

Noting that the list of mandatory data series was last updated in 2004, Directors concurred that adapting the perimeter of mandatory data provision to the evolving global economy is crucial for ensuring the effectiveness and evenhandedness of Fund surveillance. Given the priorities identified in the 2021 Comprehensive Surveillance Review, they generally supported updating and expanding the overall envelope of mandatory data provision in the areas of public sector, foreign exchange interventions (FXI), and swaps and repos among central banks, while reiterating their support for expanding macrofinancial data requirements. Directors acknowledged that the streamlined proposals on data on public sector, foreign exchange interventions, and central bank swaps and repos, represent a compromise that aims to enhance the information that the Fund needs for surveillance, while taking into consideration the key concerns raised by Fund members during the Review.

Directors endorsed the expansion of the mandatory provision of public sector data, as proposed in the staff paper. Noting the capacity constraints in some Fund members for producing these indicators, Directors called on staff to work closely with the authorities to identify technical assistance priorities that would help countries address these constraints over time.

Directors generally agreed with the proposal, as outlined in the staff paper, to introduce mandatory provision of data on foreign exchange interventions. They also endorsed the mandatory provision of information on central bank swaps and repurchase agreements. Many Directors noted, however, that the data on FXI and on swaps and repos can be market sensitive and decontextualized. In this context, Directors called on staff to ensure the upmost care when handling confidential information to avoid undermining the authorities' policy implementation, while also building trust in the revised data provision policy. In addition, Directors generally saw merit in introducing a secured electronic platform that members may decide to use for transmission to the Fund of mandatory data considered confidential, while stressing the need for cost-effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of this platform.

Directors endorsed the proposed transition periods for introducing the new data provision requirements and the general guidance on frequency and timeliness for the new data to be provided. They emphasized the need to consider capacity constraints and noted that, even

---

[1] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

after the updated data requirements come into force, the lack of capacity to provide the data to the Fund would not lead to a breach of obligation; although members would be expected to develop the needed statistical capacity over time. In this context, Directors called for continued outreach to Fund members, including provision of tailored capacity development assistance to those countries where data provision capacity is constrained. Capacity development needs will also be informed by the new data adequacy assessment framework.

Directors looked forward to the next Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes in 5 years or later, as appropriate.

February 20, 2024

# REVIEW OF DATA PROVISION TO THE FUND FOR SURVEILLANCE PURPOSES

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Data provision by member countries is a key input into the IMF's surveillance activities**. The 2024 Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes takes place against the backdrop of profound shifts in the global economy, highlighting the important need for adequate macroeconomic and financial data to inform analysis and policymaking. The existing Data Provision Framework (DPF) has served the membership well and helped to support close cooperation between the Fund and its members, including through capacity development activities. Many members routinely provide far more data to the Fund than mandated under the DPF framework. However, progress is needed in three priority areas:

- ***Perimeter of mandatory data provision.*** The minimum list of indicators that members are required to provide to the Fund was last updated in 2004, since when surveillance needs have continued to evolve given global economic developments. Guided by the 2021 Comprehensive Surveillance Review, this DPF Review proposes a substantial, but manageable, update to the overall envelope of data that members are required to provide to the Fund in the areas of public sector, foreign exchange intervention, and macrofinancial indicators. Most Fund members already provide these data voluntarily, but addressing the remaining data gaps would support even-handedness in surveillance, reduce blind spots, and thereby further improve the effectiveness of Fund surveillance.

- ***Data adequacy framework.*** Effective surveillance requires a more structured and transparent assessment of data adequacy for surveillance. The strengthened framework, introduced in this Review, will facilitate policy dialogue with the authorities on data issues and improve prioritization of capacity development efforts, by more clearly identifying areas where data needs to be improved, thereby enhancing the integration of surveillance and CD.

- ***Outdated data.*** The Board confirmed during this review the long-standing practice of not applying the remedial framework when members do not provide those data categories listed in Article VIII, Section 5 that the Fund considers outdated.

**The first formal Board meeting on the DPF Review took place in March 2022, at which time the Executive Board endorsed some of staff's proposals.** In particular, the Board endorsed staff's proposals to expand macrofinancial data requirements, to introduce a new, principles-based approach for assessing data adequacy for surveillance, and to continue the approach to outdated data as described above. The 2022 formal Board meeting was preceded and followed by several informal engagements. Furthermore, in December 2023, the Board endorsed on a lapse-of-time basis the use of the new data adequacy assessment framework in Article IV consultations initiated after February 1, 2024. This paper specifies which proposals have already been adopted, where the Board requested further work, and how staff's proposals have evolved in light of the Board feedback.

**This main DPF paper is accompanied by a Background Paper (SM/24/39, Sup.1).** The latter elaborates on technical and legal aspects of data provision and reports results from surveys of country authorities and IMF staff. The Background Paper also includes the Summing Up from the March 2022 formal Board meeting.

Approved By
**Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Bert Kroese, and Rhoda Weeks-Brown**

Prepared by an interdepartmental team from Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (SPR), Statistics Department (STA), and Legal Department (LEG), led by Martin Sommer, Christine Dieterich, and Nadia Rendak under the overall guidance of Daria Zakharova, Cheng Hoon Lim, and Katharine Christopherson. Mark Flanagan and Kenneth Kang provided additional strategic guidance. The SPR team included Pablo Morra (external sector lead, currently in WHD), Murad Omoev, Dmitry Plotnikov, Manrique Saenz (public sector lead), and Fabian Valencia (macrofinancial lead). The STA team comprised Daniela Marchettini (data strategy lead), Daniel Rodriguez, and Arushi Kapoor. The LEG team included Julianne Ams and Qingxiang Li. Evridiki Tsounta (SEC) facilitated discussions with Executive Directors. At earlier stages of the Review, contributors and leaders included Serkan Arslanalp, Nombulelo Braiton, Fabio Comelli, Pilar Garcia Martinez, Mary Goodman, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, Takahide Koike, Yan Liu, Lusine Lusinyan, Marco Marini, David McDonnell, Gohar Minasyan, Mico Mrkaic, Malika Pant, Sanjaya Panth, Helene Poirson Ward, Stefanie Rika, Marco Rodriguez Waldo, J.R. Rosales, Gabriela Rosenberg, Edgardo Ruggiero, Masashi Saito, Haiyan Shi, Bernhard Steinki, Patrizia Tumbarello, Helen Wagner, and Di Yang. Hanan Altimimi-Bane, Geraldine Cruz, Florence Dotsey, Emily Fisher, Anna Konopatskaya, and Emelie Stewart assisted the project.

## CONTENTS

# Glossary

| | |
|---|---|
| AE | Advanced Economies |
| BIS | Bank of International Settlement |
| BoP | Balance of Payments |
| CB | Central Banks |
| CD | Capacity Development |
| CDIS | Coordinated Direct Investment Survey |
| CG | Central Government |
| CID | Climate Change Indicators Dashboard |
| CPI | Consumer Price Index |
| CPIS | Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey |
| CSR | Comprehensive Surveillance Review |
| D4D | Data for Decisions Fund |
| DGI | Data Gaps Initiative |
| DLP | Debt Limit Policy |
| DPF | Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes |
| DSA | Debt Sustainability Analysis |
| DSF | Debt Sustainability Framework |
| ECB | European Central Bank |
| e-GDDS | Enhanced General Data Dissemination System |
| EM | Emerging Markets |
| ESA | External Sector Assessments |
| FSA | Financial Stability Assessments |
| FSAP | Financial Sector Assessment Program |
| FSB | Financial Stability Board |
| FSI | Financial Soundness Indicators |
| FSSF | Financial Sector Stability Fund |
| FTE | Full-Time Equivalents |
| FX | Foreign Exchange |
| FXI | Foreign Exchange Intervention |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| G20 | Group of Twenty |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GFS | Government Finance Statistics |
| GFSM | Government Finance Statistics Manual (2014) |
| GG | General Government |
| HIPC | Heavily Indebted Poor Countries |
| IAG | Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics |
| IEO | Independent Evaluation Office |

| | |
|---|---|
| IIP | International Investment Position |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IPF | Integrated Policy Framework |
| ISD | Integrated Surveillance Decision |
| LEG | Legal Department |
| LIC | Low-Income Countries |
| LLMIC | Low- and Lower-Middle-Income Countries |
| MAC | Market Access Countries |
| MFS | Monetary and Financial Statistics |
| NFPC | Non-Financial Public Corporations |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development |
| PRGT | Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust |
| QEDS | Quarterly External Debt Statistics (World Bank) |
| QPSD | Quarterly Public Sector Debt (World Bank/IMF) |
| RPPI | Residential Property Price Index |
| SDDS | Special Data Dissemination Standard |
| SDDS Plus | Special Data Dissemination Standard Plus |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SDMX | Statistical Data and Metadata Exchange |
| SIA | Statistical Issues Appendix |
| SIFS | Systemically Important Financial Sector |
| SOE | State-Owned Enterprises |
| SPR | Strategy, Policy, and Review Department |
| STA | Statistics Department |
| TA | Technical Assistance |
| TCIRS | Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance |
| TSR | Triennial Surveillance Review |
| UFR | Use of Fund Resources |

# INTRODUCTION

*If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.*
The Leopard, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa

## A. Context

**1. The 2024 Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes (DPF) comes at a critical time.** Tectonic shifts in the global economy highlight and further amplify the need for adequate macroeconomic and financial data to inform analysis and policymaking. Salient global economic developments have included a dramatic rise in debt levels—including due to the recent COVID pandemic, deepening and increasingly integrated financial systems, persistent inflationary pressures, rapid tightening of monetary policy with attendant fiscal and financial sector risks, tensions in the multilateral trade and financial sector, and multispeed growth trajectories which exacerbate pre-existing economic vulnerabilities. As noted in the 2021 *Comprehensive Surveillance Review* (CSR), this difficult economic landscape also involves unusually high uncertainty. The DPF review represents an opportunity to take a step forward and address current data gaps to further improve the effectiveness of Fund surveillance.

**2. An overarching theme of this review is that data provision needs to be well integrated with evolving surveillance priorities of the Fund and its members.** This is in line with both the aforementioned CSR as well as the *Overarching Strategy on Data and Statistics for the Fund in the Digital Age*, endorsed by the Board in March 2018. The Strategy called for an *integrated* approach to the treatment of data issues. In responding to the 2016 Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) evaluation (*Behind the Scenes with Data at the IMF*), the Strategy proposed closer integration of the CSR, the DPF, G20 Data Gaps Initiative, and the Review of IMF Data Dissemination Initiatives.[1] Accordingly, in terms of sequencing, this DPF review follows the CSR for alignment with the newly established surveillance priorities endorsed by the Board in May 2021 (Figure 1).[2]

**3. This review has proposed to introduce several new features to the data provision framework; as noted in the relevant sections of this paper, some of these proposals were already endorsed by the Board at the March 2022 meeting.** The list of indicators that members are required to provide to the Fund has not been updated since 2004 and therefore is no longer sufficiently congruent with evolving surveillance needs. Accordingly, this review has proposed a substantial update to the overall envelope of data requirements in the areas of public sector, foreign exchange intervention, and macrofinancial data. In addition, while the overall underlying framework for data provision has remained effective, this review elaborates in two areas to further enhance it.

[1] The IMF data dissemination initiatives support voluntary data publication tiered according to member capacity: the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS), the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS), and the SDDS Plus.

[2] The last *Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes* was concluded in 2012. In 2015, the review cycle was extended to 5 years or more, on as-needed basis. See *Selected Streamlining Proposals Under the FY16–FY18 Medium-term Budget—Implementation Issues*.

First, it proposed a new, more structured assessment of data adequacy for surveillance. In December 2023, the Board endorsed on a lapse-of-time basis the use of the new data adequacy assessment framework for Article IV consultations initiated after February 1, 2024. Second, the review proposed, and the Board agreed with, maintaining the long-standing practice of the Fund of not applying the remedial framework to members not providing information listed in Article VIII, Section 5 of the Fund's Articles of Agreement that the Fund considers outdated.

**Figure 1. Integrated Roadmap for Improving Data for Fund Surveillance**




Source: IMF staff.

**4. The review has benefited from significant consultation**. The Executive Board and Executive Directors provided strategic guidance on key issues during several informal engagements (March 2019, March 2021, December 2022, and January 2024), a formal Board meeting (March 2022),[3] a technical session (May 2023), and previously also during discussions of the 2018 Data and Statistics Strategy and the 2021 CSR. Developing the DPF proposals required close consultation across the Fund with teams working on related workstreams—for example, surveillance review,

[3] Outcomes of the March 2022 formal Board meeting are summarized in the Acting Chair's Summing Up (Section IX of the Background paper). Specifically, the Board endorsed the following staff proposals: (i) to expand macrofinancial data requirements for all member countries, and that members designated as having systemically important financial sectors should provide to the Fund a larger set of macrofinancial indicators, (ii) to introduce a new, principles-based approach for assessing data adequacy for surveillance, and (iii) to maintain the Fund's long-standing practice of not applying the existing remedial framework to members not providing the data required under Article VIII, Section 5, that the Fund considers outdated.

debt sustainability and transparency, and external sector policies. IMF country teams provided extensive information on availability of macroeconomic and financial indicators in member countries and helped identify the outdated series. Staff information was supplemented with a comprehensive survey of member authorities in the summer and fall of 2021 which shed further light on availability and provision of data and helped refine staff proposals. The DPF work was also informed by the Fund's coordination with international partners, such as the World Bank on debt transparency and the G20 Data Gaps Initiative. Finally, selected country teams participated in a pilot on the new assessment of data adequacy for surveillance, complemented by a comprehensive review process among IMF country teams on the draft guidance note for the new data adequacy assessment.

**5. Given the ongoing post-pandemic resource pressures from the pandemic, this review focuses on issues of greatest priority.** Experience in dealing with the limited number of instances of poor or non-compliance by Fund members with the requirements of the DPF suggests that it would be helpful to refine the framework for addressing cases involving: (i) the provision of inaccurate data, and (ii) serious delays and repeat lapses in data provision. However, since the DPF framework has served the membership well and cases of non-cooperation have been rare, including during the pandemic, it is proposed, as broadly supported by Executive Directors in previous engagements, that these issues be addressed at a later stage as resources allow.

## B. The Current Framework for Mandatory Data Provision

**6. The mandatory provision of data to the Fund is governed by the Articles of Agreement.** More specifically, Article VIII, Section 5 and Annex A to the 2004 Board Decision specify data categories that members are obliged to provide to the Fund, except when capacity limitations are a binding constraint.[4] Annex I shows the original list of 12 data categories from Article VIII, Section 5 and the 12 additional data categories required under the 2004 Decision. These data categories are considered the minimum necessary for effective discharge of the Fund's duties.[5] If the member has the capacity to provide this data, the non-provision or provision of inaccurate data would be a breach of Article VIII, Section 5 and would be subject to the remedial framework adopted by the Board in 2004.[6] Additional data can be requested by the Board if it considers such data necessary for the Fund's activities. The assessment of whether a country has breached its

---

[4] Article IV, Section 3(b) also requires each member to provide the Fund with the information necessary for "firm surveillance" over the exchange rate policies. However, the Fund has historically relied on Article VIII, Section 5 for data provision. In addition, pursuant to the Integrated Surveillance Decision, Article IV consultations include consultations under Articles VIII and XIV of the Articles of Agreement where a member maintains exchange restrictions, multiple currency practices (MCPs), or discriminatory currency arrangements. In July 2022, the Fund completed the review of its longstanding policy on MCPs, which includes a discussion of data requirements related to MCP assessments (IMF, 2022d).

[5] Staff document provision of the 12 data categories required by the 2004 Decision, as well as the international investment position and exchange rates, in the Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (TCIRS) in the statistical issues appendix of Article IV staff reports.

[6] Members are not obligated to provide information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed.

obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 involves an element of judgment, with the benefit of any doubt given to the member (IMF, 2003). Background Paper, Section I elaborates on the main aspects of the legal framework for mandatory data provision.

7. **Despite its mandatory nature, data provision has reflected strong cooperation.** Members as well as the Fund have a shared interest in the development of sufficient capacity to produce and provide key data to facilitate appropriate analysis of macrofinancial developments and formulation of sound policies in the ever-changing global environment. When capacity constraints prevent provision of specific mandatory data series, the Fund stands ready to support its members through capacity development, including technical assistance (TA) and training, to help gradually build the needed ability to produce data. Nonetheless, lack of capacity will not excuse a member indefinitely from its obligation to provide information—members are expected to improve their statistical reporting systems over time.

8. **In addition to the mandatory data provision framework, there is a voluntary framework for data publication based on the IMF's Data Standards Initiatives that set international dissemination standards for data transparency**.[7] Fund members provide far more data to the Fund than the mandatory data, including for operational purposes in the context of bilateral surveillance. There are some overlaps between the mandatory data and the indicators encouraged to be published under the voluntary framework with the intent of facilitating widespread access to the data essential to assess economic conditions and policies. There are also other important synergies between the mandatory and voluntary frameworks, as discussed in Background Paper, Section II.

9. **There are several modalities for members to provide the mandatory data to the Fund**. These include direct provision through the IMF's Area Departments and the Statistics Department (STA) or publication. The chosen avenue of data provision is agreed between the authorities and staff. While the Fund encourages publication of Board documents, it does not mandate public disclosure of data provided by members to the Fund. Information provided to the Board under Article VIII, Section 5 may be on a confidential basis, as elaborated below.

10. **The Fund treats confidential data with utmost discretion and has a fully developed framework for handling confidential information.** Article VIII, Section 5 requires provision of the data to the Fund, and if members so desire, they can request the data to be treated as confidential, for which the Fund has a fully developed framework for protecting confidential information (Background Paper, Section III and IMF, 2014). The Executive Board, Management, and staff cannot disclose non-public information to third parties or the public unless the member consents. Depending on the level of confidentiality requested by the authorities, sharing of the data among staff may also be restricted to those with the strict need to know.[8] The data is used to inform staff's

---

[7] In this review, Data Standards Initiatives and data dissemination initiatives are used interchangeably.

[8] For example, in case of the foreign exchange intervention data, staff with the strict need to know would typically include selected staff on the relevant country team in an area department, and as needed, small teams working on

(continued)

analysis, including in the context of preparing staff reports where staff do not include in staff reports information designated as confidential.[9] While Executive Directors primarily rely on staff analysis in the conduct of surveillance, they can in principle request the underlying mandatory data, although such requests are very rare in practice. Should such a request be made, data can be shared with the Board using various modalities, considering the authorities' preferences. For instance, data can be provided to the Board orally during a Board meeting.[10] Alternatively, data can be shared electronically through the existing IMF systems. As a newly proposed option, staff stand ready to carry out further work on establishing a dedicated electronic platform for confidential data transmission and access, including by leveraging the IMF's existing platforms already used by many central banks. This platform could be used on an optional basis by those members who prefer keeping their data in strict confidence (Background paper, Section VIII). Finally, the data could be stored on a hardcopy in a secure office.

# DEVELOPMENTS IN DATA PROVISION SINCE THE 2012 REVIEW

**11. Data provision under the DPF framework has been improving, allowing the Fund to better discharge its surveillance duties.** A stock-taking exercise confirms that the mandatory data provision as proxied by the Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (the TCIRS table included in Article IV staff reports) has been increasing from an already high level over the past decade. Figure 2 compares data provision in a balanced sample of 154 countries with Article IV consultations held during 2012–13 (last DPF review), 2018–19 (pre-COVID), and 2020–21 (pandemic period):

- Virtually all members report most existing required indicators, pointing to strong cooperation between the Fund and its members, including during the pandemic;
- Significant progress has been made in the provision of data on the international investment position and general government fiscal flows, where the initial reporting rates were lower a decade ago than for other indicators. Nevertheless, members should continue their efforts to improve data availability, given the remaining data gaps notably in low- and middle-income countries.

**12. Frequency and timeliness of data provision remain guided by the Fund's surveillance needs.** The current framework for data provision does not mandate minimum timeliness or

---

relevant multilateral surveillance activities such as the *External Sector Report* or the Board presentation on *External Sector Assessments of the Fund's Wider Membership*.

[9] Members may also request deletions of non-public, highly market-sensitive material from the staff report, in conformity with the Fund's Transparency Policy.

[10] Even where the associated staff report does not contain confidential information, where strictly confidential information is disclosed orally during a Board meeting, and the area department or ED notifies SEC of that fact, the minutes of such Board meeting would be classified as strictly confidential. Further, under existing procedures, informal restricted sessions can be held where needed to convey highly confidential information.

maximum frequency, recognizing diverse surveillance needs and conditions across the Fund membership, including statistical capacity. In practice, the obligation is considered met when information is provided according to country-specific understandings between the IMF country teams and the authorities, geared toward supporting bilateral and multilateral surveillance. In the absence of specific understandings, general understandings drawn from internationally accepted practices are used by staff to assess compliance with the obligation.

**Figure 2. Data Provision to the Fund—Developments since the 2012 DPF Review**

(In percent of total sample)




Sources: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (TCIRS) in Article IV staff reports and a survey of IMF country teams. The sample is a balanced panel of 154 members that held Article IV consultations during 2012–13. For 2020–21, information from Article IV reports has been supplemented with the survey of country teams given the temporary extension of deadlines for Article IV consultations.

**13. Timeliness of data provision has been broadly in line with the IMF data dissemination initiatives.** Figure 3 benchmarks the timeliness for the gross domestic product (GDP), central government debt, consumer price index (CPI), and broad money data reported in the TCIRS against the commitments under the IMF data dissemination initiatives. All SDDS and SDDS Plus countries provide data with timeliness in line with their commitments under the dissemination standards. While only encouraged for e-GDDS countries, the number of e-GDDS countries providing timely data in line with the SDDS/SDDS Plus requirements has increased over time.

**Figure 3. Timeliness of Data Provision**




Sources: IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB) and TCIRS from Article IV Staff Reports. The vertical axis shows the number of member countries. Vertical dotted lines represent the timeliness encouraged (e-GDDS) or required (SDDS/SDDS Plus) under the dissemination initiatives. Charts cover SDDS Plus, SDDS, and e-GDDS participants disseminating data in the DSBB database through a National Summary Data Page (NSDP). E-GDDS participants not yet disseminating through a NSDP are included only if they had Article IV consultations in both vintages, with information sourced from TCIRSs

**14. Improvements in data provision to the Fund have been supported by the Fund's capacity development (CD) efforts and data dissemination initiatives**. The number of countries benefiting from TA and training has grown strongly in recent years (Box 1, Figure 4). One of the donor-supported programs, the Data for Decisions Fund (D4D), targets low- and lower-middle-income countries, including fragile states, and aims to improve the availability and quality of data for macroeconomic policy making and achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As of January 2024, 33 small and fragile states plus 22 low-income countries—excluding the small and fragile states to avoid double counting—have implemented the e-GDDS and begun publishing macroeconomic data essential for surveillance through National Summary Data Pages (official websites) on a pre-announced schedule. In addition, three low-income countries are subscribed to the SDDS.

## Box 1. Capacity Development to Improve Data Production

**CD activities on data have increased substantially in recent years across domains, including with support of two multi-partner vehicle trust funds.** Overall, CD mission delivery measured in annual FTEs increased by about 60 percent since 2010–11, with a greater focus on low-income countries and fragile states, supported by the Financial Sector Stability Fund (FSSF) launched in 2017 and the Data for Decisions Fund (D4D) in 2018. Both funds are designed to help finance CD activities in support of surveillance in low- and lower-middle-income countries.

**Expansion of CD in Support of Data for Surveillance**
(average FTEs per time period; fiscal years)




Source: Fund staff calculations

**Staff continues to work with key stakeholders to adjust the CD product mix and enhance its effectiveness.** The share of statistical CD delivered to fragile and conflict affected states (FCS) states has hovered around between one-third and one-fourth of TA missions, with a positive trend since the end of the pandemic as absorptive capacity in fragile states is recovering. On CD modalities, TA missions account for about three-fourths of CD, with associated training and workshops delivered at regional CD centers, complemented by a comprehensive online training curriculum for macroeconomic and financial statistics, financed by the Data for Decision Fund (D4D).

**The FSSF and D4D has greatly helped member countries build capacity in compiling Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) and broader fiscal data.** The statistics workstream under the FSSF is targeting nearly *universal* coverage of low and lower-middle-income countries in reporting FSIs. In parallel, work under the D4D is focused on expanding the coverage of fiscal and debt reporting for the general government for low and lower-middle-income countries. These initiatives have helped address capacity constraints for countries that plan to graduate from the e-GDDS to the SDDS (IMF, 2022a).

**During the pandemic, CD on data issues has encountered a tension between strong demand for data to guide policies and scarce resources in low-income countries and fragile states, overstretched by competing crisis management demands.** In response, STA, while keeping the number of CD missions broadly constant, quickly adjusted the delivery modality of CD relative to changes in demand and absorptive capacity, aiming for shorter interventions, with a view to addressing specific needs of the authorities. These included, for example, hands-on support in compiling CPI and GDP to address larger seasonal adjustment reflecting the pandemic and increases in informality; and delivering webinars on how to account for various fiscal stimulus measures in the fiscal accounts. Since the easing of the pandemic allowed STA to resume in-person CD delivery, the demand for CD with a strategic, medium-term objective has recovered.

**Figure 4. Fund Capacity Development Efforts and Implementation of IMF Data Standards Initiatives**




Sources: IMF staff estimates and IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board. Country groupings have been adjusted to make them non-overlapping. EMDEs includes emerging market and developing economies, excluding LICs, fragile and small states; LICs includes low-income countries, excluding fragile and small states.

# NEW ASSESSMENT OF DATA ADEQUACY FOR SURVEILLANCE[11]

15. **Effective surveillance requires a candid assessment of data adequacy for conducting analysis and formulating policy advice.** Staff has been required, as part of the Article IV consultation, to assess the adequacy of member countries' data for surveillance. In addition to an assessment in Statistical Issues Appendix (SIA),[12] data issues are expected to be discussed in the main text of the Article IV staff report. Major deficiencies also need to be covered in the staff appraisal to ensure that readers can appreciate the extent to which data weaknesses might undermine the quality of staff analysis and policy advice. This approach seeks to ensure due attention to data issues in surveillance and prompt corrective actions if warranted, with staff proposing corrective measures and CD support as needed. In line with current practice, the data adequacy assessment (DAA) is not intended to evaluate whether a country's statistical practices adhere to the latest methodological standards.[13] Instead, it focuses on examining how the data provided to the Fund affects the country team's ability to conduct effective surveillance.

[11] Wording of this section follows IMF (2023b).

[12] The SIA was endorsed by the Board in 2004 (see IMF, 2004, Public Information Notice/04/37) and refined in subsequent reviews of the Data Provision Frameworks and in 2015 with the introduction of the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (see Public Information Notice/08/60, Public Information Notice/12/125, and Decision No. 15827-(15/67), Annex I).

[13] A different framework, the Data Quality Assessment Framework (DQAF), is used for the assessment of conformity with best statistical practices, including internationally accepted methodologies, and serves as framework for the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), prepared by the Statistics Department.

**16. A framework for assessing data adequacy for surveillance was first endorsed by the Board in 1995 and amended several times to facilitate greater candor.** The DAA classification framework in place prior to this review was introduced in 2008,[14] followed by operational improvements in 2012.[15] That framework required country teams to make judgments as to whether, on aggregate, data is adequate for surveillance, broadly adequate, or has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.[16] The SIA was amended in 2012, with a greater focus on data issues affecting financial sector surveillance in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008.[17]

**17. Assessments of data adequacy for surveillance have been broadly stable since the last DPF review (Figure 5), but significant room for improvement was identified.** Most country teams—more than 85 percent in 2022—assessed data as either adequate or broadly adequate to conduct surveillance. However, the 2016 IEO Report pointed out that the assessments of data adequacy in staff documents tend to be more-favorable-than-warranted. The IEO evaluators concluded that the lack of candor stems from several factors, including insufficient attention given to data quality and concerns about undermining the relationship with country authorities as well as the credibility of staff's analysis and policy advice. In addition, the IEO Report noted that the SIA "is largely ignored by country authorities and the Board" because it is not integrated in the staff report. In 2018, when endorsing the Overarching Strategy on Data and Statistics, the Board acknowledged that while data adequacy assessments rely on the judgment of country teams, they lack a clear statement of the country teams' rationale for the assessment. For these reasons, the Board supported the introduction of a more structured and principle-based framework that would highlight data weaknesses more transparently and indicate how they hinder IMF staff's analyses and policy advice. The strengthened framework will also facilitate policy dialogue with country authorities on data issues and improve the prioritization of capacity development efforts, by more clearly identifying areas where data needs to be improved. This would further enhance the integration of surveillance and CD.

[14] See IMF (2008).

[15] See IMF (2012).

[16] The 2022 Guidance Note for Surveillance under Article IV Consultations already mentions four data adequacy categories in anticipation of changes being introduced in this new framework (see below), given Board endorsement of those changes prior to the completion of the Guidance Note (IMF, 2022b).

[17] IMF (2013).

**Figure 5. Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance—Current Framework**




Source: IMF staff estimates based on Article IV consultations staff reports.

**18. The new DAA framework offers a more structured, granular, and principle-based assessment of data adequacy for surveillance, while taking into consideration resource constraints:**

- **Streamlined questionnaire, complemented with data quality factsheets:** Twenty country teams were involved in the 2019 DAA trial exercise. They supported the new framework, appreciating the further integration of data issues, surveillance, and CD. They indicated that completing the questionnaire for the first time required just a few hours. In the subsequent, more comprehensive review process for the draft technical note for implementation of the new DAA, area departments raised concerns about resource implications, including the time needed for discussions during Article IV missions. To address this concern, STA significantly streamlined the questionnaire compared to the version discussed in the March 2022 Board paper on the DPF Review, reducing the number of questions from 30 to 18 (see Background Paper, Section IV). Factual questions in the previous version of the questionnaire, for example, on the GDP base year, were removed. Instead, STA will provide country teams with a new internal tool reporting facts about a country's data and metadata, which will support greater objectivity in the assessment of data adequacy. To generate these data quality factsheets, STA is developing an internal database, drawing from several IMF datasets and data disseminated by country authorities.

- **Country teams' assessment informed by data quality characteristics relevant for surveillance:** The revised questionnaire includes questions by sector (national accounts, price indices, government finance and debt statistics, external sector statistics, and monetary and financial statistics) that span data quality characteristics such as coverage, frequency/timeliness, reliability, consistency, and data granularity. Country teams will assess if the data for each sector is adequate for surveillance, taking into consideration factual information about data quality characteristics (provided in the factsheets) and their own judgement. Large differences between objective data quality characteristics and the country team's questionnaire responses will be discussed during the internal Article IV review process, and if needed, explained in the Article IV staff report.

- **Greater granularity in the classification of data adequacy**. As endorsed by the Board in the March 2022 meeting on the DPF Review, the assessment categories were increased from three to four categories of data adequacy (A, B, C, and D), with categories A and B denoting that data are adequate or broadly adequate for surveillance and categories C and D denoting that data weaknesses hamper surveillance to some degree or significantly (Figure 6). Increasing the number of categories allows for more differentiation, reducing the moral hazard problems that have led to the bunching of assessments in the "broadly adequate for surveillance" (B) category.

- **More transparent discussion of data issues in Article IV staff reports**. In line with existing practice, country teams should include their assessment of the country's overall data adequacy for surveillance in Article IV staff reports. Reflecting the recommendations of the 2016 IEO Report to more prominently highlight data issues, a new Data Issues Annex (DIA) will be introduced to replace the current SIA, which is part of the Informational Annex. The new DIA will be moved from the Informational Annex into the main staff report and will summarize the sector specific assessments from the questionnaire and provide an explanation of the rationale for the overall assessment. It will also outline any needed corrective action, including the authorities' plans to address data gaps and priorities for CD. The DIA will continue to include the Table for Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (TCIRS)[18] and information on the country's participation in the IMF Data Standards Initiatives. For category C and D countries, data issues should be explicitly discussed in AIV staff reports; and major deficiencies (Category D countries) will need to be discussed in the staff appraisal (see IMF, 2022).

- **Dynamic enhancements going forward**: The DAA questionnaire and the data quality fact sheet will be fine-tuned over time based on feedback from country authorities and IMF staff. STA will maintain a database to store country teams' responses to the questionnaire, the overall assessment rating, and corrective action to facilitate monitoring and evaluation.

[18] When completed, the DPF Review may update the list of mandatory series. The list of the indicators in the TCIRS table will be updated accordingly.

**Figure 6. Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance—Proposed Changes**




Source: IMF staff.

**19. STA will continue to support country teams during the implementation of the new DAA and is planning outreach events for country authorities.** STA is allocating resources (1 Full Time Equivalent, FTE) to support country teams when preparing the first DAA for an Article IV consultation. Once the new framework is established, the resource demands on country authorities, IMF country teams, reviewing departments, and STA are expected to be moderate, as the one-time investment in the DAA will be followed by regular updates in future Article IV consultations. STA will plan outreach events during the 2024 Spring Meetings to raise awareness among country authorities of the new DAA framework and their implications for surveillance. STA also stands ready to engage with country authorities by remotely attending data-related discussions during Article IV missions. A new pilot initiative to place STA economists on Article IV missions would also help facilitate the transition, albeit the initial number of missions covered will be small. During STA direct support to country teams in January 2024, teams have welcomed the new DAA's structure, granularity and the supplementary information provided in the quality factsheets.

**20. In December 2023, the Board endorsed the introduction of the new DAA framework in Article IV consultations initiated (i.e., when the Policy Consultation Meeting takes place) after February 1, 2024.** Given the significant delay in implementing the DAA, compared to the originally envisaged schedule, staff proposed, and the Board endorsed proceeding with the implementation of the new DAA framework, including the replacement of the SIA with the new DIA, which will be moved to be an annex to the main staff report, ahead of the completion of the DPF Review. The new start date will give staff sufficient time and a predictable schedule to plan the implementation of the DAA.

# EXPANDING THE PERIMETER OF REQUIRED DATA PROVISION

**21. Adapting the perimeter of mandatory data provision to the evolving global economy is critical for keeping Fund surveillance effective**. The salient global developments have included rising debt levels, resurgence of inflation and associated rapid tightening of monetary policy, a more complex and interconnected financial sector, and cross-border tensions, among others. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the macroeconomic landscape, the CSR identified three urgent gaps in the existing data provision framework: public sector data, data on foreign exchange intervention, and indicators for macrofinancial analysis.[19] Enhancing data provision to the Fund in these areas would help deliver on the CSR's surveillance priorities of (i) confronting risks and uncertainties, (ii) preempting and mitigating spillovers, (iii) fostering economic sustainability, and (iv) delivering unified policy advice.

**22. This section presents staff proposals for new data reporting requirements.** These proposals, summarized in Table 1 and presented more fully in Annex II and Background Paper, Section V, were informed by both formal and informal engagements with Executive Directors and the Board. Furthermore, two surveys, one with the Fund's country teams and the other with country authorities, provided important information on current data production and provision. Developing staff proposals inevitably involved a trade-off between the data needs of the Fund and the burden placed on members. Less ambitious proposals would reduce the resource requirements placed on members but would entail higher surveillance risks and a reduced capacity to monitor developments and provide advice. Where capacity remains a constraint, there may also be a tradeoff between improving quality of the data already provided to the Fund and broadening the perimeter of mandatory data provision. These trade-offs can be managed in several ways:

- ***Dialogue with the membership, including through surveys, has helped to prioritize the proposed requirements.*** Following from this process, certain initial proposals preferred by staff were streamlined (in particular, those related to foreign exchange intervention and fiscal indicators), with the scope of some data requirements narrowed, while some other indicators were moved from the mandatory to a voluntary list. In contrast, the proposal to require provision of macrofinancial indicators was endorsed by the Executive Board—in the version preferred by staff—in March 2022.

- ***New requirements can be phased in gradually, recognizing capacity constraints.*** Even after the updated data requirements come into force, the lack of capacity to compile the required data would remain valid grounds for non-provision of required data, although members would be expected to develop the needed statistical capacity over time.

[19] See IMF (2021c) and IMF (2021d).

- ***Finally, staff proposed that some of the new data requirements be applicable to only a subset of the membership.***[20] The Board has the discretion to require certain data from only a subset of the membership, if based on a relevant economic difference that impacts the data needed by the Fund to conduct surveillance and other activities.[21] In this vein, staff proposed—and the Executive Board endorsed in March 2022—that certain macrofinancial indicators only be required from member countries designated by the Fund as having systemically important financial sectors (Background Paper, Section IX).

## A. Public Sector Data

### Context

**23. Analysis of fiscal risks is one of the key areas of Fund surveillance**. Public debt levels are trending towards record highs (Figure 7) as the pandemic has triggered a sharp drop in revenues and large increases in public spending. Managing higher debt loads will be a key feature of the macroeconomic landscape for years to come, especially as persistent inflationary pressures keep nominal interest rates elevated. Sound policymaking will require a firm grasp of the complementarities and trade-offs among policies and over time. Worsening of risk sentiment could increase the likelihood of debt crises in debtor economies. To provide relevant and credible policy advice, the Fund will need to continue scrutinizing debt developments closely, with more comprehensive and granular data.

**Figure 7. Gross Public Debt**
(Percent of GDP)




Sources: Historical Public Debt Database and WEO.

[20] See IMF (2003) at para. 15, noting that information may be required under Article VIII, Section 5 by a decision of the Fund that is general (i.e., applying to all members or a group of members) or country-specific in nature.

[21] The Fund's principle of uniformity of treatment requires that similarly situated members be treated similarly. Thus, differential treatment is allowed when there are differences among members relevant to the power being exercised. Any decision to require data from a subset of Fund members would need to take into account the specific economic conditions of a member (or group of members). An example of this approach in a separate context is the integration of mandatory financial stability assessments (FSAs) for certain members into Article IV surveillance based on the size and interconnectedness of those members' financial sectors. See IMF (2021b).

**Table 1. New Indicators Proposed for Mandatory Provision to the Fund[1]**

| Public sector data | Foreign exchange intervention data | Macrofinancial data * | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***For all members*** | ***For all members*** | ***For all members*** | ***For members with systemically important financial sectors*** |
| General government debt[2]<br><br>General government debt[2] – at least 80 percent of the stock decomposed by currency, residency[3], and maturity<br><br>Central and general government debt – at least 80 percent of the stock decomposed by creditor type and instruments<br><br>Central and general government debt – by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors[4]<br><br>Liquid financial assets of central and general government | Spot FXI by the central bank<br><br>Derivatives FXI by the central bank<br><br>**Transactions among central banks**<br><br>***For all members***<br><br>Swaps and repurchase agreements among central banks | Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) for commercial banks:<br>• Capital adequacy<br>• Asset quality<br>• Earnings and profitability<br>• Liquidity<br>• Sensitivity to market risk<br><br>Credit and assets for other depository corporations (central bank excluded):<br>• Totals and breakdowns by sector and domestic vs. foreign currency denomination | Other Financial Corporations' credit and financial assets:<br>• Totals and breakdowns by sector and domestic vs. foreign currency denomination<br><br>Residential real estate price index |

[1] The more detailed list of indicators can be found in Annex II, and recommended definitions are provided in Background Paper, Section V.

[2] The central government counterpart is already required under the 2004 Board Decision. The central government debt decompositions required under the 2004 Board Decision (specifically, the debt decompositions by maturity, currency, and residency when data are amenable to this classification) will continue to be required for the entire debt stock (that is, 100 percent coverage).

[3] Breakdown by residency is required only when data is amenable to this classification.

[4] Breakdown by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditor for central and general government debt would be required only when such debt constitutes 20 percent or more of total debt stock at the central or general government levels, respectively, for each reporting year.

* Macrofinancial indicators were endorsed by the Executive Board in March 2022.

**24. Fiscal risks are primarily assessed based on the stock and composition of debt, public gross financing needs (reflecting the fiscal deficit and debt amortization), financing sources, and contingent liabilities**. Assessing such risks requires having adequate data on debt composition, investor base, and liquidity buffers to evaluate rollover and liquidity risks and the impact of exchange rate and interest rate movements. In addition, fiscal risks may accumulate outside of the central government, including in local, provincial, and regional governments, and non-financial public corporations (NFPCs), whose liabilities may end up being paid partially or fully by the central government if the original obligor is unable to honor its debts. Studies have shown that the average cost of government intervention in state-owned enterprise (SOEs) across a sample of 80 countries during the 1990s and 2010–18 was above 5 percent of GDP, while the bail out cost exceeded 10 percent of GDP in some cases (Baum and others, 2020).

**25. Current data provision requirements should be enhanced to facilitate improved assessments of sovereign risks and fiscal space, as highlighted in the 2021 CSR.** Under the current framework, the requirement to provide debt data to the Fund is limited to the stocks of central government debt and central government-guaranteed debt. This contrasts with the broader coverage required for fiscal flows (revenue, expenditure, balance, and composition of financing) which includes both general and central government. Although breakdowns by residency, currency, and maturity are currently required at the central government level, no information on debt holders or instrument types is mandated. No information on liquidity buffers of the government is required either.

**26. The need for a broader and more consistent debt coverage has been a recurrent topic for the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) and Debt Limit Policy (DLP) reviews**. More comprehensive public sector data provision requirements would enhance the Fund's capacity to assess fiscal space and analyze risks to fiscal and external sustainability, while supporting efforts to enhance public debt transparency.

- ***The DSA reviews for both market-access countries (MAC) and low-income countries (LIC) have made a clear case for a broader-than-central-government coverage of debt to assess sovereign risks and debt sustainability.***[22] General government (including local governments) plus NFPCs that constitute material fiscal risks is the expected coverage of debt for the market-access countries, as reconfirmed in the latest Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework (SRDSF). The LIC Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) calls for analysis based on total public and publicly guaranteed debt whenever possible, including debt of NFPCs except those shown to constitute limited fiscal risks.

- ***Reviews of the MAC DSA and the DLP also made the case for requiring the composition of debt by holder type.***[23] Information about who holds the debt provides information on debt rollover risks that is a key part of debt sustainability assessments. The seniority structure of

[22] The MAC DSA was reviewed in January 2021 and the new Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework was rolled out during 2022. See IMF (2020d), IMF (2018a), and IMF (2022c).

[23] See paragraphs 35–41 in IMF (2020c). Also, see Annex VII of IMF (2020d).

payments (impacted by debt collateralization, among other factors),[24] and the ability to restructure debt in an adverse scenario are also key to determine fiscal risks, including for the most vulnerable low-income members, as observed in recent debt restructuring cases.

**Enhancing Public Sector Data Provision**

**27. To help address the above critical data needs, this review proposes that the Fund require provision of broader and more granular debt data (Background Paper, Section V)**. This would entail:

- Broadening the aggregate debt data coverage to include general government debt;[25]
- A new breakdown of central and general government debt by creditor type and instrument type. Moreover, a breakdown of debt by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors would also be required for the central and general government debt, whenever the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is at least 20 percent of the total debt stock at the central or general government levels (both excluding guaranteed debt), respectively, for each reporting year;[26, 27]
- Extension of the existing breakdowns by maturity, currency, and residency to cover the general government, in addition to the central government. The breakdown by maturity can be provided in either of two forms: either as a breakdown of debt stock by residual maturity (one year or less; more than one year), or through provision of the corresponding amortization schedule,

---

[24] Collateralized debt and complex instruments could be a source of risks, for example by amplifying negative financial shocks and diluting the rights of other creditors.

[25] Staff also proposed mandatory provision of aggregated debt and profit/loss information on non-financial public corporations (NFPC). While staff offered several alternative specifications of the NFPC data requirement, some Directors continued to have concerns about the countries' ability to collect these data given current legal structures and information systems; views also differed on how to define NFPCs that pose fiscal risks. Staff also proposed to include general government-guaranteed debt in the perimeter of mandatory data provision. However, many Executive Directors raised concerns about the potential cost implications of this indicator and, in some cases, limited legal authority of their central governments to collect this data.

[26] The 20 percent threshold is set at a level that captures most of the DSSI-eligible countries (95 percent)—which are considered more vulnerable to debt crises—while also capturing countries where debt to multilaterals and official bilateral creditors encompasses a significant share of total debt. At the same time, this threshold mitigates the reporting burden on non-DSSI eligible countries as 53 percent of them would not have to provide such detailed data. Calculations are based on the World Bank's IDS database as well as the database in Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014).

[27] Multilateral creditors would be broken down by IMF, WB, ADB/AfDB/IADB, and other multilaterals. Official bilateral creditors would be broken down by country, showing: (i) among Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt; and (ii) among non-Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt. In contrast with the IMF's Policy on Debt Limits, the DPF does not require disclosing the debt to individual commercial creditors, and only requires disclosing individual official bilateral credit aggregated at the country level to avoid revealing the affairs of individuals or corporations. This categorization of multilateral and official bilateral creditors may not necessarily reflect the perimeter for the application of the Fund's lending into arrears policies. As in the Debt Limits Policy, the categorization of these creditors as official is based on their classification by the debtor country.

distinguishing between amortizations scheduled within a year and amortizations scheduled beyond one year. The member should specify which of these two breakdowns is being chosen;

- Data on financial liquid assets, an important mitigating factor for liquidity and sustainability risks, would be required at the central and general government levels.

**28. For the newly proposed debt breakdowns at the central government level (by creditor type and by instrument) and for all debt breakdowns at the general government level, decomposition of the full debt stock will not be required.** Instead, coverage of at least 80 percent of the central and general government debt stocks, respectively, will be required when providing these debt decompositions.[28] Staff proposes this threshold approach because calculating the breakdowns over the entire debt stock may be prohibitively expensive for some members given limitations in their information systems. For the debt segment for which the breakdown is not provided, information about the instrument type or issuing government unit (e.g., state government or local government) will have to be provided as part of the member's obligation. Nonetheless, the provision of full coverage is encouraged when available, and members are encouraged to explain the reasons for leaving part of the debt out of the breakdown.[29]

**29. Members may face practical difficulties in identifying holders of publicly traded external debt securities, which calls for additional flexibility in the specification of data requirements.** The external debt statistics guide (IMF, 2014c) suggests that, in these circumstances, countries "might attribute the value of all (external) debt securities to "other sectors" when breaking debt down by creditor type. If so, this assumption would need to be clearly identified in any presentation of data because it may be only very broadly reliable; for instance, monetary authorities hold significant quantities of cross-border securities as part of their foreign exchange reserves." For the purposes of the debt breakdowns by (i) creditor type (at the central government and general government levels) and (ii) residency (at the general government level), publicly traded external debt securities can be attributed to foreign private creditor category when members are facing practical difficulties in identifying holders of such securities. The value of the publicly traded external debt securities would count toward the 80 percent minimum coverage stipulated for provision of the debt breakdowns by creditor type (at the central government and general government levels) and by residency (at the general government level). This flexibility responds to concerns from some members that distinguishing holder types is difficult for debt securities traded in financial markets.

**30. The proposed new requirements are accompanied by recommended definitions of indicators (Background Paper, Section V).** As is already the case under the DPF framework, the recommended definitions for all proposed new indicators are derived from internationally accepted

---

[28] For the central government debt, the decompositions required under the 2004 Board Decision (specifically, the debt decompositions by maturity, currency, and residency when data are amenable to this classification) will continue to be required for the entire debt stock (that is, 100 percent coverage).

[29] Staff sensitivity analysis based on a subset of countries for which sufficient information is available suggests that, in most situations, the information value of the debt breakdowns based on less-than-complete information should be sufficient for surveillance purposes, while providing important cost relief to members. Therefore, staff assess that a coverage of at least 80 percent of total stock will be sufficient for the effective discharge of the Fund's duties.

practices and constitute the general understandings that will apply in the absence of specific understandings between staff and the authorities. Specific understandings on definitions are acceptable as long as members provide adequately detailed specifications of the data and such specifications are consistent with commonly understood meanings of a particular indicator.[30] Put differently, the DPF framework allows for flexibility on the specific definitions of indicators, considering that member-specific circumstances including capacity constraints can make alternative definitions more appropriate.[31]

### Impact of Staff Proposals on Member Countries

**Figure 8a. Availability of Selected Public Sector Indicators: Survey of IMF Country Teams [1]**

(Sample 190 Members)




Sources: Survey of IMF country teams and staff calculations.

[1] GG debt by creditor indicates availability of GG debt decomposition based on the creditor classification in Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) (foreign official, foreign banks, foreign non-banks, domestic central bank, domestic banks, and domestic non-banks), while GG debt by creditor (World Bank) indicates availability of GG debt decomposition based on the creditor classification in World Bank International Debt Statistics (foreign bond holders, foreign commercial banks, and other foreign private creditors). These decompositions do not exactly match with the decomposition by creditor type under the proposed requirements on public sector data provision.

[30] To avoid ambiguity, staff shall have understandings with the authorities on the relevant definitions. The authorities and staff could choose to record specific understandings in writing to the extent possible. However, it is recognized that specific understandings can be evidenced *de facto* through long-standing data provision practices established between members and staff. In order to ensure appropriate application of the remedial framework, it is important that, where relevant, mutually acceptable specific understandings be in place *before* data provision practices change or shortcomings are identified. It is also important to distinguish the specific understandings on the data that is required for the Fund's activities (both content and frequency/timeliness) and any additional information being provided by the member voluntarily.

[31] The 2004 Decision included the definitions of "general government" and "gross external debt." During this DPF Review, staff proposed to change the definition of general government, to bring it in line with the GFSM2014 principles. However, a few Directors noted that this change would in some cases cause implementation challenges. Therefore, this review proposes to maintain the definitions from the 2004 Decision. In line with the long-standing practice, staff may choose to make adjustments to the data provided by the authorities where, in staff's view, such adjusted data better reflect the country-specific circumstances of members.

**31. Staff analysis suggests that the more comprehensive public sector data requirements would be manageable, but require substantial transition periods**. According to the survey of IMF country teams, about 70 percent of members provide information on the total stock of general government debt ("GG debt"). However, general government debt decompositions are generally less frequently available (Figure 8a).

**Figure 8b. Availability of Selected Public Sector Indicators: Survey of Country Authorities [1]**
(Percent of Members that Produce Data Among 84 Respondents)




Sources: Survey of IMF members and staff calculations.

[1] The figure shows shares of countries producing individual indicators among the 84 respondents. Shares of countries producing indicators at central government level are added on those at general government level whenever available (the survey did not include questions about decompositions of central government debt by maturity, currency, and residency).

**32. Much of the granular public debt data proposed for mandatory provision is already produced by most members that responded to the survey of country authorities (Background Paper, Section VI).** These include decompositions of GG debt by creditor, instrument, maturity, currency, and residency as well as the GG's liquid financial assets (Figure 8b). Also, based on the survey of country authorities, 15–20 percent of the respondents that do not produce the debt decomposition at the GG level actually produce it at the central government (CG) level.[32] As discussed in Section E, a longer transition period is proposed for decompositions of GG debt than aggregate GG debt, considering that some countries will need time, resources, and possibly legal changes to be able to prepare these decompositions.

**33. This review recommends that provision of certain granular fiscal data should be encouraged, but not required** (Background Paper, Section V). These data include the decompositions of GG debt by fixed/flexible interest rate, general government-guaranteed debt, GG and GG-guaranteed debt with unrelated collateral,[33] and debt, profit/loss, and liquid financial assets of NFPCs. Furthermore, as discussed in paragraph 28, the provision of full coverage for certain breakdowns of debt stock is encouraged when available. Based on the survey of country authorities (the survey of IMF country teams did not cover these variables), less than 50 percent of respondents produce information on the general government-guaranteed debt (Figure 8b). Survey responses also suggested that producing this data universally across the membership would likely prove costly and time consuming, and staff assess that the costs to the membership would exceed the surveillance benefits in most situations. As for debt guaranteed with unrelated collateral, this information is very important in the context of IMF lending—in this specific context, detailed disclosure of collateralized debt is covered under the IMF's *Policy on Debt Limits*. While, as noted in paragraph 27, the provision of the decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors would be required for central and general government debt where such debt constitutes a significant share of total debt at each level, respectively, the provision of such decomposition would be optional for guaranteed debt.[34]

---

[32] Responses to the survey of country authorities indicated concerns by a few members over contractual and domestic legal constraints to the provision of debt data. These constraints are taken into account in staff's recommendation of a transition period for these data requirements, which would allow members to align domestic regulations or agreements with counterparts with the new data provision requirements. Domestic law or contractual constraints are not considered a defense under the Fund's legal framework for non-provision of required information under Article VIII, Section 5.

[33] Collateralized debt is considered to have related collateral if the financing is used to purchase or construct a new asset (e.g., an airplane, an oil platform), and the asset or the future receipts it is expected to generate (e.g., airline ticket sales, or the revenues from the sale of oil) serve as collateral to secure the debt. An example for an unrelated collateralization is a budget loan collateralized with oil receivables. See IMF and WB (2020c).

[34] Some debt may be subject to confidentiality clauses which limit the authorities' disclosure, but the data can be provided confidentially, if members so desire, and such data would be subject to the Fund's confidentiality framework as described in paragraph 10 and Section III of the Background Paper. Also, note that information on bilateral official creditors would be required at the country level (not individual institutional level), while information at the individual institutional level is encouraged but not required (see the Background Paper Tables 1A and 1B for details). If confidentiality clauses still prevent disclosures, the authorities are encouraged to work with creditors as needed to permit disclosure, and a transition period is proposed to meet the requirement to report credit by individual official creditors at the creditor-country level.

## B. Foreign Exchange Intervention

### Context

**34. Assessing balance of payments stability and exchange rate policies stands at the core of the Fund's surveillance mandate.** Article IV establishes a general obligation for members to collaborate with the Fund and other members to ensure orderly exchange arrangements and promote stability of the system of exchange rates—systemic stability. The 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) clarified that systemic stability is most effectively achieved by each member adopting policies that promote balance of payments (BoP) stability and domestic stability.[35] The concept of BoP stability is anchored on the exchange rate: it refers to a BoP position that does not, and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive exchange rate movements. The Fund, in turn, is obliged to monitor members' compliance with their obligations under Article IV and conduct firm surveillance over exchange rate policies (bilateral surveillance). Further, the Fund must oversee the international monetary system to ensure its effective operation (multilateral surveillance).[36]

**35. Access to timely and comprehensive data on foreign exchange interventions (FXI) is key for the Fund to carry out effective bilateral and multilateral surveillance**. The ISD provides five guiding principles for members in the conduct of their policies ("Principles for the Guidance of Members' Policies", or "the Principles").[37] As part of bilateral surveillance, the Fund is required to assess members' adherence to the Principles. For the purpose of Fund surveillance of the Principles, the ISD also identifies certain developments that would require thorough review and might indicate the need for discussion with a member. Two of the five Principles and one of the indicators that may warrant additional discussion with the member about the observance of the Principles directly address foreign exchange intervention, making FXI data provision to the Fund critical, particularly in cases of large external imbalances and (presumed) one-sided intervention.[38]

**36. Accurate data on FXI is also an important input for the Fund in undertaking external sector assessments (ESAs) and making other policy assessments.** The ESAs are a key component of Fund surveillance, as they help the Fund assess members' BoP stability, evaluate adherence to the Principles, and monitor the effective operation of the international monetary system. FXI data is necessary as an input into the current account and real effective exchange rate models of the External Balance Assessment (EBA) and EBA-lite frameworks that inform staff's ESAs, and, together with international reserve levels, is one of the five key areas analyzed by staff to make a judgment

[35] Decision on Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance, Decision No. 15203-(12/72), July 18, 2012 ("ISD").

[36] Article IV, Section 3.

[37] ISD, para. 21.

[38] Principle B of the Principles establishes that "A member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter disorderly conditions, which may be characterized inter alia by disruptive short-term movements in the exchange rate of its currency." Principle C establishes that "Members should take into account in their intervention policies the interests of other members, including those of the countries in whose currencies they intervene." ISD, para. 21. One of the indicators that may warrant additional discussion with the member about the observance of the Principles is "Protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market." ISD, para. 22(i).

on countries' external positions. The majority of Fund members already publish or provide some FXI data to the Fund. However, as highlighted in the CSR, access to FXI data for all members would help undertake more precise external sector assessments and analyze risks to external stability, including spillovers and spillbacks, and better ensure even-handedness in surveillance. If provided frequently, FXI data would also facilitate the understanding and assessment of countries' monetary policy frameworks and the de-facto classification of exchange rate arrangements, helping assess whether policies are conducive to orderly economic and financial conditions.

37. **Enhanced access to data on FXI has become critical and urgent for effective surveillance** (Figure 9). Considering the widespread use of FXI as a policy tool and the more complex ways in which it is currently undertaken (including through derivative instruments and/or in some cases through market interventions by agencies other than the monetary authorities), access to FXI data has become increasingly important for Fund surveillance. In addition, the Fund is developing, and on a pilot basis implementing, an Integrated Policy Framework (IPF) to calibrate an appropriate mix of policies in response to macroeconomic and financial developments.[39] As part of this effort, staff are expected to deepen discussions with country authorities about FXI and its interactions with other policies to better inform the Fund's policy advice. For these engagements to be fruitful, enhanced access to FXI data is essential, as elaborated below.

**Figure 9. FXI Data Is Essential for Surveillance**




Source: IMF staff.

38. **Provision of FXI data should be enhanced to better support both bilateral and multilateral surveillance.** The majority of members publish or provide some FXI data to the Fund.[40] However, these data do not adhere to a well-defined, consistent methodology, varying substantially in coverage, format, frequency, and timeliness, which leaves gaps and hinders surveillance. Currently, there about 50 economies for which staff do not have any FXI data, accounting for one-third of global foreign exchange reserves, one-quarter of world GDP, and a fifth of global trade flows (Figure 10). In these cases, staff approximates FXI based on the stock of FX reserves and assumptions about their composition, valuation, and income earned on reserve assets. However,

[39] IMF (2020b).

[40] In recent years, the authorities of some countries have taken steps to increase data availability on FXI, including the European Central Bank, Korea, Singapore, and Switzerland.

depending on market movements and other factors, these estimates can be imprecise and/or contested by the authorities or other stakeholders, hampering staff's analysis and the credibility of Fund's surveillance.

**Figure 10. Provision of FXI Data to the Fund**

**Economic Importance of Members for which FXI Data Are Not Available**

(In percent)




Sources: AREAER, survey of IMF country teams, and staff calculations. For countries that are members of currency unions, FXI data provision has been assessed at the currency union level.

1/ GDP in US dollars.

2/ Trade flows = exports and imports.

## Enhancing Data Provision of FXI

**39. To help address this critical data need, it is proposed that members be required to provide the Fund with data on FXI.** While recognizing that there is no internationally accepted definition of FXI, this review proposes that, for the purposes of the DPF policy, the scope of the FXI data requirement comprises all purchases and sales of foreign exchange made by the central bank (or the corresponding monetary authority) in the spot market and through derivative financial instruments for the purposes of:

(i) influencing foreign exchange market conditions (i.e., the level or volatility of the exchange rate), including to stabilize and maintain orderly market conditions, support a managed or pegged exchange rate arrangement, or influence the monetary policy stance,

(ii) managing the level of international reserves (e.g., transactions to build up or sell international reserves), or

(iii) transferring exchange rate risk, including through non-deliverable financial derivatives that settle in local currency.[41, 42]

**40. The proposed new mandatory FXI data provision would consist of the two items below.** A more detailed description of the data provision requirement is available in Box 2 and Background Paper, Section V. A voluntary FXI reporting template is included in Background Paper, Section VII.[43, 44] In addition to the two mandatory indicators below, Fund staff will continue to request more granular information—to be provided by members on a voluntary basis—when needed, for example, for the determination of the de-facto exchange rate regime. The two mandatory data provision items would be:

(i) Spot FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority),

(ii) Derivatives FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority),

**41. Members are encouraged to provide additional, more granular data on a voluntary basis.** The DPF framework establishes the minimum mandatory set of data required for surveillance. As is always the case in Fund surveillance, members are encouraged to provide additional information on a voluntary basis. To complement the proposed FXI data provision requirement, members are encouraged to voluntarily provide more disaggregated, granular, frequent, and timely data, including for example data on gross FXI transactions (i.e., purchases and sales of foreign exchange) at the highest possible frequency (e.g., monthly or weekly) and (where applicable) interventions in offshore foreign exchange markets. Additionally, members are encouraged to voluntarily provide information on selected foreign exchange operations, such as total net foreign exchange transactions of the monetary authorities, net foreign exchange transactions undertaken by

---

[41] Under the ISD and earlier surveillance decisions, FXI has traditionally been understood to be an exchange rate policy—i.e., a policy undertaken for balance of payments purposes. See, e.g., IMF (2006b), footnote 22. The proposal coming out of the DPF review is consistent with that approach. It is important to note that policies undertaken for balance of payment purposes, including FXI, may or may not be undertaken with the specific purpose of affecting the exchange rate. While data provided to the Fund would facilitate assessment of members' policies, these assessments would continue to require further in-depth discussions with the authorities.

[42] During the March 2022 Board meeting, staff proposed a broader FXI data requirement for consideration by the Executive Board, comprising all purchases and sales of foreign exchange made by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) and other public sector entities conducting such transactions at the direction of the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority), including spot transactions and transactions with derivative instruments. Staff considered that the March 2022 proposal would have helped to produce objective, comprehensive, and comparable data across members. However, a few Directors preferred using a narrow scope of the FXI data requirement, noting that the proposed data requirement differed from how most central banks report and market participants understand FXI, and that the data could be costly to compile for some members. Many Directors also had concerns about the confidentiality and market sensitivity of the data. The revised staff proposal in this Board paper helps address the concerns raised by some members.

[43] Members that do not issue a domestic currency and have adopted a foreign currency as legal tender would only engage in FXI as defined for the purpose of the data requirement if they were to purchase or sell foreign currencies other than those adopted as legal tender. Otherwise, they would not have any data to report on the FXI items.

[44] Members belonging to currency unions that delegate FXI transactions to a supranational monetary authority may fulfill the FXI data requirement through reporting by the supranational monetary authority. If such transactions are not delegated or the national monetary authority engaged in transactions in addition to those undertaken by the supranational monetary authority, these should also be reported to fulfill the data requirement. As with all obligations under the Articles, the individual members retain responsibility for compliance.

the monetary authorities acting as financial agents of the government, direct purchases/sales of foreign exchange from/to public sector entities, and FXI undertaken by public sector entities at the direction of the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority), where applicable (Background Paper, Section VII).[45] Such additional data would facilitate a more in-depth understanding of the foreign exchange operations of the monetary authorities, foster greater cross-country comparability of the data, and allow for greater depth in policy discussions and advice. To encourage voluntary data provision, the Tenth Review of the IMF Data Standards Initiatives (IMF, 2022a) introduced detailed FXI data as encouraged data category for SDDS Plus countries.

### Box 2. Elaborating on the FXI Data Provision Requirement

**Provided FXI data will be analyzed in the context of other macroeconomic data, with due account of country-specific characteristics and policy frameworks.** As is always the case in the context of surveillance, the provision of data will be a starting point for analysis and policy discussions with the authorities. In interpreting the FXI data, staff will be guided by the overall macroeconomic conditions in which the FX transactions take place, additional information, and data that the authorities may provide on a voluntary basis, and the policy framework of the economy.

**Further to the scope set forth in paragraphs 39–40, for purposes of the data provision requirement under Article VIII, Section 5, the following transactions by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) would be presumed to constitute FXI:**

*(i) Influencing foreign exchange market conditions (i.e., the level or volatility of the exchange rate), including to stabilize and maintain orderly market conditions, support a managed or pegged exchange rate arrangement, or influence the monetary policy stance;*

- Intervention in the foreign exchange market by countries with floating exchange rate arrangements, to fight appreciation/depreciation pressure on the currency or dampen excessive market volatility and maintain orderly market conditions. For example, these transactions may take place in the context of shocks that are presumed to be temporary or at any other time if the monetary authorities feel that the level of the exchange rate is not in line with macroeconomic fundamentals and/or the volatility of the exchange rate is excessive.
- Intervention in the foreign exchange market by countries with pegged exchange rate arrangements to maintain the exchange rate at a certain level or range, or within a fluctuation band. These transactions would be inherent to such exchange rate arrangements.
- Intervention in the spot foreign exchange market by directly transacting with market participants, through intermediaries (e.g., financial institutions or a foreign exchange bureau), or through foreign exchange auctions.
- Intervention in the spot foreign exchange market to ease or tighten monetary policy conditions, for example when interest rates are considered to be at the effective lower bound or when interest rate transmission is considered to be weak. In some cases, FXI may be part of the member’s monetary policy framework.

*(ii) Managing the level of international reserves (e.g., transactions to build up or sell international reserves)*

[45] These data items are not within the scope of the proposed data provision requirement. If provided voluntarily, they could be provided as memo items.

## Box 2. Elaborating on the FXI Data Provision Requirement (concluded)

- Discretionary interventions to build international reserves. For example, opportunistic transactions to build reserves in the context of large financial inflows, a rise in commodity prices (in the case of a commodity exporter), or large foreign direct investment inflows.
- Interventions through preannounced programs of future foreign exchange purchases or sales.

*(iii) Transferring exchange rate risk, including through non-deliverable financial derivatives that settle in local currency.*

- Interventions in the forward or option markets, or in some cases central banks may provide foreign exchange hedging through financial derivatives that settle in local currency.

**The following transactions by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) would be presumed not to constitute FXI and therefore not to be within the scope of the FXI data provision requirement:**[1]

- Foreign exchange transactions undertaken for the normal administrative operation of the central bank (e.g., procurement transactions), reserve portfolio management operations, and foreign exchange transactions undertaken with or on behalf of other central banks.
- Direct FX transactions between the monetary authorities and the government and/or public sector agencies (e.g., SOEs).
- Transactions in which the foreign exchange transaction is offset by a corresponding change in foreign exchange assets or liabilities vis-à-vis the counterparty, which include:
    - Operations undertaken on behalf of public sector entities for which the central bank acts as financial agent (e.g., borrowing or repayment of loans);
    - Changes in foreign currency deposits by financial institutions at the central bank;
    - Foreign exchange swap and repurchase transactions with domestic entities (e.g., financial institutions) or other central banks;
    - Transactions with the IMF or other multilateral or bilateral creditors.

**Staff's assessment of the accuracy of provision of FXI will be based, inter alia, on cross-checks and consistency with other data.** As done with all data provided to the Fund under the mandatory data provision framework, staff will check the consistency of the data provided to the Fund with other macroeconomic variables. In the case of FXI, staff may compare the data against changes in reserves adjusted for estimated valuation changes and income earned on reserve assets. Staff will also rely on the list of transactions that are presumed or not presumed to constitute FXI, as described above.

**Where Fund staff has questions about non-provision or inaccurate provision of FXI data, staff will engage with the member.** As envisaged under the procedural framework for Article VIII, Section 5, if staff has concerns about non-provision or inaccuracy of FXI data, staff will discuss the sources of any major differences between the provided data and staff estimates with the authorities, giving the member the benefit of any reasonable doubt in the assessment of compliance with the data provision requirement.

[1] As discussed above, while these transactions are presumed not to constitute FXI, staff may assess such transactions against other macroeconomic variables and indicators, and country-specific circumstances, to determine if such transactions fall within the scope of the FXI data requirement. Staff will engage further with the member in such circumstances.

## Impact of Staff Proposals on Member Countries

**42. Results from the survey of country authorities point to confidentiality concerns as the main reason for not reporting FXI data to the Fund (Background Paper, Section VI).** Most respondents reported that they produce data on spot FXI, but not on derivatives FXI and FXI by other agencies (Figure 11). However, the latter likely reflects that many countries (particularly emerging market economies and low-income countries) do not engage in such types of foreign exchange intervention. About three quarters of the country authorities reported that they provide data on spot FXI to the Fund, while provision of the other FXI variables is significantly lower (likely reflecting that many members do not engage in those transactions). Most countries not providing FXI data to the Fund are emerging market economies or low-income countries and pointed to confidentiality concerns as the main reason, noting in some cases that the data is market-sensitive or that its public disclosure could render FXI less effective. It should be noted, however, that data provision to the Fund under Article VIII, Section 5 can be made confidentially, without a presumption of publication.

**Figure 11. FXI—Results from the Survey of Country Authorities**




Sources: Survey of IMF members and staff calculations.

**43. The proposed data provision requirements seek to strike a balance between the Fund's surveillance needs and concerns of some members about confidentiality.** To that end, a narrow set of data is proposed for mandatory provision at an aggregated level, in net terms (consolidating purchases and sales of FX), over a specified reporting period, and with an appropriate reporting lag. Only volume data are proposed to be required, and no intervention exchange rates are requested.[46] Data on FXI through derivatives are proposed to be reported in notional terms. The reporting agency for the entire dataset would be the central bank or the corresponding monetary authority based on each country's institutional arrangement. No data is proposed to be provided directly by government agencies other than the central bank or the corresponding monetary authority. In addition to the proposed required indicators, member countries would be encouraged to voluntarily provide additional, more granular information, but these data would not be part of the mandatory data provision requirement. To support the provision of FXI data, staff has developed a voluntary standardized template (Background paper, Section VII). During the transition period, staff will remain in a close dialogue with country authorities as they prepare for FXI data provision, including to continue explaining confidentiality arrangements and specific use of FXI data in Fund surveillance.

## C. Swaps and Repurchase Agreements Among Central Banks

**44. Swap lines among central banks have become a common feature of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN).[47]** These credit lines allow central banks to obtain foreign currency from another central bank in exchange for their own currencies, normally at a time of severe market stress or liquidity pressure, agreeing to swap back the currencies at a specified date in the future. The use of swap lines played an important role during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, when the U.S. Federal Reserve engaged in swaps with some advanced and emerging market economies to ease pressure in dollar funding markets. Some swaps lines were thereafter converted into permanent standing facilities and proved useful again to maintain financial stability at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. In recent years, the network of bilateral swap lines has expanded significantly, notably involving China, but also other reserve currency issuers and many emerging and developing economies. The network of bilateral swap lines is estimated to have increased from only a few in 2007 to 91 at end-2020.[48]

**45. Information on swap lines and repurchase agreements among central banks is limited.** Some central banks publish information when swap lines are agreed on the total amounts available for drawing and about standing facilities with other central banks, but the details on the terms and

---

[46] Separately, under Article VIII, Section 5, members must provide to the Fund information about "buying and selling rates for foreign currencies". FXI conducted in a manner that segments the member's foreign exchange market (i.e., if the authorities conduct foreign exchange transactions in a manner that makes foreign exchange available at a particular rate only to/from selected market participants, or for specific purposes) would fall under the Fund's policy on multiple currency practices, and information on *exchange rates* for those transactions would have to be provided to the Fund for purposes of the MCP assessment.", see paragraph 35 in IMF 2019a and paragraphs 71-74 of the MCP Guidance Note (IMF, 2023c).

[47] See e.g., IMF (2016a) for a discussion of these and other developments related to the Global Financial Safety Net.

[48] See IMF (2021e).

use of the arrangements are normally not disclosed. Given the significant expansion of the swap line network and its growing role in the GFSN, enhancing data on these agreements is essential both for bilateral and multilateral surveillance, to assess available resources for countries to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability and the effective operation of the international monetary system in the face of adverse shocks.

**46. It is proposed that members provide the Fund with data on currency swaps and repurchase agreements among central banks.** This review proposes the data requirement to comprise the net amount of those currency swaps and repurchase agreements entered by the central bank with other central banks that may be used for maintaining the stability of financial markets and the financial system.[49] Transactions with international financial institutions (such as the BIS) would be excluded. The data to be provided to the Fund would cover the total aggregated amount available for drawing under all such existing swaps and repurchase agreements with other central banks ("standing facilities"), and not their actual use.[50] Information on the use of the facilities and the terms of the agreements would be encouraged for data provision on a voluntary basis.[51]

## D. Macrofinancial Data

### Context

**47. Over the past decade, the IMF has repeatedly called for deeper and more integrated macrofinancial surveillance.** Motivated by the Global Financial Crisis, the *2012 Financial Surveillance Strategy* included as one of its priorities strengthening of the analytical underpinnings of macrofinancial risk assessments and policy advice.[52] Subsequently, the *2014 Triennial Surveillance Review* (TSR, IMF, 2014a) called for macrofinancial analysis to be an integral part of Article IV consultations. More recently, while finding notable improvements, the *2019 IEO evaluation of the Fund's Financial Surveillance* (IEO, 2019) and the CSR noted the need to further deepen macrofinancial analysis while better integrating it into bilateral surveillance. The *2021 Financial Sector Assessment Program Review* echoed some of these findings in the context of FSAPs.[53] During the discussion of the CSR, Executive Directors agreed that Article IV staff reports should provide a

---

[49] As discussed above, for purpose of the new data provision requirement under Article VIII.5, these transactions would not be presumed to constitute FXI. Such swaps and repos are normally not used to conduct FXI, although in some cases they could help fund FXI depending on how the amounts drawn are used.

[50] If some swaps and repurchase agreements are unlimited in the amounts that may be drawn or only constrained by the amount of eligible collateral, these facts should be noted as part of the provision of data.

[51] During the March 2022 Board meeting, staff had proposed a broader data requirement comprising the use of all swaps and repurchase agreements among central banks. However, concerns were raised by some members about the scope of the required data (noting that countries may engage in swap and repurchase agreements for a variety of purposes) and its confidentiality and market sensitivity (noting that disclosing information about the use of the facilities could reveal financial system vulnerabilities). To address these concerns, the revised staff proposal in this Board paper focuses on the standing amounts of the agreements which may be used for market and financial stability purposes, while encouraging the provision of other more sensitive information on a voluntary basis.

[52] IMF (2012a).

[53] IMF (2021b).

well-articulated view about systemic risk grounded in a rigorous analysis of financial vulnerabilities. When discussing the FSAP Review, Directors stressed the importance of strengthening the development of FSAP tools to assess, inter alia, macrofinancial interactions, interconnectedness, vulnerabilities among non-bank financial institutions, and risks in nonfinancial sectors.[54]

**Figure 12. The Financial Sector and Its Interlinkages with Other Sectors and Policies**




Source: IMF (2017a).

**48. Fully delivering on the calls for strengthed macrofinancial surveillance requires enhanced data provision.** The Fund should be in a position to assess all sources of systemic risk from within and outside the financial system and consider interlinkages across sectors and policies (Figure 12). While previous surveillance reviews raised the need for better data on macrofinancial indicators (e.g., 2012 *Review of Policy on Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes*[55] and *2014 Triennial Surveillance Review*),[56] surveillance has so far relied primarily on voluntary provision of these indicators and publicly available information. Most Fund members have been voluntarily providing a number of financial sector indicators related, for example, to capital adequacy, liquidity, and asset quality of the banking system. Nonetheless, the 2021 CSR has highlighted several important macrofinancial data gaps, including limited data on non-bank financial institutions, real estate prices, foreign exchange risk exposures, and nonfinancial corporates, with several of these areas also identified as shortcomings under the *G20 Data Gap Initiative* (Background Paper, Section II).[57] These data gaps prevent the Fund from fully delivering on well-integrated macrofinancial analysis in Article IV consultations across countries in an evenhanded manner. In particular, the nonbank financial institutions have grown rapidly since the global financial crisis, now accounting for about half of global financial assets (FSB, 2022). Fast growth of these institutions may have contributed to accumulation of financial vulnerabilities, including due to the previous period of

[54] IMF (2021b), IMF (2021c).

[55] IMF (2012b).

[56] TSR, IMF (2014a).

[57] The *2021 FSAP Review* (IMF, 2021b) also highlighted data challenges, although access to granular data needed for the FSAP risk analysis lies outside of the scope of the DPF.

low interest rates (IMF, 2023a). These developments further reinforce the need to reduce the blind spots in macrofinancial surveillance.

**Enhancing Macrofinancial Data Provision**

**49. The proposed data provision requirements—endorsed by the Executive Board in March 2022—seek to ensure proper monitoring of the core financial system and key sources of systemic risk**. These indicators would help better assess resilience of the banking sector, credit exposures within the financial system, and more broadly linkages between the financial system, the real economy, and the rest of the world. Furthermore, jurisdictions with large, complex, and highly interconnected financial institutions are more likely to experience rapid propagation of domestic and global shocks, with significant implications for financial stability. Therefore, the new requirements are tiered according to systemic importance of the members' financial sectors, as designated by the Fund under the framework for mandatory financial stability assessments.

**50. Minimum mandatory data provision from all members covers the following aggregate indicators:**[58]

- ***Core Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) for commercial banks,*** which include 11 standard metrics of capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings and profitability, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk.

- ***Credit and assets for other depository corporations (central bank excluded)***, comprising totals and the breakdown for credit into six counterpart sectors: (i) other depository corporations (excluding the central bank), (ii) other financial corporations (comprising financial institutions other than depository corporations, such as insurance companies and pension funds), (iii) nonfinancial corporate sector, (iv) households, (v) general government (or central government, depending on the member country's institutional coverage), and (vi) non-residents; plus the breakdown of assets and credit between domestic and foreign currency.

**51. Staff provide recommended definitions for these macrofinancial indicators that will constitute general understandings**.[59] Background Paper, Section V provides recommended definitions for the proposed required indicators applicable to all member countries. The Fund's statistical manuals offer more in-depth descriptions, although these should be considered as general guidelines and not prescriptions.[60] For example, the indicators for capital adequacy are likely to vary depending on the regulatory regime of each country and there is no presumption that all

[58] Reflecting the limitation under Article VIII, Section 5 that members shall be under no obligation to furnish information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed, all requirements in this section refer to aggregate metrics for the corresponding type of institution. Furthermore, this limitation also implies that if a member only has one corporation in a particular category, they would not be required to provide information on that category.

[59] See paragraph 27.

[60] These include the 2019 Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators (IMF, 2019b) and the 2016 Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide (IMF, 2016b).

members should adopt a particular regulatory framework (e.g., some members may follow Basel I, while others Basel III). Following the Executive Board's endorsement of staff proposals in March 2022, the specifications of macrofinancial indicators remain generally unchanged, although minor drafting changes have now been included, as presented in Background Paper, Section V.

**52. This review proposed, and the Executive Board agreed in March 2022, that members with jurisdictions designated by the Fund as having systemically important financial sectors (SIFS) be required to provide several additional macrofinancial indicators.**[61] This additional data provision includes indicators for financial corporations other than depository corporations, aggregated across institutions, and residential real estate price indices. The recommended definitions are again presented in Background Paper, Section V:

- ***Other financial corporations' credit and financial assets.*** These indicators encompass the provision of totals as well as the same sectoral and currency breakdowns as above. This data will facilitate surveillance of the non-bank financial sector.
- ***Residential real estate price index.***[62] This requirement is being introduced given the importance of housing market developments for financial stability and the macroeconomic developments more broadly.

**53. In addition to the required indicators, all members would be encouraged to voluntarily provide some additional information**. These encouraged indicators would include further granular metrics for banks, other financial institutions (insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds), as well as households and nonfinancial corporates[63] (Table 4C in Section V of the Background Paper). These additional indicators, combined with the minimum mandatory data provision, would facilitate analysis of risks across the entire financial system, as well as the examination of interlinkages with the rest of the economy, which is critical for early detection of vulnerabilities and timely activation of mitigating policies. Staff assess that the cost of imposing a uniform mandate to provide these additional indicators would exceed the benefits—for instance, producing data on household and corporate balance sheets could prove costly for a large share of Fund members at this juncture.[64] Likewise, some of the more detailed indicators suggested for

---

[61] Currently 46 members (47 jurisdictions) have been identified as having SIFS (IMF, 2021b).

[62] Members without a systemically important financial sector would be encouraged, but not required, to provide a residential real estate price index.

[63] During the pandemic, public sector support to the private sector increased significantly in many countries, posing risks to the general government balance sheet. However, while the adverse fiscal impact can be substantial during unique events, staff do not currently see the case for imposing new data provision requirements for the private sector outside of financial entities. The main creditors of households and nonfinancial corporations are typically financial institutions. These liabilities would be covered by the proposed mandatory requirements on credit supplied by financial entities to these sectors. Additionally, the inclusion of additional encouraged indicators for household and corporate indebtedness is intended to further improve data collection on private indebtedness.

[64] By adopting this approach, the Fund would encourage its members to enhance data production and provision of household and corporate sector debt, while flexibly accommodating capacity constraints. As the data collection advances, member countries would be encouraged to provide data on the relevant breakdowns such as household residential real estate and consumer debt.

voluntary provision—such as common Tier 1 equity—have typically followed trends in other measures of bank capital already proposed for mandatory provision. Therefore, the overall strategy of combining mandatory and voluntary provision of data seeks to strike a balance between the data needs for macrofinancial surveillance, the varying levels of complexity of financial systems across the membership, and the burden imposed on member countries.

**Impact of Staff Proposals on Member Countries**

**54. The survey of IMF country teams indicates that a large fraction of the membership would already comply with most of the new proposed data requirements**. Depending on a specific indicator, some 80–95 percent of members already provide most proposed FSIs to the Fund, while about 70 percent provide data on the net foreign exchange position (Figure 13). Similarly, about 90 percent of members provide total assets, credit, and their breakdown for other depository corporations using the standardized report forms. Data provision is also high for indicators proposed to be required from member countries with SIFS. Roughly two-thirds of jurisdictions with SIFSs provide data on credit by other financial corporations with sectoral breakdowns, while close to 90 percent provide total assets. Nearly all jurisdictions with SIFS currently provide to the Fund or publish residential real estate price indices.[65] Results from the survey of country authorities are broadly comparable (Background Paper, Section VI).

## E. Frequency and Timeliness of New Data to Be Provided to the Fund

**55. The existing DPF expectations regarding frequency and timeliness would also apply to the new indicators**.[66] Staff should establish common understandings with the country authorities on frequency and timeliness of data to be provided to the Fund. Since these are based on country-specific circumstances, the understandings may vary by member. While it is possible for specific understandings to stipulate less frequent or timely data provision than general understandings, the agreed frequency and timeliness must be sufficient to meet the Fund's surveillance needs with due regard to evenhandedness among members. In the absence of specific understandings between staff and the authorities, the below general understandings, broadly motivated by internationally accepted practices such as the IMF Data Standards Initiatives and further guided by the outreach discussed in paragraph 4, would apply for the newly required data categories.

[65] Under the G-20 Data Gaps Initiative-2, G-20 countries were required to compile a residential property price index (RPPI) by the end of 2021. As noted in the 2021 Data Gap Initiative report (FSB and IMF, 2021), 19 G-20 countries met this target by compiling at least one RPPI.

[66] See the 2013 DPF Guidance Note (IMF, 2013).

## Figure 13. Macrofinancial Indicators—Data Availability

(Number of reporting members)

**For all countries**

**Financial Soundness Indicators** 1/




1/ RC=Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets; RTC = Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets; KNL = Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital; ANL = Nonperforming loans to total gross loans; ROA = Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; EIM = Interest margin to gross income; ENE = Noninterest expenses to gross income; SLT = Liquid assets to total assets; SLS = Liquid assets to short term liabilities ; SNO = Net open position in foreign exchange to capital.

**Other Depository Corporations: Assets and Credit Stocks** 2/




**For countries with Systemically Important Financial Sectors (SIFS)**

**Other Financial Corporations' Financial Assets and Credit and Residential Real Estate Price Index** 2/




2/ Other Depository Corporations (ODCs) comprise depository corporations (excluding the central bank) and money market funds. Other Financial Corporations (OFCs) comprise (i) Non-money market investment funds; (ii) Other financial intermediaries except for insurance corporations and pension funds; (iii) Financial auxiliaries, (iv) Captive financial institutions and money lenders, (v) Insurance corporations, (vi) Pension funds.

Sources: Survey of IMF country teams, IMF members, and staff calculations.

- An annual frequency of the ***public sector data*** could generally be appropriate. Data reporting could be based on either a calendar or fiscal year. Staff propose a time lag of two quarters for central government debt data, while a longer lag of up to three quarters could be considered for data on liquid assets of the central and general governments as well as data on debt of general government. As noted above, a different frequency and timeliness of data provision can be agreed between staff and the authorities, depending on country-specific surveillance needs.

- In staff's view, provision of data on ***foreign exchange intervention and foreign exchange swaps and repurchase agreements among central banks*** should preferably be aligned with the BoP statistics. Therefore, staff had initially proposed quarterly FXI and swaps/repos data provision with a 3-month lag (the lag was later extended to 6 months). However, several constituencies had concerns about these data provision parameters on the grounds of confidentiality and market sensitivity. Guided by the Board discussions, staff therefore propose semi-annual frequency of FXI and swaps/repos data provision with a 6-month lag as a pragmatic compromise. Staff note that these revised FXI data provision parameters will still allow the effective discharge of some Fund's duties such as facilitating core work on external sector assessments, although the staff's ability to analyze FXI policies and their interactions with other policy levers will be significantly more constrained compared to the initial staff proposal. Provision of more frequent/timely data would be strongly encouraged on a voluntary basis.

- For most ***macrofinancial indicators***, staff propose a quarterly frequency with one quarter lag—specifically, for the commercial banks' FSIs, residential real estate price indices, and credit and asset indicators for other financial corporations. Credit and asset indicators for other depository corporations would ideally be provided on a monthly frequency with a three-month lag.

## F. Transitional Arrangements

**56. To facilitate an orderly introduction of the new data requirements, a transition period would be desirable.**[67] Annex II and Tables in Background Paper, Section V stipulate the first reporting period for which the data requirement would be effective. Generally, these dates imply a transition period of about 1–3 years, depending on a specific indicator. Even after the new requirements become effective, members will only be required to provide data to the extent they have the capacity to do so—that is, a member will not be found in breach of its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5, if the reason for non-provision of data or provision of inaccurate data is a lack of capacity.[68]

- For the ***public sector*** data, the first reporting year would be 2027 (calendar or fiscal year basis) for all series except the total stock of GG debt, for which the first reporting year would be 2025 given its broad availability.

[67] The 2004 Board decision also included a transition period. Provision of most new indicators was delayed by about one year after the Board decision, and for a few indicators, the time lag was longer, about four years.

[68] See paragraphs 6–7 and Background Paper, Section I.

- While ***foreign exchange intervention and swap and repurchase agreements among central banks*** data are readily available in those countries that engage in these operations, the survey of country authorities revealed that these operations (such as swaps and repos among central banks) are sometimes subject to confidentiality clauses and non-disclosure agreements. It is therefore proposed that the first reporting period is the second half of 2026 (H2/2026) so that members can address any legal (or other) constraints either internally or cooperatively with their counterparts. As noted above, staff will remain in a close dialogue with country authorities as they prepare for FXI data provision, including on matters related to data confidentiality.

- Finally, most ***macrofinancial*** series could be reported from the third quarter of 2025 (Q3/2025). Notable exceptions include the net open position in foreign exchange to capital and credit and asset indicators for other financial corporations, which exhibit relatively lower availability compared to the other indicators. For these indicators, the first reporting period would be Q3/2027. Furthermore, in the event of a future revision to the list of members with systemically important financial sectors, newly designated countries would also benefit from transition periods.

## G. Indicators of Economic Sustainability

**57. Securing economic sustainability has been recognized as one of the key surveillance priorities.** The CSR has identified several key sustainability trends and issues that are likely to be critical for the Fund's surveillance in the next five to ten years, especially demographic shifts, technological change, inequality (including gender-related issues), socio-political and geopolitical developments, and climate change. In many circumstances, these issues can have a first-order impact on macroeconomic stability and sustainability, where sustainability is defined as allocation of resources that is consistent with sustained, balanced, and inclusive growth over time. In addition, the COVID crisis has exacerbated some pre-existing trends, such as rising inequality and the growing influence of socio-political factors, highlighting that sustainability issues require close attention in the Fund's surveillance and other work streams.

**58. This DPF review does not propose expanding the perimeter of required data to sustainability indicators.** These issues represent emerging areas for the Fund, and macro-critical issues and societal preferences differ significantly across the Fund members. Further experimentation will be needed to arrive at a common approach to the analysis of economic sustainability. Imposing a uniform requirement on members to provide a common set of indicators to the Fund would therefore not be realistic at this juncture. However, if a particular sustainability or welfare issue is considered critical for a given country, staff will engage with the authorities on compiling/providing the relevant data and report on policy discussions in the Article IV staff report. Moreover, various Fund-wide initiatives are already operational to collect data more systematically as part of workstreams such as climate change (through a dedicated Climate Change Indicators Dashboard, CID) and gender (through the Gender Data Hub which curates a core set of macro-critical gender-related indicators).[69] The G-20 has launched a new data gaps initiative which will cover climate change, household distributional indicators, fintech, and financial inclusion data. Many indicators of economic sustainability, including those related to the SDGs, are already available from other institutions, such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The Fund can continue drawing on these external sources for now, guided by the Board's policy on the Third-Party Indicators.[70] Further guidance on the use of economic sustainability indicators was provided in the revised Guidance Note on Surveillance (IMF, 2022b).

# OUTDATED DATA REQUIREMENTS

**59. Some categories of minimum required information under Article VIII, Section 5 have become outdated.** As explained in Section I of the Background Paper, Article VIII, Section 5 stipulates the minimum set of macroeconomic indicators that members are required to furnish to the Fund. However, through an internal survey undertaken as part of this review, staff has confirmed that several categories of minimum required indicators from the original Article VIII, Section 5 list ("Original List") have either been displaced by methodological improvements or become less pressing for the Fund activities given longer-term global economic trends (the "outdated" data items). These include certain detailed price indices and a subset of the indicators related to gold, as summarized below and described in detail in Annex III:

- ***Indices of commodity prices in wholesale and retail markets.*** These have been superseded by methodological improvements (PPI and CPI indexes, respectively).

- ***A number of gold categories whose relevance has diminished over the past decades given changes in the international monetary system.*** Specifically, these are holdings of gold at home and abroad by banking and financial agencies (other than official agencies); production of gold; gold exports and imports according to countries of destination and origin; and gold transactions in the international balance of payments.

**60. As staff had previously advised, removal of information categories from the Original List would require an amendment to the Articles.[71]** An amendment to the Articles could entail for instance deleting the outdated data items from the Original List or removing the whole list of minimum required data items. The latter option, in turn, would provide full discretion to the Executive Board to establish a "living list" of the information that members are required to provide to the Fund. For example, the provision could read in full: "*The Fund may require members to furnish it with such information as it deems necessary for its activities*." The list of required data would then be established by Executive Board decision and could be subject to periodic reviews by the Board to

[69] The Fund also augmented the Financial Access Survey with gender-related data, a unique global database on access to and use of financial services. See, e.g., IMF (2020e).

[70] IMF (2017b).

[71] See, e.g., IMF (2003): "The deletion from Article VIII, Section 5 of data items explicitly specified in the provision but no longer critical for the Fund's activities could only be done by an amendment of the Articles of Agreement."

better reflect the Fund's evolving data needs. Such an amendment would provide an opportunity to modernize the legal architecture of data provision to the Fund by allowing the Fund's data requirements to adapt to changing economic realities. However, recognizing the time needed to build consensus around an amendment to the Fund's Articles of Agreement, staff do not propose a standalone amendment to Article VIII, Section 5 at this time. Such an amendment could—if the membership considers it necessary at a later stage to amend provisions of the Articles—be included as part of such general proposal.[72]

**61. In light of the above, this review proposed—and the Board endorsed in March 2022—to maintain the current long-standing practice under which the Fund has not applied remedial measures with respect to non-provision of information considered by the Fund as outdated data (Background Paper, Section IX).** As noted above, the majority of members are not providing these outdated items, and the Fund has not initiated non-observance procedures against members for these data items. This proposal implies that while the obligation of members under Article VIII, Section 5 to provide these categories of outdated data remains in place, the Fund will continue its practice of not applying remedial measures in cases where a member fails to provide such data to the Fund. Therefore, this proposal does not entail any operational changes on the part of the Fund and/or its members.

# RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW REQUIREMENTS AND ENTERPRISE RISK ASSESSMENT

**62. The new data requirements will likely require additional resources for units compiling data in some member countries but the burden on Fund resources, as well as on most member countries, should be contained**. As most additional data needs are sourced from administrative and operational records (balance sheets, income statements, financial operations data), most authorities will likely be in a position to compile the data with a limited increase in resources, although fragile and small states may need to step up capacity, including through Fund CD, especially on compilation of public sector data. As a practical matter, some of the new data requirements such as general government debt, other financial corporations survey, residential real estate prices and other FSIs are already *required* for SDDS Plus countries (26 countries) and *encouraged* for SDDS countries (51 countries). Under the Fund's CD governance arrangements, the allocation of CD resources is guided by continuous prioritization that country teams make to reflect their evolving needs, in consultation with CD departments. Consequently, the introduction of the new data needs will inform prioritization by country teams and CD departments taking account of the full spectrum of evolving surveillance priorities.

[72] Any proposed amendment would need to be circulated to the membership, and adoption would require the approval of three-fifths of the Fund's members, having 85 percent of the total voting power.

**63. In the case of fiscal indicators, most information is already provided in the context of regular surveillance activities or available in administrative/official sources**. Some of the information (particularly the breakdown by creditor type) is not in the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook database and it is not the topic of CD activity, but is generally expected to be discussed with the authorities during Article IV consultations as it is a necessary input into the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries and/or the newly introduced Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries. Overall, the country coverage for CD on fiscal indicators may need to be expanded beyond those low- and lower-middle-income countries that are eligible for IMF02 (externally financed) funding. Therefore, sufficient IMF01 (core budget) resources would be critical to support this line of CD work, and the related CD activities may in some cases require reprioritization given the resource limit faced by the Fund.

**64. Given the already significant compilation of core FSIs, member countries would be expected to provide such data with limited additional CD**. More advanced macrofinancial indicators could require some increase in CD. Compliance with depository corporation data requirements should be achievable by stepping up the pace of ongoing CD, using the new reporting forms for FSIs. As the RPPI and data for the other financial corporations are required only from members with SIFS (46 in total), TA would be mainly guided by Fund policy on CD delivery to countries that fall in the high-income group, implying a limited burden on Fund resources.[73]

**65. The proposed scope of the FXI data requirement outlined in this paper will support the authorities' data provision.** While FXI data are not part of Balance of Payment or the Monetary and Financial Statistics manuals, the proposed scope of FXI data provision is similar to how most central banks understand FXI, which implies that the data requirements should not require intensive CD in most cases.

**66. As for indicators under the category of voluntary data provision, the burden on the membership and the implications for CD would be ascertained in due course.** An experimental CID was launched in April 2021. Under the baseline scenario, the CID will be consolidated and made permanent. Under an ambitious scenario (as defined in the ongoing discussions on Operationalizing the Fund's Climate Strategy), the CID would be enhanced by increasing country coverage and data timeliness, frequency, and granularity. Regarding welfare and distributional measures, wellbeing and sustainability indicators are expected to be covered in the update of the System National Accounts scheduled to be completed in 2025. The Fund does not provide CD on poverty measures as this is in the purview of the World Bank.

**67. A lack of action to expand the perimeter of mandatory data provision would carry important enterprise risks for the Fund.** Not tackling the identified data gaps would raise concerns about possible blind spots and lack of evenhandedness in Fund's advice. More broadly, the Fund could be seen as losing agility and not delivering on its mandate if it does not respond to key

[73] Only sixteen of the 46 members with SIFS do not fall under the Fund Policy on CD delivery to high-income members (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, and Thailand).

emerging challenges relevant to today's global economy and its membership across all income levels. At the same time, staff recognize that the proposed data requirements will impose costs on the membership. However, this risk can be effectively mitigated by the proposed transition periods, inherent flexibilities in the Fund's data provision policy, and availability of capacity development support. The transition periods would also provide room to address any domestic legal constraints of members. Some members expressed concerns about the risk of data breaches and associated risks for country authorities and credibility of the Fund. Staff propose to address these risks through tight controls on transmission and access to any data that is labeled as confidential, and in case of foreign exchange intervention, by lowering the reporting frequency and increasing the time lag relative to the original staff proposal. This said, streamlining of the proposed data requirements (especially, the FXI and NPFC data) means that some identified data gaps will not be fully addressed, posing risks to the effectiveness of Fund surveillance.

# CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

**68. The 2024 Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes has put forward a focused set of proposals to enhance the framework in the priority areas.** These proposals, some of which have already been endorsed by the Executed Board, include a more structured and transparent framework for assessing data adequacy for surveillance, a broader and more granular perimeter of required data provision to recognize the ongoing tectonic shifts in the global economy, and addressing several outdated data requirements. The DPF framework will continue relying on cooperation by Fund members, while allowing for flexibility in the modalities of data provision. The proposed decision set forth below implements the proposals discussed in this paper. After the DPF review is concluded, staff will update the related Guidance Note. During the transition period, staff will remain closely engaged on DPF implementation with the members.

**69. The endorsed and proposed expansion of perimeter of required data provision will help address important data needs and further improve Fund surveillance.** The three key areas (public sector data, foreign exchange intervention, and macrofinancial indicators) all represent themes where a broader and more granular coverage is required for effective surveillance and credible policy advice in line with the CSR surveillance priorities. Staff note that some Executive Directors had concerns regarding mandatory provision of some key indicators, such as debt and profit/loss of non-financial public corporations and such proposals were dropped; other proposed data requirements, such as foreign exchange intervention, were streamlined. More comprehensive data should be provided to the Fund on a voluntary basis wherever possible, including on foreign exchange intervention, as these additional indicators would help improve Fund surveillance and policy advice. More generally, staff stress the benefits for members of continuing efforts to improve reporting on public finance, FXI, and macrofinancial indicators, beyond the perimeter of mandatory data provision to the Fund. These qualifications notwithstanding, the proposed modifications to the data provision policy represent significant progress relative to the status quo. Staff intend to revisit the possibility of mandatory NFPC data provision at the next DPF review.

**70. In addition to the recommendations provided in this paper, staff will resume work on the remaining issues when resources allow.** These include, in particular, enhancing the DPF framework to deal with cases of delayed provision of data and provision of inaccurate data to the Fund. These issues could be addressed in a stand-alone policy paper or in the next review of data provision to the Fund.

# ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION[74]

- Do Directors agree with the staff's proposals for enhancing provision of public sector data, foreign exchange intervention, and swaps/repos transactions among central banks?
- Do Directors support the proposed transition periods and the proposed guidance on frequency and timeliness of the new data to be provided?
- Do Directors support staff's further work on a dedicated platform for the provision of confidential data required under Article VIII, Section 5, guided by the principles staff outlined during the May 2023 technical session with Executive Directors?

[74] At the March 2022 formal Board meeting, the Board also discussed and endorsed staff proposals related to the following additional issues: (1) Do Directors agree with the staff's assessment of data provision trends since the last DPF review in 2012? (2) "Do Directors support introduction of the staff's new framework for assessing data adequacy for surveillance?" (3) "Do Directors agree with the staff's proposals for enhancing provision of … macrofinancial data?" (4) Do Directors agree to maintain the Fund's long-standing practice of not applying remedial measures to members not providing outdated data series?"

# Annex I. Current Data Provision Requirements

**Table 1. Current Data Provision Requirements**

| Article VIII Section 5 (12 categories) | 2004 Decision, Annex A (12 additional categories) |
|---|---|
| (i) Official holdings at home and abroad of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange<br>(ii) Holdings at home and abroad by banking and financial agencies, other than official agencies, of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange<br>(iii) Production of gold<br>(iv) Gold exports and imports according to countries of destination and origin<br>(v) Total exports and imports of merchandise, in terms of local currency values, according to countries of destination and origin<br>(vi) International balance of payments, including (1) trade in goods and services, (2) gold transactions, (3) known capital transactions, and (4) other items<br>(vii) International investment position, i.e., investments within the territories of the member owned abroad and investments abroad owned by persons in its territories so far as it is possible to furnish this information<br>(viii) National income<br>(ix) Price indices, i.e., indices of commodity prices in whole-sale and retail markets and of export and import prices<br>(x) Buying and selling rates for foreign currencies<br>(xi) Exchange controls, i.e., a comprehensive statement of exchange controls in effect at the time of assuming membership in the Fund and details of subsequent changes as they occur<br>(xii) Where official clearing arrangements exist, details of amounts awaiting clearance in respect of commercial and financial transactions, and of the length of time during which such arrears have been outstanding | (i) Reserve, or base money<br>(ii) Broad money<br>(iii) Interest rates, both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds<br>(iv) Revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing (i.e., foreign financing and domestic bank and nonbank financing) for the general and central governments respectively; the stocks of central government and central government-guaranteed debt, including currency and maturity composition and, if the debt data are amenable to classification on the basis of the residency or nonresidency of the holder, the extent to which the debt is held by residents or nonresidents<br>(v) Balance sheet of the central bank<br>(vi) External current account balance<br>(vii) Exports and imports of goods and services<br>(viii) For the monetary authorities: international reserve assets (specifying separately any reserve assets that are pledged or otherwise encumbered), reserve liabilities, short-term liabilities linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means, and the notional values of financial derivatives to pay and to receive foreign currency (including those linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means)<br>(ix) Gross domestic product, or gross national product<br>(x) Consumer price index<br>(xi) Gross external debt<br>(xii) Consolidated balance sheet of the banking system |

# Annex II. New Indicators Proposed for Mandatory Provision to the Fund

**Table 1. Proposed Mandatory Public Sector Indicators**

| Indicator | First reporting period* |
|---|---|
| Total *stock* of **general government** debt[1,2] | 2025 |
| *Stock* of **general government** debt – decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by maturity[1,2] | 2027 |
| *Stock* of **general government** debt – decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by currency[1,2] | 2027 |
| *Stock* of **general government** debt – decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by residency[1,2] | 2027 |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt – decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by creditor type[2] | 2027 |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt – decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors[2,3] | 2027 |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt – decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by instrument[2] | 2027 |
| *Liquid financial assets* of **central and general government**[2] | 2027 |

Note: The recommended definitions for these indicators can be found in Background Paper, Section V.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund. The reporting period may refer to either calendar or fiscal year, based on member circumstances.

[1] The central government counterpart is already required under the 2004 Board Decision, with decompositions required for the entire central government stock.

[2] Where members only have the capacity to provide data at the central government level, they would be expected to expand capacity to cover the general government over time. Data provision would be subject to flexibilities specified in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the Main Paper.

[3] Breakdown by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditor for central and general government debt would be required only when the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is above 20 percent of total stock of debt at the central or general government level (both excluding guaranteed debt), respectively, for each reporting year. Multilateral creditors would be broken down by IMF, WB, ADB/AfDB/IADB, and other multilaterals. Official bilateral creditors would be broken down by country, showing: (i) among Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt; and (ii) among non-Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt.

**Table 2. Proposed Mandatory Indicators for FXI and Swap and Repurchase Agreements among Central Banks**

| Indicator | First reporting period* |
|---|---|
| FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) in the spot market, net amount | H2/2026 |
| FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) undertaken with derivative instruments, net amount | H2/2026 |
| Swap and repurchase agreements entered into by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with other central banks (or corresponding monetary authority), which may be used for maintaining the stability of financial markets and the financial system. The data would cover the total amounts available under the swap or repurchase agreements, in an aggregated form, independently of their use. | H2/2026 |

Note: A description of the scope of these data provision requirements can be found in Background Paper, Section V.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund.

**Table 3. Proposed Mandatory Macrofinancial Indicators for All Member Countries**

| Indicator | First reporting period* |
|---|---|
| Banks' Financial Soundness Indicators: | |
| Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | Q3/2025 |
| Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets | Q3/2025 |
| Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital | Q3/2025 |
| Nonperforming loans to total gross loans | Q3/2025 |
| Return on assets | Q3/2025 |
| Return on equity | Q3/2025 |
| Interest margin to gross income | Q3/2025 |
| Noninterest expenses to gross income | Q3/2025 |
| Liquid assets to total assets | Q3/2025 |
| Liquid assets to short-term liabilities | Q3/2025 |
| Net open position in foreign exchange to capital | Q3/2027 |

**Table 3. Proposed Mandatory Macrofinancial Indicators for All Member Countries (concluded)**

| Indicator | First reporting period* |
|---|---|
| Total assets of other depository corporations[1] | Q3/2025 |
| Credit from other depository corporations:[2] | |
| Total | Q3/2025 |
| Sectoral breakdown: | |
| To other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| To other financial corporations[3] | Q3/2025 |
| To nonfinancial corporations[4] | Q3/2025 |
| To households | Q3/2025 |
| To general government (or central government)[5] | Q3/2025 |
| To non-residents | Q3/2025 |
| Currency breakdown (domestic vs. FX) of other depository corporations' total assets and credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) | Q3/2025 |

Note: The recommended definitions for these indicators can be found in Background Paper, Section V.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund.

[1] Other depository corporations include all deposit-taking corporations (except for the central bank) and money market funds.

[2] Credit comprises debt securities, loans, and trade credit/advances.

[3] Other financial corporations include (i) non-money market investment funds; (ii) other financial intermediaries except for insurance corporations and pension funds; (iii) financial auxiliaries; (iv) captive financial institutions and money lenders; (v) insurance corporations; (vi) pension funds.

[4] Nonfinancial corporations include (i) public nonfinancial corporations, (ii) national private nonfinancial corporations, and (iii) resident foreign-controlled nonfinancial corporations.

[5] Depending on their institutional coverage, members may provide credit to central government instead of general government.

**Table 4. Proposed Additional Macrofinancial Indicators Required from Members with Systemically Important Financial Sectors (SIFS)**

| Indicator | First reporting period* |
|---|---|
| Total financial assets of other financial corporations[1] | Q3/2027 |
| Credit from other financial corporations[2] | |
| Total | Q3/2027 |
| Sectoral breakdown: | |
| To other depository corporations[3] | Q3/2027 |
| To other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |
| To nonfinancial corporations[4] | Q3/2027 |
| To households | Q3/2027 |
| To general government (or central government)[5] | Q3/2027 |
| To non-residents | Q3/2027 |
| Currency breakdown (domestic vs. FX) of other financial corporations' total financial assets and credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) | Q3/2027 |
| Residential real estate price index | Q3/2025 |

Note: The recommended definitions for these indicators can be found in Background Paper, Section V.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund.

[1] Other financial corporations include: (i) non-money market investment funds; (ii) other financial intermediaries except for insurance corporations and pension funds; (iii) financial auxiliaries; (iv) captive financial institutions and money lenders; (v) insurance corporations; and (vi) pension funds.

[2] Credit comprises debt securities, loans, and trade credit/advances.

[3] Other depository corporations include all deposit-taking corporations (except for the central bank) and money market funds.

[4] Nonfinancial corporations include: (i) public nonfinancial corporations, (ii) national private nonfinancial corporations, and (iii) Foreign-controlled nonfinancial corporations.

[5] Depending on their institutional coverage, members may provide credit to central government instead of general government.

# Annex III. List of Outdated Series

| Category | Rationale for being deemed outdated |
|---|---|
| Indices of commodity prices in wholesale and retail markets | Wholesale and retail price indices have been superseded by methodological improvements (PPI and CPI indexes, respectively). Mandatory data provision of the consumer price index was introduced in 2004. Staff do not propose introducing PPI as a mandatory indicator at this time. |
| Holdings at home and abroad by banking and financial agencies, other than official agencies, of gold<br>Production of gold<br>Gold exports and imports according to countries of destination and origin<br>Gold transactions in the international balance of payments | Limited relevance for current Fund activities given past changes in the international monetary system. |

# References

Arslanalp, S. and T. Tsuda, 2014, "Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Paper 14/39.

Baum, A., P. Medas, A. Soler, and M. Sy, 2020, "Managing Fiscal Risks from State-Owned Enterprises," IMF Working Paper 20/213.

Financial Stability Board, 2022, "Global Monitoring Report on Nonbank Financial Intermediation," December 2022.

Financial Stability Board and International Monetary Fund, 2021, "G20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI-2): The Sixth Progress Report," October.

Independent Evaluation Office, 2016, "Behind the Scenes with Data at the IMF: An IEO Evaluation," Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, March.

———, 2019, "IMF Financial Surveillance," Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, February.

International Monetary Fund, 2003, "Strengthening the Effectiveness of Article VIII, Section 5," Washington DC, May.

———, 2004, "Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes", Washington DC, March.

———, 2006a, "Financial Soundness Indicators: Compilation Guide," Washington DC, March.

———, 2006b, "Article IV of the Fund's Articles of Agreement—An Overview of the Legal Framework," Washington DC, June.

———, 2008, "Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes," Washington DC, March.

———, 2012a, "The IMF's Financial Surveillance Strategy," Washington DC, August.

———, 2012b, "Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes," Washington DC, August.

———, 2013," Operational Guidance Note on Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes," Washington DC, June.

———, 2014a, "Updated Guidance Note on the Fund's Transparency Policy," Washington DC, April.

———, 2014b, "Triennial Surveillance Review," Washington DC, August.

———, 2014c, "External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compliers and Uses," Washington DC.

———, 2015, "Selected Streamlining Proposals Under the FY16–18 Medium-term Budget—Implementation Issues," Washington DC, March.

———, 2016a, "Adequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net," Washington DC, March.

———, 2016b, "Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide," Washington DC.

———, 2017a, "Approaches to Macrofinancial Surveillance in Article IV Reports", Washington DC, March.

———, 2017b, "Use of Third-Party Indicators in Fund Reports", Washington DC, October.

———, 2018a, "Guidance Note on the Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries," Washington DC, February.

———, 2018b, "Overarching Strategy on Data and Statistics at the Fund in the Digital Age," Washington DC, March.

———, 2019a, "Review of the Fund's Policy on Multiple Currency Practices: Initial Considerations," Washington DC, June.

———, 2019b, "Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators (2019 FSI Guide)," Washington DC.

———, 2020a, "Guidance Note on Implementing the Debt Limits Policy in Fund Supported Programs," Washington DC, August.

———, 2020b, "Toward an Integrated Policy Framework," Washington DC, October.

———, 2020c, "Reform of the Policy on Public Debt Limits in IMF-Supported Programs," Washington DC, October.

———, 2020d, "Review of the Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries," Washington DC, November.

———, 2020e, "Measuring Financial Access: 10 Years of the IMF Financial Access Survey," Washington DC, May.

———, 2021a, "Review of the Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries," Washington DC, February,

———, 2021b, "Financial Sector Assessment Program Review – Towards A More Stable and Sustainable Financial System," Washington DC, April.

———, 2021c, "2021 Comprehensive Surveillance Review," Washington DC, May.

———, 2021d, "2021 Comprehensive Surveillance Review – Modalities for Modernizing Surveillance," Washington DC, May.

———, 2021e, "IMF Working Paper 21/210 – Evolution of Bilateral swap Lines," Washington DC, August.

———, 2022a, "Tenth Review of the International Monetary Fund's Data Standards Initiatives," Washington DC, March.

———, 2022b, "Guidance Note for Surveillance under Article IV Consultations," Washington DC, June.

———, 2022c, "Guidance Note on the Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries," Washington DC, August.

———, 2022d, "Review of the Fund's Policy on Multiple Currency Practices: Proposals for Reform," Washington DC, July.

_______, 2023a, "Nonbank Financial Intermediaries: Vulnerabilities Amid Tighter Financial Conditions," IMF Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 2, April 2023, Washington D.C.

_______, 2023b, "Review of the Framework for Data Adequacy Assessment for Surveillance", December 2023, Washington D.C.

_______, 2023c, "Guidance Note for the Fund's Policy on Multiple Currency Practices", December 2023, Washington D.C.

International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2020a, "Public Sector Debt Definitions and Reporting in Low-Income Developing Countries," Washington DC, January.

———, 2020b, "The Evolution of Public Debt Vulnerabilities in Lower Income Economies," Washington DC, February.

———, 2020c, "Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers," Washington DC, February.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

February 20, 2024

# REVIEW OF DATA PROVISION TO THE FUND FOR SURVEILLANCE PURPOSES—BACKGROUND PAPER

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**This Background Paper provides additional information to accompany the main paper for Review of Data Provision to the Fund (DPF) for Surveillance Purposes (SM/24/39).** This material, presented in nine sections, covers the following issues:

- Legal aspects of the mandatory data provision (DPF) framework;
- The broader ecosystem supporting data provision to the Fund;
- The IMF's framework for handling confidential information;
- A questionnaire for the new assessment of data adequacy for surveillance;
- The full list and definitions of indicators proposed for mandatory provision to the IMF;
- Findings from surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams;
- Voluntary template for provision of foreign exchange intervention and swaps/repos data;
- Proposal for an electronic platform for confidential data transmission and access;
- Executive Board Meeting on Review of Data Provision to the Fund, March 14, 2022 Summing Up.

Approved By
**Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Bert Kroese, and Rhoda Weeks-Brown**

Prepared by an interdepartmental team from Strategy, Policy, and Review Department (SPR), Statistics Department (STA), and Legal Department (LEG), led by Martin Sommer, Christine Dieterich, and Nadia Rendak under the overall guidance of Daria Zakharova, Cheng Hoon Lim, and Katharine Christopherson. Mark Flanagan and Kenneth Kang provided additional strategic guidance. The SPR team included Pilar Garcia Martinez, Tryggvi Gudmundsson, Takahide Koike, Pablo Morra (external sector lead, currently in WHD), Mico Mrkaic, Murad Omoev, Manrique Saenz (public sector lead), Masashi Saito, Fabian Valencia (macro-financial lead), and Di Yang. The STA team comprised Nombulelo Braiton, Daniela Marchettini (data strategy lead), Daniel Rodriguez, and Xinyuan Johnny Yin. The LEG team included Julianne Ams and Qingxiang Li. Hanan Altimimi-Bane, Geraldine Cruz, Florence Dotsey, Emily Fisher, Anna Konopatskaya, and Emelie Stewart assisted the project.

## CONTENTS

**BOXES**



**FIGURES**



**TABLES**

# SECTION I. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR MANDATORY DATA PROVISION TO THE FUND

**1. The mandatory provision of data to the Fund is governed by the Articles of Agreement.** Under Article VIII, Section 5, members are required to report the information the Fund deems necessary for its activities. More specifically, Article VIII, Section 5 and Annex A to the 2004 Board Decision specify data categories that members are obliged to provide to the Fund, except when they lack capacity to do so.[1] This obligation is not limited to a particular activity of the Fund. Rather, it is general in nature and applies to all of the Fund's activities under the Articles, including surveillance and the use of Fund resources (UFR).[2] Article VIII, Section 5(b) requires members to provide information "in as detailed and accurate a manner as practicable and, so far as possible, to avoid mere estimates." Separately, Article IV, Section 3 also requires members to provide to the Fund information necessary to exercise firm surveillance over members' exchange rate policies, although in practice the Fund has relied on Article VIII, Section 5 for the necessary data. Beyond the list of information required from all members, the Board can request additional data for one or more members if the Board considers such data necessary for the Fund's activities. An example of the Board's exercise of this power is individual Board decisions on UFR in the General Resources Account. However, it should be noted that Article VIII, Section 5 does not apply to the provision of information that is required for UFR under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) or the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which involve trust resources.[3]

**2. There are limitations with respect to the obligation to provide data:**

- Lack of capacity is a defense to a breach of obligations. When capacity constraints prevent provision of specific data series, the Fund stands ready to support its members though capacity development to help build the needed ability to produce the required data. However, a member's lack of capacity will not excuse it indefinitely from its obligation to provide particular information. Members are obliged to improve their statistical reporting capacity over time, and steps taken to strengthen capacity would be taken into account in making a judgment as to whether a member is in breach of its obligation.

- In addition to this general capacity-based limitation, there is a second more specific capacity-based limitation that only applies to the provision of information on the International

[1] In Article IV staff reports, data provision of 12 data categories required by the 2004 Decision, as well as international investment position and exchange rates must be documented in the Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (TCIRS).

[2] See *Strengthening the Effectiveness of Article VIII, Section 5* (IMF, 2003, hereinafter "2003 Paper") at para. 12; *Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes—Operational Guidance Note* (IMF, 2013a, hereinafter "Data Provision Guidance Note") at footnote 19; *Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes* (IMF, 2004, hereinafter "2004 Review") at para. 14; *See Misreporting of Information in the Context of Fund Surveillance and Fund Financial Assistance—Present Legal Framework* (IMF, 2000, hereinafter "Misreporting Paper") at para. 7.

[3] See IMF (2003).

Investment Position (IIP): Article VIII, Section 5(a)(vii) requires members to provide information on IIP only "so far as it is possible to furnish this information."[4]

- Under Article VIII, Section 5, members are not obligated to provide information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed, though many members provide such information voluntarily.[5]

**Box 1. Capacity**

The assessment of capacity is not always straightforward. There are no criteria for this purpose specified in the Articles or Board decisions. Rather, the Fund assesses capacity on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a wide range of factors.[1] In some cases, it is relatively easy for the Fund to assess a member's capacity.[2] If a member admits that it has certain information and simply refuses to disclose it to the Fund, it will not be able to claim the capacity defense. In contrast, a member whose infrastructure has been devastated by a natural disaster will clearly not have the capacity to collect and report economic data. The more difficult cases fall in the middle. Here, the Fund engages in a broad-based analysis of the member's circumstances, including the complexity of the data and the member's level of development. In this analysis, it gives the benefit of any doubt to the member.

[1] Misreporting Paper at pp. 7–8; 2003 Paper at paras. 17–18.
[2] Leckow (2005) at p. 47.

3. **As a backstop, the Fund has developed a formal remedial framework to address cases of non-provision or provision of inaccurate data.** The non-provision or provision of inaccurate data required under Article VIII, Section 5 constitutes a breach of the member's obligations under that Article, unless the non-provision or provision of inaccurate data is due to a lack of capacity. In 2004, the Board adopted a remedial framework that is triggered whenever it appears to the Managing Director that required data are not being provided by a member or are inaccurate.[6]

4. **The obligation is for members to provide the data to the Fund—i.e., to the Executive Board**. In practice, the modalities by which the information is disclosed to the Board vary. While some required information is disclosed explicitly to the Board in staff reports, other required information informs staff analysis but may not be specifically disclosed. However, the Board has the right to access information required under Article VIII, Section 5, and staff may not on grounds of confidentiality withhold such information from the Board if it is requested.[7]

[4] *See* 2003 Paper at para. 17.

[5] In the UFR context, where safeguarding Fund resources is an issue, the Fund may request firm-specific data as a condition for the use of Fund resources. In such cases, the non-provision of such information would not be a breach of the member's obligation to provide data to the Fund but could lead to the Fund deciding not to provide financing to the member (or applying the misreporting framework in case of inaccurate provision). See IMF (2000).

[6] Decision No. 13183, as amended. Prior to escalation to management, staff is also required to undertake steps to seek to resolve any issues with data provision. See IMF (2013a).

[7] *Updated Guidance Note on the Fund's Transparency Policy* (IMF, 2014a, hereinafter "Transparency Guidance Note") at Appx IX.

# SECTION II. POLICY FRAMEWORKS SUPPORTING DATA PROVISION TO THE FUND

**5. There are a number of policy frameworks supporting Data Provision.** The *2018 Overarching Strategy on Data and Statistics at the Fund* (IMF, 2018) called for a more integrated approach to the treatment of data issues in Fund policy frameworks. To respond to the *2016 IEO evaluation Behind the Scenes with Data at the IMF* (IEO, 2016), the overarching strategy proposed ways to prevent the fragmentation across data frameworks, noting potential synergies among different initiatives. These include the CSR, the DPF, the *G20 Data Gaps Initiative*, and the *Review of the Fund's Data Standards Initiatives*. The strategy also sought better alignment across frameworks. In this spirit, this Review follows the CSR and ensures that its surveillance priorities guide new data requirements. The Fund's efforts to encourage publication of key data through the *IMF Data Standards Initiatives* (e-GDDS, SDDS, and SDDS Plus) have focused on data needed by the Fund for surveillance purposes. Figure 1 outlines the linkages between surveillance and capacity development in the context of the data standards.

**Figure 1. Stronger Integration Between Surveillance and Capacity Development**




Source: IMF staff.

**6. The ecosystem of official data used in Fund surveillance goes well beyond the minimum set of indicators provided to the Fund under Article VIII or voluntarily published under the IMF data dissemination initiatives (Figure 2). Synergies exist among mandatory and voluntary frameworks.** For example, the data categories that adherents are encouraged to publish under the first tier of the Data Dissemination Initiatives, enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS), have been aligned since 2015 with those in the Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (TCIRS), included in the Statistical Issues Annex of Article IV staff reports. This alignment seeks to ensure that data publication supports data provision to the Fund (see Annex

I of the main paper). While the data required/recommended under this DPF review and the completed 2022 Review of the Data Standards Initiatives overlap to a considerable extent, the fundamental differences between the purposes and users (Fund/obligatory provision, markets/voluntary publication) make fuller convergence understandably unfeasible.

**Figure 2. Data Provision to the Fund, 2020–21**

(Number of Fund members)




Sources: TCIRS table in Article IV staff reports and a survey of IMF country teams. For some indicators, non-provision of certain details is due to institutional arrangements (for example, absence of central banks in some small states).

**7. Data sharing and increased collaboration across international agencies have also helped boost the amount and breadth of data available to the Fund well beyond the mandatory data series.** The G20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI) launched in 2009 at the request of the G20 by the IMF and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and a renewed international cooperation through the Inter-Agency Group on Economic and Financial Statistics (IAG)[8] have helped close data gaps identified during the global financial crisis. Those data gaps were subsequently aligned in 2012 with the data requirements under the SDDS Plus, aimed at economies with systemically important financial sectors.[9] While the second phase of the DGI ended in 2021, the workplan for the third phase of DGI (DGI-3) was welcomed by the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in October 2022, further leveraging international collaboration to advance in key priorities. The DGI-3 is now in the second year of implementation (Box 2). Data Sharing Agreements among IAG

[8] The IAG comprising the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), the European Central Bank (ECB), Eurostat, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) Secretariat, the IMF (chair), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and the World Bank, has a coordinating role in monitoring the implementation of the DGI.

[9] IAG members would collect the data from their members only once and share the information using a Statistical Data and Metadata Exchange (SDMX) technology.

members have been increasing, and work is ongoing to promote sharing of more granular data among G20 countries.

**Box 2. The G20 Data Gaps Initiative: Progress Achieved and the Road Ahead**

The G20 Data Gaps Initiative (DGI) aimed to address four concerns that emerged after the global financial crisis: major data gaps that may have hampered early detection and/or monitoring of risks in the financial sector, cross-border financial linkages, vulnerabilities of domestic economies to shocks; and impediments to data sharing of official statistics. The initiative, focused on G20 economies,[1] consists of 20 recommendations and two consecutive phases (2009–15 and 2015–21).

Relying on strong collaboration among participating economies and international organizations, the DGI has achieved considerable progress in addressing policy-relevant data gaps, especially in the financial sector, despite the challenges posed by the pandemic. Challenges have included collecting and reporting the national aggregates of Securities Financing Transactions for the non-bank financial institutions; compiling and disseminating institutional sectoral accounts, compiling household distribution information; and reporting complete quarterly general government debt and operations. Nonetheless, as of October 2021, all G20 economies reported quarterly IIP and FSI data (except one of the seven FSIs required for the SDDS Plus adherents).[2] All G20 economies reported core Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) data and all but one reported inward data to the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). Moreover, all but one of the G20 economies prepared a residential property index and locational banking statistics. More than half of the G20 economies report (to the BIS) cross-border exposures of nonfinancial corporations and 10 report a commercial property price index. This outcome brought the G20 members that are not yet SDDS Plus subscribers somewhat closer to adherence and supports SDDS subscribers to disseminate encouraged data categories.

A new data gaps initiative (DGI-3) was welcomed by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBGs) in October 2022 meeting, and the G20 leaders meeting in Bali, November 2022. It includes recommendations across four main statistical and data priorities:

- Climate change indicators;
- Household distributional information;
- Fintech and financial inclusion data; and
- Access to private sources of data and administrative data.

DGI- 3 is now in the second year of implementation. Ten task teams comprising of representatives from the IAG agencies and participating economies are working to establish methodological frameworks, develop guidance, and facilitate the compilation of data required to achieve the targets. The task teams work closely with the IAG, and participating economies to coordinate with existing statistical workstreams to avoid duplication and leverage synergies. The first DGI-3 progress report was completed in October 2023 which highlights progress participating economies have made across each recommendation and outlines near-term work program.

[1] Participating economies include G20 economies and non-G20 FSB member economies (Hong Kong, SAR; Netherlands; Singapore; Spain; and Switzerland).

[2] Except residential real estate prices index (RPPI). At least one RPPI is available in 19 of the G20 economies.

## Box 2. The G20 Data Gaps Initiative: Progress Achieved and the Road Ahead (concluded)

### Existing and Proposed DPF

***Public Sector Data***

- Total stock of general government debt **(DGI II.16)**
- Total stock of central government debt **(DGI II.16)**
- Total stock of central government-guaranteed debt
- Debt stock of CG/GG– decomposition by maturity, currency, residency, creditor type, individual multilateral and official creditors, instrument
- Liquid financial assets of CG/GG

***Foreign Exchange Intervention (FXI) and swaps/repos***

- FXI by monetary authorities in spot market
- FXI by monetary authorities in derivative market **(DGI II.6)**
- Swaps/repos among Central Banks (CB)

***Macro-financial Indicators***

*All countries*

- Banks FSIs **(4 of 11 included in DGI II.2)**
- Other depository corporations: Assets
- Other depository corporations: Credit
- Other depository corporations: Credit breakdown by borrower type
- Other depository corporations: Currency breakdown of credit and assets

*Additional for SIFS*

- Other financial corporations: Assets
- Other financial corporations: Credit **(Similar to DGI II.5)**
- Other financial corporations: Credit breakdown by borrower type **(Similar to DGI II.5)**
- Other financial corporations: Currency breakdown of credit and assets **(Similar to DGI II.5)**
- Residential real estate prices **(DGI II.2)**

***Voluntary Provision***

Indicators on economic sustainability (such as demographics, technology/digitalization **(DGI-3 Rec 10-12)**, inequality **(DGI-3 Rec 8-9)**, socio-political and geopolitical factors, and climate change **(DGI-3 Rec 1-7)**).

### Data Gaps Initiative[1/]

***Monitoring risks in the financial sector***

II.2 Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI)

II.3 FSI Concentration and Distribution Measures

II.4 Data for Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions

***Vulnerabilities, Interconnections, and Spillovers***

II.8 Sectoral accounts

II.9 Household Distribution Information

II.10 International Investment Position

II.11 International Banking Statistics

II.12 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey

II.13 Coordinated Direct Investment Survey

### New Data Gaps Initiative[2/]

- Climate change (Recommendations 1-7)
- Household Distribution Information (Rec 8-9)
- Fintech and financial inclusion Data (Rec 10-12)
- Access to private sources of data and administrative data (Rec 13-14)

1/ Refers to phase II of the Data Gaps Initiative (DGI-2, 2015-21).
2/ Phase III of the Data Gaps Initiative (DGI-3) was launched in 2022.

**Figure 3. Supporting Data Provision to the Fund**




Source: IMF staff.

**Figure 4. Data Used in Fund Surveillance**




MFS=Monetary and Financial Statistics
IIP-A=Annual International Investment Position
FSI=Financial Soundness Indicators
GFS=Government Finance Statistics Database
QEDS=Quarterly External Debt Statistics (World Bank)
IIP-Q=Quarterly IIP
CDIS=Coordinated Direct Investment Survey
QPSD=Quarterly Public Sector Debt (World Bank/IMF)
CPIS=Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
Reserves=Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity

Sources: IMF databases and staff estimates, based on the above listed database sources, and the 2012 Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes. Data for 2021 is preliminary.

# SECTION III. THE FUND'S FRAMEWORK ON THE TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

8. **The Fund treats very seriously the safeguarding of confidential information**. In order to play its role effectively as a confidential advisor in carrying out its mandate, the Fund has a fully developed framework for the handling of confidential information.

### Vis-à-vis the Public

9. **The Fund's Executive Board, management and the staff may not disclose information that a member or other party has provided in confidence, unless that party consents to disclosure and such disclosure is consistent with Fund rules**. Pursuant to the immunities of the Fund under Article IX of the Fund's Articles of Agreement, information and documents provided by members (or any other party) to the Fund form part of the Fund's archive which is inviolable. "Inviolability" has been applied to mean that all non-public information or documents generated within or received by the Fund from members or other parties are protected by the Fund's immunities and would only be disclosed (including in response to a subpoena) with the approval of that member or other party and in accordance with the Fund's policies. Further, pursuant to the Fund's Rules and Regulations and the Staff Code of Conduct, staff is prohibited from making unauthorized disclosures to third parties of confidential information obtained in the course of their service to the Fund, and internal rules provide for procedures and potential sanctions to address staff misconduct. The Fund's Office of Internal Investigations can investigate disclosure of non-public information at staff level, and staff can be subject to sanctions up to the termination of employment. Appendix IX of the Transparency Policy Guidance Note provides further detail on this framework.

### Within the Fund

10. **In order to appropriately safeguard information, it is critical that staff and information providers reach common understandings on how specific information should be classified: Public, For Official Use, Confidential, or Strictly Confidential**. These classifications will limit sharing even within the Fund. However, management and staff cannot agree to withhold information from the Fund's Executive Board that is required to be reported under the Articles of Agreement or a Board-established policy or that is necessary for the Board to exercise its responsibility in a meaningful way. Such information includes the authorities' policy positions and plans in areas that are relevant for Fund surveillance or financial assistance but generally excludes information on hypothetical courses of actions that have been informally discussed with the authorities. In drafting Board documents, Fund staff exercises caution not to inadvertently include confidential information, unless it is of the type that must be reported to the Executive Board. Paragraphs 40–44 and Appendix IX of the Transparency Policy Guidance Note provide more detail on when disclosure to the Board is required. Even in circumstances where information must be provided to the Board, confidentiality vis-à-vis the public remains. The Fund—including the Board,

individual Executive Directors, management, and staff—may not publish non-public information provided by a member unless that member consents.

**11. Confidential information is provided to the Executive Board via a secure platform that allows access by each Executive Director and individually authorized member country officials**. All such confidential information made available in this manner is encrypted to prevent further distribution to non-designated individuals. Executive Directors are also governed by a Code of Conduct requiring them to protect the security of any confidential information provided to, or generated by, the Fund. The Board Ethics Committee handles any alleged misconduct by Executive Directors, including possible breach of the obligation of Executive Directors to protect confidential information. Authorities are obliged to ensure that the applicable Fund restrictions on access to these documents and information are respected, including limitations on internal access in accordance with the material's classification as well as no public disclosure or citation of any confidential information. For the most sensitive information, Executive Directors are provided access via uniquely identifiable encrypted documents that may not be copied or shared. As outlined during the May 2023 technical session with Executive Directors, a new electronic platform for confidential data provision and access could be developed that the authorities could use on a voluntary basis.

# SECTION IV. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE NEW ASSESSMENT OF DATA ADEQUACY FOR SURVEILLANCE

***Instructions.*** *The questionnaire has six sections that evaluate the adequacy of data provision for surveillance purposes, where adequacy is as defined in the table below (category A, B, C and D). The first two sections focus on statistics in the real sector, covering both the national accounts and price indices, and the next three sections on the fiscal, external, and financial sectors. The last section provides room for the country team to highlight any issues related to inter-sectoral consistency. To support the country team's assessment, STA provides for each section of the questionnaire a data quality factsheet about the country's data quality characteristics (coverage, consistency, reliability, and timeliness), using data and metadata from IMF databases and those reported/published by countries. The criteria provided for each question and accompanying data quality factsheets are not meant to be exhaustive, and country teams should consider all data available to the team and other important aspects in which data affects surveillance.*

### Definition of Categories of Data Adequacy for Surveillance

***Category A:*** *The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance: this indicates that the data is comprehensive, consistent, and covers all the aspects relevant for surveillance purposes. There is a high level of confidence in the overall quality of the data and the team's analysis.*

***Category B:*** *The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance: This indicates that the data provided to the Fund is mostly comprehensive and consistent,* *covering a wide range of aspects relevant for surveillance purposes. There may be some shortcomings or minor gaps, but they do not significantly impact the overall quality of the team's analysis.*

***Category C:*** *The data provided to the Fund has shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance: This indicates that the data provided to the Fund may have some notable gaps or limitations that could affect the overall quality of the team's analysis.*

***Category D:*** *The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance: This indicates that the data is minimally sufficient for surveillance purposes. It may have significant gaps, limitations, or inconsistencies that compromise the overall quality of the team's analysis.*

### Real Sector Statistics—GDP/National Accounts

**12. Coverage:** Is the coverage of sectors, industries, and activities, including those related to the informal/illegal sector, in the national accounts sufficiently comprehensive and up to date for the team's analysis? Are revisions to the national accounts well explained, limited in size and frequency, so that the team's analysis does not yield different outcomes depending on the vintage of the data?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**13. Granularity:** Do measures of economic activity include a breakdown by production, expenditure, and income? Are the breakdowns sufficiently granular, such that the team can differentiate between public and private consumption and investment? Are there differentiated deflators available for the expenditure components?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**14. Frequency/Timeliness**: Are national account statistics available at the frequency and timeliness that are appropriate for the team's analysis?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

### Real Sector Statistics—Consumer Price Index (CPI)

**15. Coverage:** Is the coverage of the CPI sufficiently comprehensive for the team's analysis, considering factors such as geographic coverage, coverage of social groups, informal markets, and illegal goods and services? Does the CPI reflect appropriately current spending patterns? Are differences between the national accounts' household consumption expenditure deflator and the CPI well explained?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**16. Frequency/Timeliness:** Is the CPI available at the frequency and timeliness that are appropriate for the team's analysis?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

### Fiscal Sector Statistics—Government Operations and Debt

**17. Coverage:** Is the coverage of government operations and debt statistics sufficiently comprehensive for the team's analysis of the fiscal stance, one-off fiscal measures and risks, including risks from quasi-fiscal activities? Are arrears, guarantees, public-private partnerships (PPPs), and other contingent liabilities distinctly identified in the debt statistics?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**18. Granularity of Government Operations:** Are the breakdowns of revenue (by type of tax, etc.) and expenditure (by economic and functional classification) sufficiently granular for the team's analysis?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**19. Granularity of Debt Statistics**. Is the structure of the debt (based on factors such as residency, creditor, instrument, currency, maturity) sufficiently granular for the team's analysis, including for their assessment of debt sustainability?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**20. Consistency:** Are above-and below-the-line transactions consistent, so that revenues less expenditures equals financing/net lending? In cases where there are discrepancies, are these well explained (for instance by providing information on off-budget accounts) so that the fiscal stance and fiscal risks are clearly identified? Are differences between the annual change in the stock of public debt and identified debt-creating flows (e.g., primary balance, automatic debt dynamics, exchange rate), also known as stock-flow adjustments, large and unexplained? In cases where the stock-flow adjustments are large, do they significantly affect the margin of error around the team's baseline debt projections?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**21. Frequency/Timeliness:** Are fiscal statistics available at the frequency and timeliness that are appropriate for the team's analysis?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

### External Sector Statistics

**22. Coverage:** Do external sector data, such as the Balance of Payments (BoP) and international investment position (IIP), cover the main components of the BoP (viz., current account, financial account, and capital account) and IIP (e.g., assets and liabilities) and their corresponding functional categories (e.g., direct investment, portfolio investment, financial derivatives and other investments)? Is the size of the net errors and omissions large and does it affect the quality of team's analysis and projections? Are BoP flows consistent with the IIP stocks? Is information regarding changes in exchange rate valuations, variation in asset and liability prices, and other relevant information available, to ensure a consistent stock-flow reconciliation between BoP and IIP?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**23. Granularity:** Is the breakdown of external sector data (e.g., by type of good/service/income, functional category, institutional sector, currency, maturity structure of financing instruments, IIP asset/liability structure, etc.) sufficiently granular for the team's analysis of current account risks and/or of risks from capital flows and excessive leverage? Is information on net international reserves sufficiently detailed, including pledged or encumbered assets and foreign exchange swap lines?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**24. Frequency/Timeliness:** Are external sector statistics available at the frequency and timeliness that are appropriate for the team's analysis?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

### Monetary and Financial Sector Statistics

**25. Coverage:** Is the coverage of monetary and financial statistics, including of financial activities beyond the banking system, sufficiently comprehensive for the team's analysis of the monetary policy stance and financial stability risks?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**26. Granularity of Monetary and Financial Statistics:** Are the breakdowns of financial sector assets and liabilities by debtor/creditor type, residency, currency, instruments, maturity, and so on, sufficiently granular for the team's analysis of financial stability risks?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**27. Granularity of Financial Soundness Indicators:** Are measures of capital adequacy, liquidity, asset quality, profitability, and other relevant measures, available and sufficiently granular for the team's analysis of vulnerabilities in the financial sector?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

**28. Frequency/Timeliness**: Are the monetary survey, financial sector balance sheet, and financial soundness indicators available at the frequency and timeliness that are appropriate for the team's analysis?

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

### Inter-sectoral Consistency of Macroeconomic Statistics

**29. Inter-sectoral consistency**: Please assess if statistics across sectors of the macroeconomic framework are consistent and provide support to the team's analysis.

*Consider the following inter-sectoral issues when answering the question: Is the central bank's financing of the government, as depicted in the government finance statistics, consistent with the central bank's balance sheet data? Does government borrowing from commercial banks aligns in both the government finance statistics and the commercial banks' balance sheets? Is the trade data in the national accounts consistent with the trade data in the BoP? Is capital spending, as reported in the government finance statistics, consistent with public investment as shown in the national accounts?*

Select a category:
A. The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance.
B. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
C. The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D. The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

# SECTION V. LIST OF INDICATORS PROPOSED FOR MANDATORY PROVISION TO THE FUND

**Table 1a. Proposed Mandatory Public Sector Indicators**[2]

| Indicator | Recommended Definition | First reporting period* | Frequency[6] (Periodicity) | Time Lag[6] (Timeliness) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total *stock* of **general government** debt[1] | **Total stock of debt,** hereafter, refers to total gross debt consisting of all liabilities that are debt instruments. The debt instruments include:<br>-SDRs<br>-Currency and deposits<br>-Debt securities<br>-Loans<br>-Insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes<br>-Other accounts payable.[3]<br><br>**General government** would continue to be defined as in the 2004 Decision, whereas the general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.[3] | 2025 | Annual | Three quarters |
| *Stock* of **general government** debt–decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock <u>by maturity</u>[1] | This indicator could be provided through a breakdown of debt by residual maturity, distinguishing short-term debt (with residual maturity one year or less) and medium to long term debt (with residual maturity more than one year or non-stated maturity). Residual maturity or remaining maturity is the period from the reference date until the final contractually scheduled payment date.[3]<br><br>The indicator could alternatively be provided through the corresponding amortization schedule, distinguishing between amortizations scheduled within a year and amortizations scheduled beyond one year.<br><br>The member should specify which of these two breakdowns is being chosen. | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters |

**Table 1a. Proposed Mandatory Public Sector Indicators (continued)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coverage of decomposed debts must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the general government level (excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on the instrument types or issuing government units (e.g., state government or local government) will have to be provided as part of the member's obligation. | | | |
| *Stock* of **general government** debt–decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by currency[1] | This includes debt stock denominated by local (domestic) currency and debt stock denominated by foreign currency.<br><br>Coverage of decomposed debts must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the general government level (excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on the instrument types or issuing government units (e.g., state government or local government) will have to be provided as part of the member's obligation. | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters |
| *Stock* of **general government** debt–decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by residency[1] | This includes debt stock owed to residents and debt stock owed to non-residents if the debt data are amenable to classification on the basis of the residency or non-residency of the holder.[4]<br><br>If data are amenable to this classification, coverage of decomposed debts must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the general government level (excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on the instrument types or issuing government units (e.g., state government or local government) will have to be provided as part of the member's obligation. | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt–decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock by creditor types | This includes:<br>- Domestic central bank,<br>- Domestic commercial bank (depository corporations except the central bank),<br>- Other domestic creditors,<br>- Foreign official bilateral creditors (including a central bank of a currency union),<br>- Foreign private creditors. | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters for general government and two quarters for central government |

**Table 1a. Proposed Mandatory Public Sector Indicators (continued)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| of at least 80 percent of the total stock <u>by creditor types</u> | Domestic debts can be alternatively reported on the basis of domestic financial institutions, domestic non-financial institutions, and domestic households (domestic other creditors).<br><br>Coverage of decomposed debts at the central government level and the general government level must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the central government level and the general government level respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on the instrument types or issuing government units (e.g., state government or local government) will have to be provided as part of the member's obligation.<br><br>When members face practical difficulties in identifying owners of publicly traded external debt securities, they can attribute it to foreign private creditor category.[5] Such external debt securities can be still counted toward the minimum 80 percent coverage. | | | central government |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt–decomposition <u>by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors where at least 20 percent of central government or general government debt, respectively, is owed to multilateral and/or official bilateral creditors</u> | Breakdown (of central and general government debt) by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditor is required only when the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is at least 20 percent of total stock of debt at the central government level or the general government level, respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year.<br><br>Multilateral creditors would be broken down by IMF, WB, ADB/AfDB/IADB, and other multilaterals.<br><br>Official bilateral creditors are broken down by country, showing: (i) among Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt; and (ii) among non-Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt. | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters for general government and two quarters for central government |

**Table 1a. Proposed Mandatory Public Sector Indicators (concluded)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | The data provision policy does not require disclosing the debt to individual commercial creditors, and only requires disclosing individual official bilateral creditors aggregated at the country level to avoid revealing the affairs of individuals or corporations. | | | |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt-decomposition of at least 80 percent of the total stock <u>by instruments</u> | Instruments include monetary gold and SDR allocations, currency and deposit (as liabilities), debt securities, loans, insurance/pension/standardized guaranteed scheme, and other accounts payable.[3] Coverage of decomposed debts at the central government level and the general government level must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the central government level and the general government level respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on instrument types or issuing government units (e.g., state government or local government) will have to be provided as part of the member's obligation. | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters for general government and two quarters for central government |
| <u>*Liquid financial assets*</u> of **central and general government** | This includes debt securities, currency and deposit as well as monetary gold and SDR holdings.[3] | 2027 | Annual | Three quarters for general government and two quarters for central government |

[1] The central government counterpart is already required under the 2004 Board Decision.

[2] Wherever an obligation requires data provision at both the general government level and central government level, to the extent capacity constraints allow, and members only have the capacity to provide data at the central government level, they would be expected to expand capacity to cover the general government over time.

[3] Data should preferably follow practices set forth in "Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2014, IMF".

[4] Residence should preferably follow definitions set forth in "Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6), IMF".

[5] This practice stems from "External Debt Statistics—Guide for Compilers and Uses—2014, IMF".

[6] The authorities and staff can agree on country-specific understandings regarding the periodicity and timeliness of data provision as long as these meet surveillance needs of Fund, paying due regard to evenhandedness among members. However, in the absence of these specific understandings, the general understandings specified in this column would apply.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund except when capacity limitations prevent them from doing so. In these circumstances, members would be expected to improve their statistical reporting systems over time. The reporting period may refer to either calendar or fiscal year, based on member circumstances.

| Table 1b. Encouraged Public Sector Indicators | |
|---|---|
| **Indicator Name** | **Recommended Definition** |
| Total *stock* of **non-financial public corporations** debt | **Nonfinancial public corporations (NFPCs)** are resident institutional units that are principally engaged in the production of market goods or nonfinancial services and are controlled by government units or by other public corporations.[3] |
| *Aggregated profit/loss of* **non-financial public corporations** | The aggregated profit/loss should preferably cover the sum of net operating balance which equals revenue minus expense (including consumption of fixed capital); however, gross operating balance can be reported instead if a satisfactory estimate of consumption of fixed capital is not available.[3] |
| Total stock of **general government-guaranteed** debt[1] | **Guaranteed debt** covers publicly guaranteed debt (loan and other debt instrument guarantees), other one-off guarantees (e.g., credit lines) and other explicit contingent liabilities not elsewhere classified (e.g., potential legal claims, payments resulting from PPP arrangements).[3] |
| *Stock* of **central and general government guaranteed** debt-decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors[2] | Multilateral creditors would be broken down by IMF, WB, ADB/AfDB/IADB, and other multilaterals.[4]<br><br>Official bilateral creditors are broken down by country, showing: (i) among Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt; and (ii) among non-Paris Club members, the two countries providing largest bilateral credit plus countries holding debt above 5 percent of total debt.<br>The creditor countries are encouraged to be disaggregated by individual creditors (if applicable). |
| *Stock* of **central and general government** debt– decomposition by fixed/flexible interest rate[2] | Flexible rate or variable rate debt instruments are those on which interest costs are linked to a reference index, or the price of a specific commodity, or the price of a specific financial instrument that normally changes over time in a continuous manner in response to market pressures. All other debt instruments should be classified as fixed interest rate. [3] |
| *Debt stock* backed by unrelated collateral within **central and general government and government guaranteed** debt[2] | Debt is **collateralized** when the creditor has certain rights over an asset or revenue stream that would allow it, if the borrower defaults, to rely on the asset or revenue stream to secure repayment of the debt. Collateralization entails a borrower granting liens over specific existing assets or future receivables to a lender as security against payment of the loan. Collateral is **unrelated** when it has no relationship to a project financed by the loan. An example would be borrowing to finance the budget deficit, collateralized by oil revenue receipts.[5] |
| *Liquid financial assets* of **public non-financial corporations** | This includes debt securities, currency and deposit as well as monetary gold and SDR holdings.[3] |

[1] The central government counterpart is already required under the 2004 Board Decision.
[2] The provision of these indicators is encouraged both at the general government level and the central government level but not required at either level.
[3] Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2014, IMF,".
[4] Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "External Debt Statistics - Guide for Compliers and Users - 2014, IMF,".
[5] For more discussions and examples, see "Guidance Note on Implementing the Debt Limits Policy in Fund Supported Programs, IMF 2021" and "Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers, G20 2020".

**Table 2. Proposed Mandatory Indicators for Foreign Exchange Intervention (FXI)**

| Indicator | Recommended Scope | First reporting period* | Frequency[2] (Periodicity) | Time Lag[2] (Timeliness) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) in the spot market, net amount | It refers to the difference between all purchases and sales of foreign exchange undertaken by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) in the spot foreign exchange market for the purposes of:<br><br>(i) influencing foreign exchange market conditions—i.e., the level or volatility of the exchange rate—including to stabilize and maintain orderly market conditions, support a managed or pegged exchange rate arrangement, or influence the monetary policy stance;<br><br>(ii) managing the level of international reserves (e.g., transactions to build up or sell international reserves);<br><br>(iii) transferring exchange rate risk. | H2/2026 | Semi-annual | Six months |
| FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) undertaken with derivative instruments, net amount[3] | It refers to the difference between all transactions to purchase and sell foreign exchange undertaken by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with derivative instruments, expressed in notional amounts,[1] for the purposes of:<br><br>(i) influencing foreign exchange market conditions—i.e., the level of volatility of the exchange rate—including those to those to stabilize and maintain orderly market conditions, support a managed or pegged exchange rate arrangement, or influence the monetary policy stance;<br><br>(ii) managing the level of international reserves (e.g., transactions to build up or sell international reserves);<br><br>(iii) transferring exchange rate risk, including through non-deliverable derivative financial instruments that settle in local currency.<br><br>The derivative instruments may include forwards (deliverable and non-deliverable, | H2/2026 | Semi-annual | Six months |

**Table 2. Proposed Mandatory Indicators for Foreign Exchange Intervention (FXI) (concluded)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | to be settled in foreign or domestic currency), futures, options (calls and puts), and/or any other derivative instrument involving the purchase or sale of foreign exchange assets where there is a transfer of exchange rate risk. This item includes transactions between the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) and any other domestic or foreign private or public sector entity. It excludes foreign exchange swaps, cross currency swaps, and repurchase agreements with domestic entities or foreign central banks. | | | |

Source: IMF Staff.

Note: Please refer to Box 2 of the Main Paper for further details on transactions which would be presumed (or not presumed) to constitute foreign exchange intervention.

[1] The notional value refers to the nominal amount of the foreign exchange transaction underlying the derivative. It is different from the market value of the derivative and the price at which the foreign exchange can be bought or sold to execute the derivative.

[2] The authorities and staff can agree on country-specific understandings regarding the periodicity and timeliness of data provision as long as these meet surveillance needs of Fund. However, in the absence of these specific understandings, the general understandings specified in this column would apply.

[3] Decomposition of derivatives FXI by instrument is encouraged on a voluntary basis.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund except when capacity limitations prevent them from doing so. In these circumstances, members would be expected to improve their statistical reporting systems over time.

**Table 3. Proposed Mandatory Indicators for Swaps and Repurchase Agreements among Central Banks**

| Indicator | Recommended Scope | First reporting period* | Frequency[1] (Periodicity) | Time Lag[1] (Timeliness) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Currency swaps and repurchase agreements entered into by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with other central banks (or corresponding monetary authority) | It refers to the aggregated net amount of all the currency swaps and repurchase agreements agreed by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with other central banks (or corresponding monetary authority) ("standing facilities") which may be used for maintaining the stability of financial markets and the financial system. The data would cover the total amounts that may be drawn under existing standing facilities, in an aggregated form, independently of their use.<br><br>If such amounts are unlimited or only constrained by the amount of eligible collateral, these facts should be noted as part of the data provision. | H2/2026 | Semi-annual | Six months |

Source: IMF Staff.

[1] The authorities and staff can agree on country-specific understandings regarding the periodicity and timeliness of data provision as long as these meet surveillance needs of Fund. However, in the absence of these specific understandings, the general understandings specified in this column would apply.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund except when capacity limitations prevent them from doing so. In these circumstances, members would be expected to improve their statistical reporting systems over time.

**Table 4a. Proposed Mandatory Macrofinancial Indicators for All Member Countries**

| Indicator | Recommended Definition | First reporting period* | Frequency[2] (Periodicity) | Time Lag[2] (Timeliness) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banks' Financial Soundness Indicators:[1] | | | | |
| Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | Capital adequacy of banks, where regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets are calculated following the corresponding regulatory framework in each country (e.g., Basel I, II, III). | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets | A narrower measure of capital adequacy using Tier 1 regulatory capital, compiled in accordance with the guidelines on the core capital concept of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital | Indicators of asset quality reporting the value of nonperforming loans less the value of specific loan provisions in percent of total capital. | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Nonperforming loans to total gross loans | Indicator of asset quality reporting the value of nonperforming loans in percent of the total value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans, and before the deduction of specific loan loss provisions). | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Return on assets | Profitability indicator reporting net income before extraordinary items and taxes in percent of the average value of total (financial and nonfinancial) assets. | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Return on equity | Profitability measure reporting net income before extraordinary items and taxes in percent of the average value of capital. | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Interest margin to gross income | Net interest income – interest earned less interest expenses – in percent of gross income. | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Noninterest expenses to gross income | Efficiency indicator reporting administrative expenses in percent of gross income. | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Liquid assets to total assets | Liquidity indicator reporting liquid assets in percent of total assets. Liquid assets are those readily available to meet a demand for cash. The holder must have the | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |

**Table 4a. Proposed Mandatory Macrofinancial Indicators for All Member Countries (continued)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | reasonable certainty that these assets can be converted into cash with speed and without significant loss under normal business conditions. | | | |
| Liquid assets to short-term liabilities | Liquidity indicator reporting liquid assets in percent of short-term liabilities (those with remaining (preferred) or original maturity of up to one year). | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Net open position in foreign exchange to capital | Indicator of FX risk exposure reporting the sum of the foreign currency positions in percent of total regulatory capital or Tier 1 capital. Foreign currency items include those that are payable (receivable) in a currency other than the domestic currency (foreign-currency-denominated) or payable in domestic currency but indexed or linked to a foreign currency (foreign currency-linked). | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Total assets of other depository corporations | Comprising deposit-taking corporations (excluding the central bank) and money market funds. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| Credit from other depository corporations:[3] | | | | |
| Total credit | Comprises debt securities, loans, and trade credit/advances. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| Sectoral breakdown: | | | | |
| To other depository corporations | Credit to other depository corporations. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| To other financial corporations | Credit (aggregate) to any type of the following: (i) Non-money market investment funds; (ii) Other financial intermediaries except for insurance corporations and pension funds; (iii) Financial auxiliaries; (iv) Captive financial institutions and money lenders; (v) Insurance corporations; (vi) Pension funds. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |

**Table 4a. Proposed Mandatory Macrofinancial Indicators for All Member Countries (concluded)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| To nonfinancial corporations | Credit to (aggregate): (i) Public nonfinancial corporations, (ii) National private nonfinancial corporations, and (iii) Foreign-controlled nonfinancial corporations. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| To households | Credit to households and nonprofit institutions serving households. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| To general government | Credit to the general government (or to the central government, depending on the member country's institutional coverage). | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| To non-residents | Credit to all sectors in other countries. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |
| Currency breakdown of credit and total assets | Breakdown between domestic and foreign currency for all credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) and total assets. | Q3/2025 | Monthly | Three months |

Source: IMF Staff.

[1] Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide" (IMF, 2019b).

[2] The authorities and staff can agree on country-specific understandings regarding the periodicity and timeliness of data provision as long as these meet surveillance needs of Fund. However, in the absence of these specific understandings, the general understandings specified in this column would apply.

[3] Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide" (IMF, 2016).

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund except when capacity limitations prevent them from doing so. In these circumstances, members would be expected to improve their statistical reporting systems over time.

| Table 4b. Proposed Additional Macrofinancial Indicators Required from Members with Systematically Important Financial Sectors (SIFS) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Indicator** | **Recommended Definition** | **First reporting period*** | **Frequency[3] (Periodicity)** | **Time Lag[3] (Timeliness)** |
| Total financial assets of other financial corporations[1] | Total financial assets (aggregate) of any type of the following: (i) Non-money market investment funds; (ii) Other financial intermediaries except for insurance corporations and pension funds; (iii) Financial auxiliaries, (iv) Captive financial institutions and money lenders, (v) Insurance corporations, (vi) Pension funds. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Credit from other financial corporations: [1] | | | | |
| Total credit | Comprises debt securities, loans, and trade credit/advances. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Sectoral breakdown: | | | | |
| To other depository corporations | Other financial corporations' credit to other depository corporations. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| To other financial corporations | Other financial corporations' credit to other financial corporations | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| To nonfinancial corporations | Other financial corporations' credit to (aggregate): (i) Public nonfinancial corporations; (ii) National private nonfinancial corporations; and (iii) Foreign-controlled nonfinancial corporations. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| To households | Other Financial Corporations' credit to households and nonprofit institutions serving households. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| To general government | Credit to the general government (or to the central government depending on the member country's institutional coverage). | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| To non-residents | Other Financial Corporations credit to all sectors in other countries. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |

**Table 4b. Proposed Additional Macrofinancial Indicators Required from Members with Systematically Important Financial Sectors (concluded)**

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Currency breakdown of credit and financial assets | Breakdown between domestic and foreign currency for all credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) and total financial assets. | Q3/2027 | Quarterly | One quarter |
| Residential real estate price index[2] | Representative residential real estate price index. | Q3/2025 | Quarterly | One quarter |

Source: IMF Staff.

[1] Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide" (IMF, 2016).

[2] Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide" (IMF, 2019b).

[3] The authorities and staff can agree on country-specific understandings regarding the periodicity and timeliness of data provision as long as these meet surveillance needs of Fund. However, in the absence of these specific understandings, the general understandings specified in this column would apply.

* This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund except when capacity limitations prevent them from doing so. In these circumstances, members would be expected to improve their statistical reporting systems over time.

**Table 4c. Encouraged Macrofinancial Indicators[1]**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Banks** | **Capital Adequacy**<br>• Common Equity Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets;<br>• Tier 1 capital to assets |
| | **Asset Quality**<br>• Loan concentration by economic activity;<br>• Provisions to nonperforming loans |
| | **Liquidity**<br>• Liquidity Coverage Ratio for the DTs that have implemented Basel III liquidity standards;<br>• Net Stable Funding Ratio for the DTs that have implemented Basel III liquidity standards. |
| | **Additional non-core FSI**<br>• Geographical distribution of loans to total loans;<br>• Gross asset position in financial derivatives to capital;<br>• Gross liabilities position in derivatives to capital;<br>• Large exposures to capital;<br>• Personnel expenses to non-interest income |
| **Other Financial Institutions** | **Insurance Corporations**<br>• Shareholder equity to total invested assets (life and non-life);<br>• Return on equity (life and non-life insurance);<br>• Combined ratio (non-life insurance);<br>• Return on assets (life insurance); |
| | **Pension Funds**<br>• Liquid assets to estimated pension payments in next year;<br>• Return on assets;<br>• Composition of investment assets (Underlying series: Financial and non-financial assets). |
| | **Mutual Funds[2]**<br>• Sectoral distribution of investments (percentage);<br>• Maturity distribution of investments (percentage) |
| **Households** | • Household debt-to-GDP; [3]<br>• Household debt to gross disposable income;<br>• Household debt service to gross disposable income;<br>• Underlying series: loans, real estate assets, total assets. |
| **Nonfinancial Corporates** | • Total debt-to-GDP;<br>• Total debt-to-equity;<br>• Debt-service to net operating income;<br>• Return on equity;<br>• Earnings to interest and principal expenses;<br>• Foreign currency debt to equity. |
| **Residential Real Estate Price Index** | For member countries without SIFS. |

Source: IMF Staff.

[1]Definitions should preferably follow those set forth in "Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide" (IMF, 2019b).

[2] Especially money market mutual funds.

[3] Including breakdowns (e.g., residential real estate loans, consumer loans), if available.

# SECTION VI. MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE SURVEYS ON DATA PROVISION

**30. Staff conducted two surveys of data provision to help inform policy proposals for the DPF review.** The survey of IMF country teams provided information on the current provision of data to the Fund in the areas of public sector, foreign exchange intervention (FXI), and macrofinancial indicators. This information was supplemented with a comprehensive survey of country authorities on data production and data provision. This Section presents key takeaways from both surveys. It should be noted that, based on feedback from the Board, staff proposals have evolved since this Section was prepared in Spring 2022. Therefore, final staff proposals do not in some cases correspond to the indicators discussed in this Section.

**31. To provide deeper insights into any data provision challenges, while anticipating possible capacity constraints especially in low-income countries, the survey findings are disaggregated by income level.** The four country groups are advanced economies (AE), emerging markets (EM), low-income countries (LIC), and fragile countries (almost all of these are also included in the LIC group). For the purposes of this Annex, fragile countries were defined as per the IMF's 2019 classification which included about 40 countries.

## A. Survey Response Rates

**32. The survey of country teams collected information on data provision by all member countries.** The perfect response rate reflects the fact that, due to the continuous nature of Fund surveillance, country teams have up-to-date views on the scope of data provision to the Fund.

**33. The survey of country authorities has provided further valuable input into staff analysis.** The response rate of the country authorities was about 50 percent on average, with the response rate from advanced economies notably higher (Table 5). This response rate, while predictably lower than for the staff survey, compares favorably with similar surveys of country authorities conducted in recent past.[10] The survey of country authorities has a few distinct advantages over the staff survey: (i) the survey asked not only about current data provision to the Fund, but also about data availability/production, (ii) included open-ended questions about issues such as capacity, confidentiality, and legal constraints, and (iii) sought views on how these challenges could be overcome.

[10] For example, the 2021 CSR survey had an overall response rate of about 30 percent.

**Table 5. Response Rate for the Survey of Country Authorities**

| | Responses per country group (in percent of respondents) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All [1] | AE | EM | LIC | Fragile |
| Public sector data | 44.2 | 74.4 | 36.1 | 22.4 | 21.4 |
| Foreign exchange intervention | 46.8 | 84.6 | 37.1 | 24.6 | 14.3 |
| Macrofinancial indicators | 52.1 | 84.6 | 44.3 | 29.8 | 16.7 |

Source: Survey of country authorities.
[1] Based on the Fund membership of 190 countries.

## B. Main Results

**Information on Data Production—Survey of Country Authorities**

**34. The survey of country authorities inquired about data production to obtain information about availability of indicators proposed for mandatory data provision**.[11] Table 6 presents the average rate of data production for the three data groups: public sector, FXI, and macrofinancial, disaggregated by income level. The survey results confirm that among respondents Fund members already produce much of the data proposed for mandatory provision to the Fund.

**Table 6. Survey of Country Authorities—Information on Data Production**

| | Responses per country group (in percent of respondents) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | AE | EM | LIC | Fragile |
| Public sector data | 71.5 | 57.1 | 61.7 | 62.6 |
| FXI [1] | 88.2 | 79.5 | 85.7 | 66.7 |
| Macrofinancial indicators | 95.5 | 96.4 | 91.2 | 95.5 |

Source: Survey of country authorities.
[1] Foreign exchange intervention in the spot market. The Euro area members are assumed to produce the data, as the currency-union FXI is being reported by the ECB.

**Information on Data Provision to the Fund—Surveys of Country Authorities and IMF Country Teams**

***Provision of Public Sector Data***

**35. The surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams yield broadly consistent results for advanced economies and emerging markets, when accounting for different response rates, broadly pointing to availability of most of the public sector data proposed for**

[11] The survey of IMF country teams did not inquire about data production/availability, only about *data provision to the Fund*.

**mandatory provision to the Fund.** Ongoing Fund CD will continue to be needed especially for provision of the LIC/fragile states public sector data.[12] Table 7 illustrates that a significant subset of the proposed data requirements is already available by member countries, while there exist some differences across indicators. Not surprisingly, data provision by advanced economies and emerging markets tends to be considerably better than by low-income countries (Figure 5).

- Data provision is particularly strong for the total stock of general government (GG) debt among advanced economies and emerging markets and less so among low-income countries and fragile states. Provision rates are still substantial for the debt breakdowns by creditor type and instrument, although depending on the country grouping.[13]
- The observed differences between the two surveys may partly reflect self-selection and different interpretations by the respondents. For example, the aggregated profit/loss of NFPCs is reported as being provided to the Fund at a much higher rate in the survey of country teams, compared with the survey of country authorities. In addition to the different sample composition of the two surveys, this particular higher rate could reflect the fact that information on NFPCs' profit/loss is available for some but not all NFPCs in the majority of member countries.
- Results for the decomposition of debt by creditor type also differs somewhat between the two surveys, especially for advanced economies. This is likely because the survey of country teams defined the debt decomposition as per Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) and the World Bank's International Debt Statistics. Staff further refined the recommended definitions for the purposes of the survey of country authorities (and the final DPF paper). The authorities' survey points to a substantially higher data provision rate using the refined definition, especially among AEs and LICs.

**36. Lower data provision rates for some indicators led to a recalibration of staff proposals, in some cases leading to moving certain indicators from mandatory to voluntary data provision.**[14]

- The availability of GG-guaranteed debt is considerably lower than data on total GG debt and, given capacity constraints, staff propose that the GG-guaranteed debt is classified as an

[12] The results of the IMF country team survey suggest that 32 LICs of which 19 fragile states do not currently provide general government debt to the Fund (Table 7).

[13] For simplicity, the results from the authorities survey regarding *central* government debt and its decompositions are not included in Table 6 because availability of these indicators is at least as good as the availability of *general* government debt.

[14] While the decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors shows low production rates among advanced economies, most AEs owe only a small share of their public debt to official creditors and therefore would not be required to provide these data in practice. Breakdown by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditor for central and general government debt would be required only when the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is above 20 percent of total stock of debt at the general government level (excluding guaranteed debt) at the end of the last reported year. If information on the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is not available at the general government level, such share should be calculated at the central government level.

encouraged indicator, considering potential cost implications of this indicator and, in some cases, limited legal authority of their central governments to collect this data.

**Table 7. Provision of Public Sector Data to the Fund**

(Share of countries, in percent of respondents)

| | Country Authorities | | | | IMF Country Teams | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Required** | *AE* | *EM* | *LIC* | *Fragile* | *AE* | *EM* | *LIC* | *Fragile* |
| Total stock of GG debt | 90.0 | 66.7 | 64.3 | 77.8 | 97.1 | 69.5 | 53.6 | 44.7 |
| Debt stock of GG - decomposition by creditor type | 33.3 | 41.0 | 64.3 | 77.8 | 11.4 | 57.9 | 46.4 | 34.2 |
| Debt stock of GG - decomposition by instrument | 86.7 | 59.0 | 50.0 | 66.7 | 82.9 | 41.1 | 32.1 | 15.8 |
| Debt stock of GG and GG guaranteed debt - decomposition by individual multilateral and official creditor | 6.7 | 30.8 | 50.0 | 66.7 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Debt stock of GG – decomposition by residual maturity | 46.7 | 51.3 | 50.0 | 66.7 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Debt stock of GG - decomposition by currency | 56.7 | 56.4 | 64.3 | 77.8 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Debt stock of GG - decomposition by residency | 70.0 | 48.7 | 57.1 | 55.6 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Liquid financial assets of general government | 43.3 | 35.9 | 42.9 | 44.4 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| **Encouraged** | | | | | | | | |
| Total stock of GG-guaranteed debt | 43.3 | 56.4 | 57.1 | 55.6 | 48.6 | 26.3 | 23.2 | 15.8 |
| Total debt stock of non-financial public corporations | 53.3 | 41.0 | 42.9 | 44.4 | 60.0 | 71.6 | 71.4 | 60.5 |
| Aggregated profit/loss (or income statement) of NFPCs | 36.7 | 25.6 | 42.9 | 44.4 | 54.3 | 70.5 | 64.3 | 55.3 |
| Debt stock backed by unrelated collateral within GG and GG guaranteed debt | 6.7 | 10.3 | 35.7 | 44.4 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Debt stock of GG– decomposition by fixed/flexible interest rate | 20.0 | 35.9 | 50.0 | 77.8 | NA | NA | NA | NA |
| Liquid financial assets of NFPCs (or balance sheet) | 23.3 | 20.5 | 28.6 | 33.3 | NA | NA | NA | NA |

Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams.

Notes: 1. The required and encouraged indicators are not exactly matched with the paper's proposals, as requirements for the central government decompositions are missing from this table, and decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors are separated into mandatory indicators (the CG debt and the GG debt parts) and encouraged indicators (the CG-guaranteed debt and the GG-guaranteed debt parts). 2. For the decomposition by creditor type, the results of survey of IMF country teams are averaged based on two types of decompositions as per Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) (foreign official, foreign banks, foreign non-banks, domestic central bank, domestic banks, and domestic non-banks) and World Bank's International Debt Statistics (foreign bond holders, foreign commercial banks, and other foreign private creditors.) In the survey of country authorities, the debt breakdown by creditor type was as follows: Domestic central bank, Other domestic depository corporations (except the central bank), Other domestic financial corporations, Other domestic creditors, Multilateral creditors, Official bilateral creditors (including a central bank of a currency union), Other external depository corporations (except the central bank of a currency union, included in official bilateral creditors), Other external creditors. See Background paper, Section V for the complete lists of the proposed indicators. The share of countries (in percent) refers to the percent of respondents in the country authorities' survey and to the percent of respondents in the IMF country teams survey. The latter is equivalent to the whole membership as the response rate was 100 percent.

- The availability of NFPCs' debt stock and aggregated profit/loss show heterogeneity across different country groups and surveys used. While staff would have preferred mandatory provision of NFPC data, these indicators will be classified as encouraged given continued concerns of some Directors about the proposed specifications of NFPC data provision.

- Staff propose that provision of certain indicators that are currently available only for a small fraction of the members—debt stock by unrelated collateral, debt stock decomposed by fixed/flexible interest rate, and liquid financial assets of NPFCs—would be encouraged but not required in the context of this DPF review.

**Figure 5. Provision of Public Sector Data to the Fund—Summary of Results**
(Share of countries, in percent[1])




Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams.
[1] The reporting shares are computed over the corresponding data categories in Table 7. The chart denotes the calculated median, minimum, and maximum.

## Provision of Foreign Exchange Intervention and Currency Swaps and Repurchase Agreements among Central Banks

**37. Many countries provide data to the Fund on intervention in the spot market, although the other indicators proposed for mandatory provision are provided less frequently, partly because some central banks do not engage in these transactions.** Spot FXI intervention is the data category which is by far the most frequently reported to the Fund according to both surveys, although other categories show significantly less data reporting (Table 8). As discussed in Section C, confidentiality concerns are one of the reasons for not providing FXI data to the Fund. Data on derivatives FXI, and currency swap and repurchase agreements with other central banks are reported much less frequently. This is likely because many countries intervene primarily in the spot market and do not engage in the other types of FXI transactions. Likewise, many central banks do not engage with swaps or repos with other central banks. Hence the lack of provision of such data likely reflects the nature of the transactions undertaken.

**Table 8. Shares of Countries that Provide FXI and Swaps/Repos Data to the Fund—by Categories**

| Data Category | Country Authorities[1] | | | | IMF Country Teams | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | AE | EM | LIC | Fragile | AE | EM | LIC | Fragile |
| FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) in the spot market, net amount | 85.3 | 55.3 | 78.6 | 80.0 | 100.0 | 61.1 | 83.1 | 78.0 |
| FXI by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) undertaken with derivative instruments, net amount | 61.8 | 34.2 | 28.6 | 20.0 | 5.7 | 6.3 | 1.7 | 0.0 |
| Foreign exchange swaps and repo agreements by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with other central banks (or corresponding monetary authorities)[2] | 61.8 | 26.3 | 14.3 | 20.0 | NA | NA | NA | NA |

Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams.
[1] Responses of the authorities of currency union members augmented with reporting by their CBs.
[2] The survey of country teams did not include this question.

## Provision of Macrofinancial Data

38. **The macrofinancial indicators proposed for mandatory provision are already largely provided to the Fund.** Both surveys have confirmed that a vast majority of members already provide most core financial sector indicators and other depository corporations data to the Fund—this is generally the case across all country groups (Table 9). Notable exceptions include the net open position in foreign exchange to capital and credit and asset indicators for other financial corporations. For these indicators, staff propose a transition period of three years, a considerably longer period than for most of the other macrofinancial indicators (one year).

**Figure 6. Provision of Macrofinancial Indicators—Summary of Results**
(Share of countries, in percent [1])




Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams.
[1] The reporting shares are computed over the corresponding data categories in Table 9. The chart denotes the calculated median, minimum, and maximum.

## Table 9. Provision of Macrofinancial Indicators to the Fund [1]

(Share of countries, in percent)

| Data Category | Country Authorities | | | | IMF Country Teams | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | AE | EM | LIC | Fragile | AE | EM | LIC | Fragile |
| **Banks' Financial Soundness Indicators** | | | | | | | | |
| Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | 97.1 | 95.7 | 94.4 | 85.7 | 100.0 | 90.5 | 89.3 | 76.3 |
| Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets | 97.1 | 95.7 | 88.9 | 71.4 | 100.0 | 87.4 | 87.5 | 76.3 |
| Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital | 97.1 | 97.9 | 88.9 | 85.7 | 100.0 | 85.3 | 85.7 | 76.3 |
| Nonperforming loans to total gross loans | 97.1 | 93.6 | 94.4 | 85.7 | 100.0 | 92.6 | 92.9 | 81.6 |
| Return on assets | 97.1 | 97.9 | 94.4 | 85.7 | 100.0 | 89.5 | 92.9 | 78.9 |
| Return on equity | 97.1 | 95.7 | 94.4 | 85.7 | 100.0 | 85.3 | 92.9 | 78.9 |
| Interest margin to gross income | 97.1 | 95.7 | 77.8 | 57.1 | 100.0 | 83.2 | 71.4 | 60.5 |
| Noninterest expenses to gross income | 97.1 | 95.7 | 83.3 | 71.4 | 100.0 | 81.1 | 73.2 | 60.5 |
| Liquid assets to total assets | 97.1 | 95.7 | 94.4 | 85.7 | 100.0 | 86.3 | 87.5 | 73.7 |
| Liquid assets to short-term liabilities | 97.1 | 93.6 | 88.9 | 71.4 | 100.0 | 86.3 | 69.6 | 60.5 |
| Net open position in foreign exchange to capital | 64.7 | 87.2 | 66.7 | 57.1 | 68.6 | 73.7 | 66.1 | 52.6 |
| **Other Depository Corporations** | | | | | | | | |
| Total assets | 94.1 | 97.9 | 88.9 | 85.7 | 94.3 | 89.5 | 87.5 | 78.9 |
| Credit from other depository corporations | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 94.1 | 95.7 | 77.8 | 85.7 | 91.4 | 88.4 | 85.7 | 76.3 |
| Sectoral breakdown: | | | | | | | | |
| To other depository corporations (interbank credit) | 88.2 | 91.5 | 61.1 | 57.1 | 91.4 | 88.4 | 85.7 | 76.3 |
| To other financial corporations | 91.2 | 85.1 | 61.1 | 57.1 | 97.1 | 88.4 | 85.7 | 73.7 |
| To nonfinancial corporations | 91.2 | 85.1 | 61.1 | 57.1 | 94.3 | 87.4 | 87.5 | 76.3 |
| To households | 97.1 | 87.2 | 66.7 | 57.1 | 91.4 | 88.4 | 87.5 | 78.9 |
| To non-residents | 97.1 | 78.7 | 55.6 | 57.1 | 91.4 | 85.3 | 85.7 | 73.7 |
| Currency breakdown (domestic vs. FX) of total assets and credit | 76.5 | 78.7 | 50.0 | 57.1 | 94.3 | 86.3 | 85.7 | 73.7 |
| **Other Financial Corporations** | | | | | | | | |
| Total financial assets | 70.8 | 46.7 | | | 92.3 | 85.0 | | |
| Credit from other financial corporations | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 62.5 | 40.0 | | | 53.9 | 70.0 | | |
| Sectoral breakdown: | | | | | | | | |
| To other depository corporations | 45.8 | 40.0 | | | 53.9 | 70.0 | | |
| To other financial corporations | 50.0 | 40.0 | | | 57.7 | 75.0 | | |
| To nonfinancial corporations | 50.0 | 40.0 | | | 57.7 | 70.0 | | |
| To households | 54.2 | 33.3 | | | 61.5 | 75.0 | | |
| To non-residents | 54.2 | 33.3 | | | 65.4 | 70.0 | | |
| Currency breakdown (domestic vs. FX) of total financial assets and credit | 25.0 | 26.7 | | | 30.8 | 60.0 | | |
| Residential real estate price index | 91.7 | 66.7 | | | 100.0 | 95.0 | | |

Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams.

[1] Indicators in the third segment would be required only from members with systemically important financial sectors.

## C. Additional Results—Reasons for Data Non-Provision

**39. The survey of country authorities included questions about the reasons for not providing data to the Fund and how these could be resolved.** While most members already provide the majority of the proposed series to the Fund, the survey answers provided valuable insights into any capacity, legal, and confidentiality constraints faced by some country authorities.

***Public Sector Data***

**40. For the public sector data, the main impediments to data provision are related to capacity constraints and challenges with obtaining source data (Figure 7)**:

- About one third of countries do not currently provide the newly requested categories of public sector data to the Fund due to capacity constraints. Some respondents (28 countries) also indicated how such capacity constraints could be resolved—the suggested solutions included additional staffing resources (20 out of 28 countries), financial resources (15 out of 28 countries) and knowledge building through technical assistance (8 out of 28 countries).
- The main unidentified ("other") reason for not providing public sector data are limitations on source data. The country specifics differ—some countries noted the decentralized nature of the government, interest in reducing an administrative burden, insufficient interconnectedness of IT systems, and in a few cases, the lack of legal authority to collect the necessary data.
- Some countries also indicated the likely timeframe for being able to start providing any missing data to the Fund. Approximately one quarter stated that they could start providing this data in one to two years, one half expected to be able to start providing data in three to five years, and the remainder in more than five years. These results helped inform the staff proposal to begin requiring most of the new public sector indicators in three years, with a few indicators being granted shorter (one year) and longer (five year) transition periods, as discussed in the main text.

**Figure 7. Reasons for Not Providing Public Sector Data to the Fund**

(By country groups)




Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams

### *Foreign Exchange Intervention and Currency Swaps and Repurchase Agreements among Central Banks*

**41. The main identified reasons for not providing FXI data are the lack of relevant transactions and, in some cases, confidentiality issues (Figure 8).** As stated above, some countries do not conduct FXI using derivative instruments and/or do not engage with swaps and repos with other central banks, and hence do not collect and report this data (these answers are included in the "other" component of Figure 8). Some country authorities also pointed out confidentiality issues, with several country authorities expressly stating a preference for not publishing FXI data, although the DPF framework allows for a confidential provision of the required indicators to the Fund without a presumption of publication. Several central banks also noted that swaps and repos with other central banks can be subject to non-disclosure agreements and consent from third parties may need to be sought before data can be provided to the Fund. Most countries did not respond to questions about a suitable transition period for introducing mandatory FXI data provision, but a few respondents noted that data provision could be accomplished within one to two years. On balance, staff propose that mandatory provision of FXI and other central bank data is introduced with a transition period of approximately three years, so that any confidentiality and legal constraints can be addressed either internally or cooperatively with third parties.

**Figure 8. Reasons for Not Providing FXI Data to the Fund**

(By country groups)




Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams

***Macrofinancial Data***

**42. While the vast majority of members already report most macrofinancial indicators to the Fund, the survey has revealed some remaining capacity constraints (Figure 9)**. As discussed in the main text, these capacity constraints are relevant especially for certain detailed decompositions (e.g., the net FX open position) and data for the non-bank financial sector. Within the "other reasons" category, limited availability of source data was the most common response. Several members commented that domestic legislation prevents them from sharing data disaggregated by individual financial institutions—it should be noted, however, that the DPF data provision framework calls only for aggregated financial sector data. A small number of members provided insights into how the remaining capacity constraints could be resolved: through additional staffing resources (9 countries out of 15 respondents), financial resources (9 countries), and knowledge building through technical assistance (9 countries). Of the 22 countries that reported the estimated time needed to start providing macrofinancial data to the Fund, 9 countries stated that they could start providing data in one to two years; 5 countries expected to be able to start providing data in three to five years and the remainder 8 countries in more than five years. On balance, given broad availability of macrofinancial data, staff propose that most new required macrofinancial indicators are phased in within 1 year, with a few indicators phased in within 3 years, as discussed in the main text. Even after the new requirements become effective, members would only be required to provide data to the extent they have the capacity to do so.

**Figure 9. Reasons for Not Providing Macrofinancial Data to the Fund**

(By country groups)




Sources: Surveys of country authorities and IMF country teams.

# SECTION VII. VOLUNTARY TEMPLATE FOR FXI AND SWAPS/REPOS DATA PROVISION

**43. This Section provides a template for provision of FXI and swaps/repos data.** The use of the template would be voluntary, and the authorities and staff can agree on a different modality of data provision. Table 10 contains the list of mandatory and encouraged data series. Mandatory provision of FXI-related indicators and swaps/repos among central banks would be expected to commence with data for the second half of 2026.

**Table 10. Voluntary Template for Data Provision**

**Mandatory indicators**

| Time period 1/ | **Spot FXI 2/** (Specify currency) | **Derivatives FXI 2/** (Specify currency) | **Swaps and repos with other central banks 2/** (Specify currency) |
|---|---|---|---|
| H2/2026 | | | |
| H1/2027 | | | |
| H2/2027 | | | |
| H1/2028 | | | |
| H2/2028 | | | |
| H1/2029 | | | |
| H2/2029 | | | |

**Voluntary indicators**

| Time period 1/ | **Total net FX transactions of the monetary authorities** (Specify currency) | **Customer/agency net FX transactions** (Specify currency) | **FX transactions with other central banks (excluding swaps and repos) or on their behalf** (Specify currency) | **Direct FX transactions between the monetary authorities and the government and public sector agencies (e.g., SOEs)** (Specify currency) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H2/2026 | | | | |
| H1/2027 | | | | |
| H2/2027 | | | | |
| H1/2028 | | | | |
| H2/2028 | | | | |
| H1/2029 | | | | |

1/ As a general understanding, data would be provided on a semi-annual basis with a six-month lag. Country authorities can reach understandings with the Fund staff on a different periodicity and timeliness of data provision, as long as these meet IMF surveillance needs.

2/ Please see Background Paper, Section V. Decomposition of derivatives FXI by instrument is encouraged on a voluntary basis.

# SECTION VIII. AN ELECTRONIC PLATFORM FOR CONFIDENTIAL DATA TRANSMISSION AND ACCESS

**44. This section briefly outlines a framework for an electronic platform that could be established to facilitate confidential data provision to the Fund.** The main principles of staff proposal were discussed with Executive Directors during a technical session in May 2023. Further details, including operational aspects, would be developed should the Board request staff to establish this platform.

**45. As discussed in the Main Paper, the revised DPF policy—if endorsed by the Board—would require members to provide to the Fund several new data categories on a mandatory basis**. Many EDs have tentatively expressed interest in setting up a dedicated electronic platform that would facilitate data transmissions from central banks to the IMF. The electronic platform would also facilitate strict controls on data access within the Fund. Not all authorities are interested to use a confidential electronic transmission system; however, some members would prefer this modality.

**46. A suitable electronic data collection platform is already in place at the Fund**. Most members are its active users.

**47. A new data transmission module could be set up for the provision of data under Article VIII, Section 5**. In case of member interest, the system could be expanded to include confidential reporting of any of the indicators proposed for mandatory data provision to the Fund. Use of this platform would be voluntary and countries could instead choose to provide data through other, already established, channels (including direct provision to IMF country teams or data publication).

# SECTION IX. EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING ON REVIEW OF DATA PROVISION TO THE FUND, MARCH 14, 2022 SUMMING UP

Executive Directors welcomed the opportunity to take stock of the experience with Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes since the last review completed in 2012. They also considered proposals for expanding the perimeter of mandatory data provision, introducing a more structured and transparent assessment of data adequacy for surveillance, and addressing outdated data requirements.

Directors agreed that the data provision framework under Article VIII, Section 5, of the Articles of Agreement has fostered close collaboration between the Fund and its members, promoting the production of key macroeconomic data since the last review, including through capacity development activities. They welcomed that virtually all Fund members continued to provide to the

Fund most required indicators, even during the pandemic. Directors also appreciated that Fund members generally provide far more data to the Fund than required under the mandatory framework.

Directors agreed that adapting the perimeter of mandatory data provision to the evolving global economy is crucial for keeping Fund surveillance effective, considering that the list of mandatory data series was last updated in 2004. Drawing on the priorities identified in the 2021 Comprehensive Surveillance Review, Directors agreed on the need to update the overall envelope of data provision in the areas of public sector and macrofinancial indicators. They also broadly supported requiring more data on foreign exchange interventions, while seeking greater clarifications, with many Directors expressing reservations and asking for more flexibility. Directors welcomed that most Fund members already provide indicators in these three areas voluntarily and considered that addressing the remaining data needs in the mandatory framework would ensure an evenhanded and more effective surveillance and improve the Fund's policy advice.

Directors broadly agreed with the proposal to expand the mandatory provision of public sector data as proposed in the staff paper, although some specific reservations were raised. Some Directors indicated that they need more time to verify the feasibility of providing some of the proposed public sector data given domestic standards and legal constraints. A few Directors asked for more flexibility in the scope of general government, taking country-specific circumstances into account. A few other Directors had reservations about making mandatory the provision of data on non-financial public corporations.

Directors agreed with the proposal to expand macrofinancial data requirements for all member countries, as proposed in the staff paper. They generally agreed that members designated as having systemically important financial sectors should provide to the Fund a larger set of macrofinancial indicators, as also outlined in the staff paper.

While many Directors agreed with the proposal to expand the mandatory provision of data on foreign exchange interventions and some other central bank transactions, as outlined in the staff paper, many other Directors expressed reservations. Most Directors noted that these data can be market sensitive; and a number of Directors considered that disclosing this information, including due to any leakage or data breach, could undermine the authorities' policy implementation. In this context, Directors agreed on the need for the utmost caution to preserve data confidentiality when members so desire and for having in place adequate safeguards to protect data confidentiality. A few Directors recommended reducing the frequency of data provision and increasing the reporting lag, while a few others preferred using a narrow definition for data on foreign exchange interventions. Some Directors favored relying on a voluntary approach for the provision of these data. A few Directors considered that the provision of data on the use of swap and repo transactions among central banks should not be required.

Many Directors agreed with the transition periods outlined in the staff paper for introducing the proposed new requirements, which should help Fund members tackle competing priorities. Many other Directors, however, stressed the need for flexibility and longer transition periods, noting domestic institutional and legal constraints and limitations imposed by the pandemic.

Directors agreed that effective surveillance requires a more structured and transparent assessment of data adequacy for surveillance. Accordingly, they endorsed the introduction of a new, principles-based approach, noting that this strengthened framework will facilitate policy dialogue with the authorities and improve prioritization of capacity development efforts by more clearly identifying areas where data need to be improved.

Directors reiterated that periodicity and timeliness of data provision should remain guided by the Fund's surveillance needs. They noted that the current framework, where information can be provided according to country-specific understandings between staff and the authorities, is geared toward supporting bilateral and multilateral surveillance. Directors agreed that in the absence of country-specific understandings, general understandings drawn from internationally accepted practices, including the IMF Data Standards Initiatives, should be used. They also reiterated that under certain conditions, the data provision framework allows for flexibility on the specific definitions of indicators, considering that member-specific circumstances, including capacity constraints, can make alternative definitions appropriate.

Directors agreed that some of the minimum required indicators listed under Article VIII, Section 5, of the Articles of Agreement and specified in Annex III of the staff paper have become outdated, owing to methodological improvements and longer-term trends in the global economy. While recognizing that an amendment to the Articles could help modernize the data provision framework, Directors agreed to maintain the Fund's long-standing practice of not applying the existing remedial framework to members not providing the data required under Article VIII, Section 5 that the Fund considers outdated.

Directors underscored the importance of taking careful account of country capacity and the constraints imposed by the pandemic when further refining the proposed reforms. They also emphasized the importance of continued outreach to Fund members, including provision of tailored capacity development assistance to those countries where data provision capacity is constrained. Directors stressed the need for continued collaboration on data and statistics with other international organizations. Noting that the review would not expand the perimeter of required data to sustainability indicators, Directors recommended working with other international organizations to gather data on climate change, inequality, and digitalization.

In sum, Directors agreed with the new principles-based approach for assessing data adequacy for surveillance, the approach to outdated macroeconomic indicators, and the enhanced data provision of macrofinancial indicators. At the same time, they concurred on the need to iron out with their national authorities the remaining specific issues in the proposals on data on public sector, foreign exchange interventions, and central bank swaps and repos. Accordingly, Directors agreed to return as soon as possible to the data provision policy to conclude the review.

# References

Independent Evaluation Office, 2016, "Behind the Scenes with Data at the IMF: An IEO Evaluation," Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, March.

International Monetary Fund, 1998, "IMF Code of Conduct for Staff," Washington DC, July.

———, 2000, "Misreporting of Information in the Context of Fund Surveillance and Fund Financial Assistance—Present Legal Framework," Washington DC, February.

———, 2003, "Strengthening the Effectiveness of Article VIII, Section 5," Washington DC, May.

———, 2004, "Review of Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes," Washington DC, February.

———, 2013a, "Operational Guidance Note on Data Provision to the Fund for Surveillance Purposes," Washington DC, June.

———, 2013b, "Sixth Edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6)," Washington DC, November.

———, 2014a, "Updated Guidance Note on the Fund's Transparency Policy," Washington DC, April.

———, 2014b, "Government Financial Statistics Manual," Washington DC.

———, 2014c, "External Debt Statistics: Guide for Compilers and Users," Washington DC.

———, 2016, "Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide," Washington DC.

———, 2018, "Overarching Strategy on Data and Statistics at the Fund in the Digital Age," Washington DC, March.

———, 2019a, "By-Laws, Rules and Regulations," Washington DC, November.

———, 2019b, "Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness Indicators (2019 FSI Guide)," Washington DC.

———, 2020, "Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund," Washington DC, March.

———, 2021, "Guidance Note on Implementing the Debt Limits Policy in Fund Supported Programs," Washington DC, May.

International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2020, "Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers," Washington DC, February.

Leckow, R., 2005, "The Obligation of Members to Provide Information to the International Monetary Fund Under Article VIII, Section 5: Recent Developments," IMF, Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4, 2005, p. 41–53.

# Proposed Decision

The following decision, which may be adopted by a majority of the votes cast, is proposed for adoption by the Executive Board:

1. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13183-(04/10), as amended (the "2004 Decision"), the Fund has reviewed data provision to the Fund for surveillance purposes and Annex A of the 2004 Decision.

2. The 2004 Decision is hereby further amended to read as set forth in the Attachment to this decision.

3. The next review of data provision to the Fund for surveillance purposes and Annex A of the 2004 Decision shall take place as needed, and normally not earlier than five years following the date of adoption of this decision.

# Appendix I. Strengthening the Effectiveness of Article VIII, Section 5 (Redlined Version)

## Attachment[1]

**1.** Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5, the Fund decides that all members shall provide the information listed in Annex A to this decision, which is necessary for the Fund to discharge its duties effectively. Members shall provide the data specified in ~~Annex A for the periods commencing after December 31, 2004, except as provided in paragraph 1(a).~~ items 1-12 of Annex A for the periods commencing after the dates indicated therein for each data category. In addition, members shall provide the data specified in items 13-22 of Annex A, starting with the first reporting period indicated therein for each data category. Members identified as having systemically important financial sectors, in accordance with Decision No. 1436-(10-92), as amended, as of the date of adoption of this decision, shall further provide the data specified in items 23-27 of Annex A, starting with the first reporting period indicated therein for each category. Members identified after the date of the adoption of this decision as having systemically important financial sectors shall additionally provide data specified in items 23-26 of Annex A for the periods commencing three years after the date of such identification, and item 27 of Annex A for the periods commencing one year after the date of such identification. Reviews of Annex A shall be conducted together with reviews of data provision to the Fund for surveillance purposes~~, and the next review of Annex A and data provision to the Fund for surveillance purposes shall take place no later than April 30, 2013.~~~~1~~.

> ~~(a) Members shall provide the data specified in paragraph (viii) of Annex A for the periods commencing after December 31, 2008.~~

**2.** When a member fails to provide information to the Fund as specified in Article VIII, Section 5 or in a decision of the Fund adopted pursuant to that Article including information listed in Annex A (hereinafter information required under Article VIII, Section 5), the procedural framework set forth in paragraphs 5 through 17 below shall apply. Failure to provide information includes both the nonprovision of information and the provision of inaccurate information.

**3.** A member has an obligation to provide information required under Article VIII, Section 5 to the best of its ability. Therefore, there is no breach of obligation if the member is unable to provide information required under Article VIII, Section 5 or to provide more accurate information than the information it has provided. However, a member that is unable to provide final data is obligated to provide provisional data to the best of its ability until it is in a position to provide the Fund with final data. When assessing a member's ability to provide information, the Fund will give the member the benefit of any doubt.

[1] For the information of Directors, Appendix I contains a clean version of the Decision incorporating the amendments proposed herein.

**4.** In the context of performance criteria associated with the use of the Fund's general resources, a member may be found in breach of its obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 only if (i) it has reported that a performance criterion was met when in fact it was not, or that a performance criterion was not observed by a particular margin and it is subsequently discovered that the margin of non-observance was greater than originally reported, and (ii) a purchase was made on the basis of the information provided by the member, or the information was reported to the Executive Board in the context of a review which was subsequently completed or of a decision of the Executive Board to grant a waiver for non- observance of the relevant performance criterion.

**Procedures Prior to Report by the Managing Director to the Executive Board**

**5.** Whenever it appears to the Managing Director that a member is not providing information required under Article VIII, Section 5, the Managing Director shall call upon the member to provide the required information; before making a formal representation to the member, the Managing Director shall inform, and enlist the cooperation of, the Executive Director for the member. If the member persists in not providing such information and has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Managing Director that it is unable to provide such information, the Managing Director shall notify the member of his intention to make a report to the Executive Board under Rule K-l for breach of obligation unless, within a specified period of not less than a month, such information is provided or the member demonstrates to his satisfaction that it is unable to provide such information.

**6.** Whenever it appears to the Managing Director that a member has provided inaccurate data on information required under Article VIII, Section 5, the Managing Director shall consult with the member to assess whether the inaccuracy is due to a lack of capacity on the part of the member; provided however, that in de minimis cases, as defined in paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13849, the preliminary communications and consultations with the member may be conducted by the Area Department. If, after the consultation with the member, the Managing Director finds no reason to believe that the inaccuracy is due to a lack of capacity on the part of the member, he shall notify the member of his intention to make a report to the Executive Board for breach of obligation under Rule K-l unless the member demonstrates to his satisfaction within a period of not less than one month that it was unable to provide more accurate information.

**7.** If the Managing Director concludes that the nonprovision of information or the provision of inaccurate information is due to the member's inability to provide the required information in a timely and accurate fashion, he may so inform the Executive Board. In that case, the Executive Board may decide to apply the provisions of paragraph 10 below.

**Report by the Managing Director**

**8.** After the expiration of the period specified in the Managing Director's notification to the member, the Managing Director shall make a report to the Executive Board under Rule K-l for breach of obligation, unless the Managing Director is satisfied that the member's response meets the requirements specified in his notification. The report shall identify the nature of the breach and include the member's response (if any) to the Managing Director's notification, and may recommend the type of remedial actions to be taken by the member.

**Consideration of the Report**

**9.** Within 90 days of the issuance of the Managing Director's report, the Executive Board will consider the report with a view to deciding whether the member has breached its obligations. Before reaching a decision, the Executive Board may request from the staff and the authorities additional clarification of the facts respecting the alleged breach of obligation; the Executive Board will specify a deadline for the provision of such clarification.

**10.** If the Executive Board finds that the member's failure to provide information required under Article VIII, Section 5 is due to its inability to provide the information in a timely and accurate fashion, the Executive Board may call upon the member to strengthen its capacity to provide the required information and ask the Managing Director to report periodically on progress made by the member in that respect. The member may request technical assistance from the Fund.

**11.** (a) If the Executive Board finds that the member has breached its obligation, the Executive Board may call upon the member to prevent the recurrence of such a breach in the future and to take specific measures to that effect. Such measures may include the implementation of improvements in the member's statistical systems or any other measures deemed appropriate in view of the circumstances.

(b) In addition, if the Executive Board finds that the member is still not providing the required information, the Executive Board will call upon the member to provide such information.

(c) The Executive Board will specify a deadline for taking any remedial actions specified under (a) and (b); in principle, the deadline will not exceed 90 days for actions specified under (b). The decision may note the intention of the Managing Director to recommend the issuance of a declaration of censure if the specified actions are not implemented within the specified period. In order to assist the Executive Board in identifying the appropriate actions to address a breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5, the member may, before the Board meeting, provide the Executive Board with a statement specifying the remedial actions it intends to take and a proposed timeframe. The member may also request technical assistance from the Fund.

(d) At the expiration of the period specified by the Executive Board, the Managing Director shall report to the Executive Board on the status of the specified actions. If the member has not taken the specified actions within the specified period, and depending on the circumstances of such failure, the Managing Director may recommend and the Executive Board may decide: (1) to extend the period before further steps under the procedural framework are taken; (2) to call upon the member to take additional remedial actions within a specified timeframe; or (3) to issue a declaration of censure against the member.

### Declaration of Censure

**12.** If a member fails to implement the actions specified by the Executive Board before the established deadline, the Managing Director may recommend and the Executive Board may decide to issue a declaration of censure. Before the adoption of a declaration of censure, the Executive Board may issue a statement to the member setting out its concerns and giving the member a specified period to respond.

**13.** The declaration of censure will identify the breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 and the specified remedial actions the member has failed to take within the specified timeframe. The declaration may specify a new deadline for the implementation by the member of the specified remedial actions; in addition, the declaration may identify further remedial actions for the member to implement before the specified deadline. It will note that the member's failure to implement any of the actions called for in the declaration within the specified timeframe may result in the issuance of a complaint for ineligibility under Article XXVI(a) and the imposition of this measure. At the expiration of the period specified by the Executive Board, the Managing Director shall report to the Executive Board on the status of the specified actions.

### Sanctions under Article XXVI

**14.** Following the adoption of a declaration of censure, if the Executive Board finds that the member has failed to implement any of the actions called for in the declaration within the specified timeframe, the Managing Director may issue a complaint to the Executive Board and recommend that the Executive Board declare the member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund for its breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5. The Executive Board decision declaring the member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund will note that the member's persistence in its failure to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 following the declaration of ineligibility may result in the issuance of a complaint for the suspension of the member's voting and related rights and in the imposition of this measure.

**15.** If the member persists in its failure to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 for six months after the declaration of ineligibility, the Managing Director may issue a complaint and recommend that the Fund suspend the member's voting and related rights. The Executive Board decision suspending the member's voting and related rights will note that the member's persistence in its failure to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 following the declaration of suspension of voting and related rights may result in the issuance of a complaint for compulsory withdrawal and in the initiation of the proceedings for the compulsory withdrawal of the member from the Fund.

**16.** If the member persists in its failure to fulfill its obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 for six months after the suspension of its voting rights, the Managing Director may initiate proceedings for the compulsory withdrawal of the member from the Fund.

**17.** All the Executive Board decisions arising from a breach of obligation taken under the procedures described above, including a decision to issue the statement of concern referred to in paragraph 12 above, will give rise to a public announcement with prior review of the text by the Executive Board.

**18.** (a) The following procedures shall apply to cases in which a member provides inaccurate information required under Article VIII, Section 5:

(i) for the purposes of a performance criterion under an arrangement in the General Resources Account, or

(ii) for another purpose in circumstances where the relevant information is reported to the Fund with respect to a performance criterion under an arrangement under a facility of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, a quantitative target under a Policy Coordination Instrument, or an assessment criterion under a Policy Support Instrument, and understandings have been reached between Fund staff and the relevant member that such reporting shall be made not only for the purposes of the relevant arrangement or instrument but for such other purposes as well, and where the deviation from the relevant performance criterion or assessment criterion, as the case may be, is judged to be de minimis as defined in paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13849.

(b) Whenever the Managing Director considers a deviation described in paragraph 18 (a) to be de minimis in nature:

(i) the consultations and notifications contemplated in paragraph 6 may be made by a representative of the relevant Area Department, and

(ii) the report of the Managing Director contemplated in paragraph 8 shall, wherever possible, be included in a staff report on the relevant member that deals with issues other than the potential breach of Article VIII, Section 5 and, with respect to potential remedial actions for such breach of obligation, shall include a recommendation that no further action by taken by the Fund. In those rare cases in which such a document cannot be issued to the Board promptly after the Managing Director concludes that a breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 has arisen, the Managing Director shall consult Executive Directors and, if deemed appropriate by the Managing Director, a stand-alone report under Rule K-1 will be prepared for consideration by the Executive Board normally on a lapse-of-time basis.

(c) Whenever the Executive Board, under paragraph 1l(a), finds that a breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 has occurred but that the relevant deviation was de minimis in nature as defined in paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13849,

(i) the Executive Board shall decide that no further action be taken by the Fund with respect to the breach, and

(II) under paragraph 17, the finding of breach of obligation shall not be published by the Fund.

# Annex A

The data referred to in paragraph 1 of this decision are the national data on the following matters:[2]

~~(i) reserve, or base money;~~

~~(ii) broad money;~~

~~(iii) interest rates, both market-based and officially deter-mined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds;~~

~~(iv) revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing (i.e., foreign financing and domestic bank and nonbank financing) for the general and central governments respectively[3]; the stocks of central government and central government- guaranteed debt, including currency and maturity composition and, if the debt data are amenable to classification on the basis of the residency or nonresidency of the holder, the extent to which the debt is held by residents or nonresidents;~~

~~(v) balance sheet of the central bank;~~

~~(vi) external current account balance;~~

~~(vii) exports and imports of goods and services;~~

~~(viii) for the monetary authorities: international reserve assets (specifying separately any reserve assets that are pledged or otherwise encumbered), reserve liabilities, short-term liabilities linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means, and the notional values of financial derivatives to pay and to receive foreign currency (including those linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means);~~

~~(ix) gross domestic product, or gross national product;~~

~~(x) consumer price index;~~

~~(xi) gross external debt[4]; and~~

~~consolidated balance sheet of the banking system.~~

| | **Required Information** | **For the periods commencing after** |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | reserve, or base money | December 31, 2004 |
| 2 | broad money | December 31, 2004 |

[1] Table 1A, Table 2, Table 3, Table 4A and Table 4B in Chapter 5 of SM/24/39 Sup. 1 provide further information on the applicable definitions and reporting frequency and time lag for items 13-27 of Annex A.

~~[3] The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extrabudgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.~~

~~[4] Gross external debt is the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not contingent, liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point(s) in the future and that are owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy. (SM/03/386, Sup. 1, 1/23/04).~~

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | interest rates, both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds | December 31, 2004 |
| 4 | revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing (i.e., foreign financing and domestic bank and nonbank financing) for the general and central governments respectively;[5] the stocks of central government and central government-guaranteed debt, including currency and residual maturity composition and the extent to which the debt is held by residents or nonresidents | December 31, 2004 |
| 5 | balance sheet of the central bank | December 31, 2004 |
| 6 | external current account balance | December 31, 2004 |
| 7 | exports and imports of goods and services | December 31, 2004 |
| 8 | for the monetary authorities: international reserve assets (specifying separately any reserve assets that are pledged or otherwise encumbered), reserve liabilities, short-term liabilities linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means, and the notional values of financial derivatives to pay and to receive foreign currency (including those linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means) | December 31, 2008 |
| 9 | gross domestic product, or gross national product | December 31, 2004 |
| 10 | consumer price index | December 31, 2004 |
| 11 | gross external debt[6] | December 31, 2004 |
| 12 | consolidated balance sheet of the banking system | December 31, 2004 |
| | **Required Information** | **First Reporting Period[7]** |
| 13 | Total stock of general government debt | 2025 |
| | Decomposition of stock of general government debt by maturity (residual maturity or amortization schedule), by currency, and, if the debt data are amenable to classification on | 2027 |

[2] The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extrabudgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.

[3] Gross external debt is the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not contingent, liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point(s) in the future and that are owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy.

[4] This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund. The reporting period may refer to either calendar or fiscal year, based on member circumstances. H2 refers to the second half of the year. Q3 refers to the third quarter of the year.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | the basis of the residency or nonresidency of the holder, the extent to which the debt is held by residents or nonresidents. In each case, coverage of decomposed debts must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the general government level (excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on the instrument types or issuing government unit (e.g., state government or local government) shall be provided. | |
| 14 | Stock of central and general government debt—decomposition by creditor type, by instrument, and by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors.[8] With respect to decomposition by creditor type and by instrument only, coverage of decomposed debts at the central government level and the general government level must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the central government level and the general government level respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on instrument types or issuing government unit (e.g., state government or local government) shall be provided. | 2027 |
| 15 | Liquid financial assets of central and general government | 2027 |
| 16 | Foreign exchange intervention (FXI) by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) (i) in the spot market (net amount), and (ii) undertaken with derivative instruments (net amount) | H2/2026 |
| 17 | Currency swaps and repurchase agreements entered into by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with other central banks (or corresponding monetary authorities) (aggregated net amount) which may be used for maintaining the stability of financial markets and the financial system. | H2/2026 |
| 18 | Banks' Financial Soundness Indicators: | |
| | Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital | Q3/2025 |

[5] Decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors (the latter aggregated at the creditor country level) is only required for members where the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is at least 20 percent of the total stock of debt at the central government level or the general government level respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt), for each reporting year.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Nonperforming loans to total gross loans | Q3/2025 |
| | Return on assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Return on equity | Q3/2025 |
| | Interest margin to gross income | Q3/2025 |
| | Non-interest expenses to gross income | Q3/2025 |
| | Liquid assets to total assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Liquid assets to short-term liabilities | Q3/2025 |
| | Net open position in foreign exchange to capital | Q3/2027 |
| 19 | Total assets of other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| 20 | Total credit from other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| 21 | Sectoral breakdown of credit from other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| 22 | Currency breakdown (domestic vs. foreign currency) of other depository corporations' total assets and credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) | Q3/2025 |
| *Members with Systemically Important Financial Sectors* | | |
| 23 | Total financial assets of other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |
| 24 | Total credit from other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |
| 25 | Sectoral breakdown of credit from other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |
| 26 | Currency breakdown (domestic vs. foreign currency) of other financial corporations' total financial assets and credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) | Q3/2027 |
| 27 | Residential real estate price index | Q3/2025 |

# Appendix I. Strengthening the Effectiveness of Article VIII, Section 5

**1.** Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5, the Fund decides that all members shall provide the information listed in Annex A to this decision, which is necessary for the Fund to discharge its duties effectively. Members shall provide the data specified in items 1-12 of Annex A for the periods commencing after the dates indicated therein for each data category. In addition, members shall provide the data specified in items 13-22 of Annex A, starting with the first reporting period indicated therein for each data category. Members identified as having systemically important financial sectors, in accordance with Decision No. 1436-(10-92), as amended, as of the date of adoption of this decision, shall further provide the data specified in items 23-27 of Annex A, starting with the first reporting period indicated therein for each category. Members identified after the date of the adoption of this decision as having systemically important financial sectors shall additionally provide data specified in items 23-26 of Annex A for the periods commencing three years after the date of such identification, and item 27 of Annex A for the periods commencing one year after the date of such identification. Reviews of Annex A shall be conducted together with reviews of data provision to the Fund for surveillance purposes.

**2.** When a member fails to provide information to the Fund as specified in Article VIII, Section 5 or in a decision of the Fund adopted pursuant to that Article including information listed in Annex A (hereinafter information required under Article VIII, Section 5), the procedural framework set forth in paragraphs 5 through 17 below shall apply. Failure to provide information includes both the nonprovision of information and the provision of inaccurate information.

**3.** A member has an obligation to provide information required under Article VIII, Section 5 to the best of its ability. Therefore, there is no breach of obligation if the member is unable to provide information required under Article VIII, Section 5 or to provide more accurate information than the information it has provided. However, a member that is unable to provide final data is obligated to provide provisional data to the best of its ability until it is in a position to provide the Fund with final data. When assessing a member's ability to provide information, the Fund will give the member the benefit of any doubt.

**4.** In the context of performance criteria associated with the use of the Fund's general resources, a member may be found in breach of its obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 only if (i) it has reported that a performance criterion was met when in fact it was not, or that a performance criterion was not observed by a particular margin and it is subsequently discovered that the margin of non-observance was greater than originally reported, and (ii) a purchase was made on the basis of the information provided by the member, or the information was reported to the Executive Board in the context of a review which was subsequently completed or of a decision of the Executive Board to grant a waiver for non- observance of the relevant performance criterion.

### Procedures Prior to Report by the Managing Director to the Executive Board

**5.** Whenever it appears to the Managing Director that a member is not providing information required under Article VIII, Section 5, the Managing Director shall call upon the member to provide the required information; before making a formal representation to the member, the Managing Director shall inform, and enlist the cooperation of, the Executive Director for the member. If the member persists in not providing such information and has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Managing Director that it is unable to provide such information, the Managing Director shall notify the member of his intention to make a report to the Executive Board under Rule K-l for breach of obligation unless, within a specified period of not less than a month, such information is provided or the member demonstrates to his satisfaction that it is unable to provide such information.

**6.** Whenever it appears to the Managing Director that a member has provided inaccurate data on information required under Article VIII, Section 5, the Managing Director shall consult with the member to assess whether the inaccuracy is due to a lack of capacity on the part of the member; provided however, that in de minimis cases, as defined in paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13849, the preliminary communications and consultations with the member may be conducted by the Area Department. If, after the consultation with the member, the Managing Director finds no reason to believe that the inaccuracy is due to a lack of capacity on the part of the member, he shall notify the member of his intention to make a report to the Executive Board for breach of obligation under Rule K-l unless the member demonstrates to his satisfaction within a period of not less than one month that it was unable to provide more accurate information.

**7.** If the Managing Director concludes that the nonprovision of information or the provision of inaccurate information is due to the member's inability to provide the required information in a timely and accurate fashion, he may so inform the Executive Board. In that case, the Executive Board may decide to apply the provisions of paragraph 10 below.

### Report by the Managing Director

**8.** After the expiration of the period specified in the Managing Director's notification to the member, the Managing Director shall make a report to the Executive Board under Rule K-l for breach of obligation, unless the Managing Director is satisfied that the member's response meets the requirements specified in his notification. The report shall identify the nature of the breach and include the member's response (if any) to the Managing Director's notification, and may recommend the type of remedial actions to be taken by the member.

### Consideration of the Report

**9.** Within 90 days of the issuance of the Managing Director's report, the Executive Board will consider the report with a view to deciding whether the member has breached its obligations. Before reaching a decision, the Executive Board may request from the staff and the authorities additional clarification of the facts respecting the alleged breach of obligation; the Executive Board will specify a deadline for the provision of such clarification.

**10.** If the Executive Board finds that the member's failure to provide information required under Article VIII, Section 5 is due to its inability to provide the information in a timely and accurate fashion, the Executive Board may call upon the member to strengthen its capacity to provide the required information and ask the Managing Director to report periodically on progress made by the member in that respect. The member may request technical assistance from the Fund.

**11.** (a) If the Executive Board finds that the member has breached its obligation, the Executive Board may call upon the member to prevent the recurrence of such a breach in the future and to take specific measures to that effect. Such measures may include the implementation of improvements in the member's statistical systems or any other measures deemed appropriate in view of the circumstances.

(b) In addition, if the Executive Board finds that the member is still not providing the required information, the Executive Board will call upon the member to provide such information.

(c) The Executive Board will specify a deadline for taking any remedial actions specified under (a) and (b); in principle, the deadline will not exceed 90 days for actions specified under (b). The decision may note the intention of the Managing Director to recommend the issuance of a declaration of censure if the specified actions are not implemented within the specified period. In order to assist the Executive Board in identifying the appropriate actions to address a breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5, the member may, before the Board meeting, provide the Executive Board with a statement specifying the remedial actions it intends to take and a proposed timeframe. The member may also request technical assistance from the Fund.

(d) At the expiration of the period specified by the Executive Board, the Managing Director shall report to the Executive Board on the status of the specified actions. If the member has not taken the specified actions within the specified period, and depending on the circumstances of such failure, the Managing Director may recommend and the Executive Board may decide: (1) to extend the period before further steps under the procedural framework are taken; (2) to call upon the member to take additional remedial actions within a specified timeframe; or (3) to issue a declaration of censure against the member.

## Declaration of Censure

**12.** If a member fails to implement the actions specified by the Executive Board before the established deadline, the Managing Director may recommend and the Executive Board may decide to issue a declaration of censure. Before the adoption of a declaration of censure, the Executive Board may issue a statement to the member setting out its concerns and giving the member a specified period to respond.

**13.** The declaration of censure will identify the breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 and the specified remedial actions the member has failed to take within the specified timeframe. The declaration may specify a new deadline for the implementation by the member of the specified remedial actions; in addition, the declaration may identify further remedial actions for the member to implement before the specified deadline. It will note that the member's failure to implement any of the actions called for in the declaration within the specified timeframe may result in the issuance of a complaint for ineligibility under Article XXVI(a) and the imposition of this measure. At the expiration of the period specified by the Executive Board, the Managing Director shall report to the Executive Board on the status of the specified actions.

### Sanctions under Article XXVI

**14.** Following the adoption of a declaration of censure, if the Executive Board finds that the member has failed to implement any of the actions called for in the declaration within the specified timeframe, the Managing Director may issue a complaint to the Executive Board and recommend that the Executive Board declare the member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund for its breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5. The Executive Board decision declaring the member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund will note that the member's persistence in its failure to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 following the declaration of ineligibility may result in the issuance of a complaint for the suspension of the member's voting and related rights and in the imposition of this measure.

**15.** If the member persists in its failure to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 for six months after the declaration of ineligibility, the Managing Director may issue a complaint and recommend that the Fund suspend the member's voting and related rights. The Executive Board decision suspending the member's voting and related rights will note that the member's persistence in its failure to fulfill its obligations under Article VIII, Section 5 following the declaration of suspension of voting and related rights may result in the issuance of a complaint for compulsory withdrawal and in the initiation of the proceedings for the compulsory withdrawal of the member from the Fund.

**16.** If the member persists in its failure to fulfill its obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 for six months after the suspension of its voting rights, the Managing Director may initiate proceedings for the compulsory withdrawal of the member from the Fund.

**17.** All the Executive Board decisions arising from a breach of obligation taken under the procedures described above, including a decision to issue the statement of concern referred to in paragraph 12 above, will give rise to a public announcement with prior review of the text by the Executive Board.

**18.** (a) The following procedures shall apply to cases in which a member provides inaccurate information required under Article VIII, Section 5:

(i) for the purposes of a performance criterion under an arrangement in the General Resources Account, or

(ii) for another purpose in circumstances where the relevant information is reported to the Fund with respect to a performance criterion under an arrangement under a facility of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, a quantitative target under a Policy Coordination Instrument, or an assessment criterion under a Policy Support Instrument, and understandings have been reached between Fund staff and the relevant member that such reporting shall be made not only for the purposes of the relevant arrangement or instrument but for such other purposes as well, and where the deviation from the relevant performance criterion or assessment criterion, as the case may be, is judged to be de minimis as defined in paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13849.

(b) Whenever the Managing Director considers a deviation described in paragraph 18 (a) to be de minimis in nature:

(i) the consultations and notifications contemplated in paragraph 6 may be made by a representative of the relevant Area Department, and

(ii) the report of the Managing Director contemplated in paragraph 8 shall, wherever possible, be included in a staff report on the relevant member that deals with issues other than the potential breach of Article VIII, Section 5 and, with respect to potential remedial actions for such breach of obligation, shall include a recommendation that no further action by taken by the Fund. In those rare cases in which such a document cannot be issued to the Board promptly after the Managing Director concludes that a breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 has arisen, the Managing Director shall consult Executive Directors and, if deemed appropriate by the Managing Director, a stand-alone report under Rule K-1 will be prepared for consideration by the Executive Board normally on a lapse-of-time basis.

(c) Whenever the Executive Board, under paragraph 1l(a), finds that a breach of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5 has occurred but that the relevant deviation was de minimis in nature as defined in paragraph 1 of Decision No. 13849,

(i) the Executive Board shall decide that no further action be taken by the Fund with respect to the breach, and

(ii) under paragraph 17, the finding of breach of obligation shall not be published by the Fund.

# Annex A

The data referred to in paragraph 1 of this decision are the national data on the following matters:[1]

| | Required Information | For the periods commencing after |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | reserve, or base money | December 31, 2004 |
| 2 | broad money | December 31, 2004 |
| 3 | interest rates, both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds | December 31, 2004 |
| 4 | revenue, expenditure, balance and composition of financing (i.e., foreign financing and domestic bank and nonbank financing) for the general and central governments respectively;[2] the stocks of central government and central government-guaranteed debt, including currency and residual maturity composition and the extent to which the debt is held by residents or nonresidents | December 31, 2004 |
| 5 | balance sheet of the central bank | December 31, 2004 |
| 6 | external current account balance | December 31, 2004 |
| 7 | exports and imports of goods and services | December 31, 2004 |
| 8 | for the monetary authorities: international reserve assets (specifying separately any reserve assets that are pledged or otherwise encumbered), reserve liabilities, short-term liabilities linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means, and the notional values of financial derivatives to pay and to receive foreign currency (including those linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means) | December 31, 2008 |
| 9 | gross domestic product, or gross national product | December 31, 2004 |
| 10 | consumer price index | December 31, 2004 |

[1] Table 1A, Table 2, Table 3, Table 4A and Table 4B in Chapter 5 of SM/24/39 Sup. 1 provide further information on the applicable definitions and reporting frequency and time lag for items 13-27 of Annex A.

[2] The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extrabudgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 11 | gross external debt[3] | December 31, 2004 |
| 12 | consolidated balance sheet of the banking system | December 31, 2004 |
| | **Required Information** | **First Reporting Period[4]** |
| 13 | Total stock of general government debt | 2025 |
| | Decomposition of stock of general government debt by maturity (residual maturity or amortization schedule), by currency, and, if the debt data are amenable to classification on the basis of the residency or nonresidency of the holder, the extent to which the debt is held by residents or nonresidents. In each case, coverage of decomposed debts must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the general government level (excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on the instrument types or issuing government unit (e.g., state government or local government) shall be provided. | 2027 |
| 14 | Stock of central and general government debt—decomposition by creditor type, by instrument, and by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors.[5] With respect to decomposition by creditor type and by instrument only, coverage of decomposed debts at the central government level and the general government level must be at least 80 percent of the total stock of debt at the central government level and the general government level respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt) for each reporting year. For debt for which the breakdown is not provided, information on instrument types or issuing government unit (e.g., state government or local government) shall be provided. | 2027 |

[3] Gross external debt is the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not contingent, liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and/or interest by the debtor at some point(s) in the future and that are owed to nonresidents by residents of an economy.

[4] This is the first period for which members would be required to provide data to the Fund. The reporting period may refer to either calendar or fiscal year, based on member circumstances. H2 refers to the second half of the year. Q3 refers to the third quarter of the year.

[5] Decomposition by individual multilateral and official bilateral creditors (the latter aggregated at the creditor country level) is only required for members where the share of debt to multilateral and official bilateral creditors is at least 20 percent of the total stock of debt at the central government level or the general government level respectively (both excluding guaranteed debt), for each reporting year.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 15 | Liquid financial assets of central and general government | 2027 |
| 16 | Foreign exchange intervention (FXI) by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) (i) in the spot market (net amount), and (ii) undertaken with derivative instruments (net amount) | H2/2026 |
| 17 | Currency swaps and repurchase agreements entered into by the central bank (or corresponding monetary authority) with other central banks (or corresponding monetary authorities) (aggregated net amount) which may be used for maintaining the stability of financial markets and the financial system. | H2/2026 |
| 18 | Banks' Financial Soundness Indicators: | |
| | Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital | Q3/2025 |
| | Nonperforming loans to total gross loans | Q3/2025 |
| | Return on assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Return on equity | Q3/2025 |
| | Interest margin to gross income | Q3/2025 |
| | Non-interest expenses to gross income | Q3/2025 |
| | Liquid assets to total assets | Q3/2025 |
| | Liquid assets to short-term liabilities | Q3/2025 |
| | Net open position in foreign exchange to capital | Q3/2027 |
| 19 | Total assets of other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| 20 | Total credit from other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| 21 | Sectoral breakdown of credit from other depository corporations | Q3/2025 |
| 22 | Currency breakdown (domestic vs. foreign currency) of other depository corporations' total assets and credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) | Q3/2025 |
| *Members with Systemically Important Financial Sectors* | | |
| 23 | Total financial assets of other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |
| 24 | Total credit from other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 25 | Sectoral breakdown of credit from other financial corporations | Q3/2027 |
| 26 | Currency breakdown (domestic vs. foreign currency) of other financial corporations' total financial assets and credit indicators (total and sectoral breakdowns) | Q3/2027 |
| 27 | Residential real estate price index | Q3/2025 |