

THE MANAGING DIRECTOR'S
GLOBAL
POLICY
AGENDA
Annual Meetings
2023



BUILDING SHARED PROSPERITY AND COLLECTIVE RESILIENCE

Building shared prosperity and collective resilience

The global economy has shown resilience, but the recovery is slow and uneven. Since the spring, global growth for this year has been slightly upgraded to 3.0 percent. Macroeconomic policies have been delivering, as global inflation is steadily declining and financial markets have stabilized. But not all countries have managed to overcome scarring from multiple shocks. Some countries have shown resilience, including a few emerging markets and the US, the only major economy that has fully recovered to its prepandemic trend. In contrast, the outputs of the euro area and China remain some 2 to 4 percent below trend. And other emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) have seen even weaker recoveries, with losses in low-income countries (LICs) exceeding 6 percent, thus exacerbating existing inequalities. Medium-term global growth projections remain weak in an environment of fragmented trade, high debt levels, and possibly higher-for-longer interest rates. Risks to the outlook are more balanced, following strong policy action in early 2023 to contain banking sector turbulence. But Russia's war against Ukraine, the climate crisis, and inflation persistence in some areas remain concerns for the global economy.

There is a danger of further divergence across economies. All countries need to contend with continued uncertainty, weak long-term growth prospects, and climate change. Some EMDEs, especially LICs, are increasingly vulnerable, given tight financing conditions, limited policy space, and dwindling buffers. LICs also face a major funding squeeze, higher risk of food insecurity, and a slower pace of convergence toward higher living standards. Heavy debt and debt service burdens are further hampering investment and growth in many EMDEs, with more than half of LICs in or at a high risk of debt distress and about a fifth of emerging market economies also vulnerable. At the same time, many EMDEs do not have the financing necessary to cope with the ongoing climate and technological transformations. And deepening fragmentation has damaging consequences for trade, investment, and global output, with the [estimated costs](#) higher for vulnerable EMDEs.

The international community must work together to build shared prosperity and collective resilience. The key policy priorities are to (1) safeguard macroeconomic stability and rebuild buffers while enhancing prosperity through growth-oriented and green reforms and (2) bolster international cooperation to strengthen the global financial safety net (GFSN) and debt architecture and to support ongoing fundamental transitions that transcend borders and require joint action. Ending Russia's war in Ukraine remains the single most impactful action.

In a world at risk of divergence, the IMF is becoming ever more important as a trusted advisor, provider of financial support, and platform for cooperation. With its near-universal membership and capacity to help prevent and address country-specific, regional,

and global crises through our surveillance, lending, and capacity development (CD), the IMF is an essential layer of the GFSN. We are focusing on (1) tailoring our surveillance to differing country circumstances with a focus on helping our members maintain stability and bolster growth prospects; (2) continuing to adapt our lending toolkit to better support our members; (3) helping members strengthen economic institutions with CD that is closely integrated with surveillance and lending; and (4) in collaboration with our partners, developing and championing solutions to address common and cross-border challenges. To deliver on this agenda, we need members' urgent support to increase our quota resources and to secure funding for both our concessional Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) benefiting our poorest members and our Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST).



SAFEGUARDING STABILITY AND ENHANCING PROSPERITY

Preserving macroeconomic stability and bolstering standards of living require sound domestic policies and a renewed impetus for growth-enhancing reforms. In achieving their priorities, policymakers will need to contend with difficult trade-offs.

- **Returning inflation to target:** Central banks should continue to focus on durably restoring price stability while calibrating policies in a data-dependent manner. Although there is now more differentiation across countries, for many, this will require maintaining a tight monetary stance and avoiding prematurely easing policy. Effective communication of policy objectives is essential for minimizing the output costs of disinflation.
- **Safeguarding financial stability:** Policymakers should stand ready to use the full spectrum of policy tools to address potential financial stability concerns, given continued pressures from the pace of monetary policy tightening. Preemptive application of macroprudential policy measures, strengthened supervision commensurate to banks' risk and systemic importance, and close monitoring of risks, including in the real estate and nonbank financial sector, remain essential.
- **Rebuilding fiscal buffers:** Fiscal policymakers should rebuild budgetary room to provide space for needed investments and to prepare for tomorrow's shocks. This generally warrants tightening the policy stance, which can help reduce debt and support monetary policy in fighting inflation. Protecting the most vulnerable by means of targeted support should remain a priority, while untargeted fiscal measures should be phased out. Clear communication of medium-term fiscal plans can help support credibility.
- **Bolstering sustainable and inclusive medium-term growth:** As the recovery takes hold, now is the time to secure a better standard of living for current and future generations. Macrostructural reforms can not only boost potential growth but also facilitate the green transition by promoting diversification away from carbon-intensive sectors. Labor market reforms that encourage participation and reduce frictions can also help support macro policies and reduce inequality.

IMF surveillance supports our members in navigating conjunctural challenges while harnessing change and lifting potential growth.

- **Bilateral surveillance** is focused on providing tailored policy advice. Our forthcoming *interim surveillance review* will help ensure our surveillance remains fit for purpose.
 - **Conjunctural challenges:** In light of increasingly heterogeneous economic circumstances among our membership, we continue to provide consistent and integrated policy advice that recognizes trade-offs and spillovers and accounts for *monetary-fiscal interactions* and *macro-financial linkages* in the context of elevated debt levels. We continue to operationalize our *integrated policy framework* and to guide members in managing capital-flow and exchange-rate volatility. To mitigate risks to financial integrity, we are reviewing our *strategy for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism*.
 - **Growth-enhancing reforms:** Structural reforms can benefit all countries. Our [analytical work](#) suggests that well-calibrated and sequenced structural measures—such as on governance, business regulation, and external sector—can provide substantial output gains for EMDEs—up to 8 percent over four years for those with large structural gaps—by promoting domestic and foreign investment and enhancing labor productivity, while also easing macroeconomic pressures. In this context, we are implementing our recently revamped Framework for Enhanced Engagement on Governance to bolster the design and impact of domestic policies to support sustainable and inclusive growth with due attention to the importance of evenhanded engagement. We also continue to analyze the *interactions of structural reforms with climate policies and debt* and will explore other topics of relevance for the membership, such as the impact of *artificial intelligence* on the future of work and inequality.
 - **Other macro challenges:** We continue to mainstream our *climate, digital, gender, macro-financial, and fragile and conflict-affected states strategies*, with a focus on relevant macrocritical elements. As part of this work, our *climate* surveillance focuses on adaptation, especially in LICs, climate-vulnerable small developing states, and fragile states, as well as mitigation in large carbon emitters, where a discussion is strongly encouraged. We also continue to analyze and tailor policies to address macrocritical *gender* gaps and to assess how policy design can maximize the impact of reforms if done through a gender lens.
- **Multilateral surveillance** continues to monitor critical interactions between global conjunctural policies and vulnerabilities. The focus is on monetary policy transmission

channels, the impact of tighter-for-longer interest rates on public financing cost and global financial stability, and spillovers from the monetary policy stance in advanced economies, including capital flow volatility. We also bring our analyses together with those of partners to help members reap the benefits of ongoing transformations while minimizing risks.

- **Global trade and spillovers:** Our analyses underscore the importance of maintaining an open global trade system, which, in the case of commodity markets, is essential for reducing food insecurity and supporting the green transition. In an increasingly fragmented world, we are also assessing practices and trends and advising our members on how to design and adapt their policy frameworks on *trade and industrial policies* to minimize any distortive effects. And we are further analyzing the implications of geoeconomic fragmentation, the drivers of weak medium-term growth, global spillover effects of a structural growth slowdown in major emerging markets, including through trade and financial channels, as well as growth prospects for low-income countries, with a focus on social safety nets.
- **Climate:** Our analytical work focuses on modalities to incentivize decarbonization, which could be implemented through a combination of carbon pricing and nonpricing instruments, including taxes, emissions trading schemes, subsidies, or regulations, with a carbon price floor differentiated by members' development level possibly accelerating the process. We are also developing tools and policy advice for *sectoral climate mitigation* and for climate impacts and *adaptation*. Through our support for *climate risk analyses and supervision*, we aim to develop members' financial sector resilience. In collaboration with others, we are also helping members strengthen local capital markets and scale up private *climate finance* to support their *green transitions*, including by exploring novel instruments to reduce investment risk. And we continue to work with standard-setters on the *climate information architecture* and the development and dissemination of *climate statistics*.
- **Digitalization:** Our research indicates that greater financial inclusion is associated with higher growth and lower inequality. We are thus working with partners on improving *public digital infrastructures* and on modalities to improve *cross-border digital platforms* that can make payments cheaper, faster, and more transparent. We are also analyzing the macro-financial implications of *central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)*. To mitigate the risks stemming from digitalization, we will follow up on the recommendations of our recent IMF and Financial Stability Board Synthesis Paper on *crypto asset policies* and are increasing our coverage of *cyber risk* oversight in financial surveillance.


THE IMF'S RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC AND SUBSEQUENT SHOCKS

In response to multiple shocks, including the pandemic and Russia's war in Ukraine, the IMF provided more than \$300 billion in financing and \$650 billion in global reserves since the onset of the pandemic.

The IMF plays a **key role at the center of the GFSN**. In contrast to other GFSN layers, which have limited coverage, the IMF has near universal membership. Its unique quota-based financing model allows it to pool a portion of its members' reserves efficiently at a low cost and in a manner that ensures fair and transparent burden sharing. Its Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) provides concessional lending to the poorest members, many of which are affected by fragility and conflict. As IMF lending is complemented with macroeconomic policy advice and capacity development, the IMF provides a unique public good to the world economy.

The IMF has continually tailored its toolkit to meet emergent global needs. For instance, in September 2022, the IMF established **Food Shock Window** in its emergency financing instruments to support countries facing urgent balance-of-payment needs related to the global food crisis. Also in 2022, the **IMF established the RST** to provide long-term affordable financing to help low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries address longer-term challenges, including by building resilience to external shocks stemming from climate change and pandemics and thereby strengthening their balance-of-payment stability. In March 2023, the IMF also temporarily increased its normal annual and cumulative access limits on members' overall access to the IMF general resources account against elevated uncertainty and challenges in the global economy.

Since the pandemic, the IMF has **approved about \$312 billion in financing** through emergency assistance instruments and upper credit tranche (UCT) quality programs to 96 countries, of which about \$45 billion has gone to 57 LICs. Overall, the IMF quintupled its interest-free lending to LICs through the PRGT. About US\$40 billion has been disbursed through rapid financing (Rapid Credit Facility/Rapid Financing Instrument and augmentations under existing arrangements) to 83 countries. Six countries, including Burkina Faso, Haiti, and South Sudan, have since benefited from the Food Shock Window. About \$148 billion has been made available to support countries



with strong fundamentals and policy frameworks, including under five Flexible Credit Lines, three Precautionary Liquidity Lines, and one Short-term Liquidity Line. About \$124 billion has been approved via new disbursing UCT programs, of which \$30 billion has gone to 29 LICs. In addition, new Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangements have been approved in conjunction with new or ongoing UCT programs with 10 countries from all regions, including Barbados, Bangladesh, Kenya, Kosovo, and Senegal.

In August 2021, the IMF's Board of Governors approved a **historic general allocation of SDRs equivalent to \$650 billion**. A recent [report](#) documents that the allocation was beneficial for the global economy, thus helping meet the long-term global need for reserves and supporting confidence at a time of extraordinary uncertainty in the global economy by reducing borrowing costs and limiting spillovers. Many IMF members, especially LICs, used the allocation to meet urgent pandemic-related fiscal and external needs. For example, The Gambia dedicated some of its allocation to a new ultra-cold storage facility for COVID-19 vaccines, whereas Senegal used SDRs to support domestic vaccine production and to invest in hospitals. LICs continue to benefit from the allocation because of the generous voluntary channeling of SDRs from stronger members, who have pledged \$100 billion, including for the IMF's PRGT and RST.

REINFORCING COLLECTIVE RESILIENCE

In our complex and shock-prone world, countries and the GFSN need to become more resilient. Increasing fragmentation, together with the existential threat of climate change, further compounds vulnerabilities and will likely add to global shocks. Protecting vulnerable countries and their people against shocks contributes to stability beyond their borders; such protection is a global public good. This is why members need to ensure that the GFSN can effectively pool resources and can direct them to where they are needed most. Coordinated actions to address debt overhang in EMDEs and to prevent debt crises from becoming systemic are also essential. And cooperation is a must to combat the climate crisis and support vulnerable countries—which have contributed the least to global emissions—in their green transitions, including with financial support and technology transfers.

The IMF at the center of the GFSN needs appropriate resources to continue safeguarding international financial stability.

Since the pandemic, we have deployed more than \$300 billion in financial assistance and an additional \$650 billion in global reserves through the 2021 allocation of special drawing rights (SDR) (Box). But without collective action, the IMF's resource envelope—which has shrunk relative to the size of total global liabilities and has become more dependent on temporary borrowed resources—is set to decline. It is thus important that our members come together to bolster our permanent quota resources by successfully completing the 16th General Review of Quotas by mid-December 2023. Equally important is to continue governance reform so that the IMF remains representative of its diverse membership. Following the quota review, we will consider reviewing General Resources Account access limits and our surcharge policy based on a comprehensive analysis of the IMF's precautionary balances, with a view to exploring reform options that would continue to protect the IMF's balance sheet and the revolving nature of its resources, while limiting the financial burden on borrowing members. To be able to continue the support for our poorest and most vulnerable EMDEs, we rely on our economically stronger members to close the remaining subsidy funding gap for the PRGT. To date, more than \$40 billion in resources has already been pledged to the RST, and—pending a successful review of the RST—we encourage members to scale up their efforts, including by raising the ambition of economically stronger members beyond the target of rechanneling 20 percent of the 2021 SDR allocation.

The IMF also needs to ensure that its lending toolkit continues to meet the evolving needs of members while safeguarding the IMF's balance sheet.

To better serve EMDEs with strong policy frameworks and institutions, we have reformed our *precautionary instruments* to ensure their strong signaling power, agility, and capacity to address external risks. We have also reformed our *policy coordination instrument* to signal policy commitment, improve flexibility, and help unlock financing from official creditors or private investors. In support of our low-income members, we will review *access limits under the PRGT* as part of an interim review once substantial progress with PRGT fundraising has been made and will start the *Review of the Fund's Concessional Facilities and Financing* to help meet LIC's balance-of-payment financing needs while ensuring the PRGT's longer-term sustainability by exploring all options, including the use of internal resources. To help preserve low financing costs for RST financing for our poorest members, we have recently adopted an RST interest rate cap. The *interim RST review* will take stock of experiences with implementation and, as warranted, will propose changes. Our financing goes hand in hand with policy advice, and our forthcoming *Review of Conditionality* and recommendations of the upcoming *Independent Evaluation Office Evaluation of Exceptional Access* will help us strengthen IMF support to members' programs while supporting the catalytic role of the IMF.

Our ability to support members' programs to restore macroeconomic stability also hinges on a global debt restructuring architecture that can durably address debt vulnerabilities:

- **Common Framework for Debt Treatments (CF):** Together with the World Bank (WB), we have supported the G20 in implementing the CF, which has started to deliver. The debt treatment for Chad was agreed on in November 2022; Ghana secured financing assurances in May 2023; and Zambia secured a landmark agreement with official creditors in June 2023, with significant progress since then, including in discussions with bondholders. We hope to build on this positive momentum toward shorter timelines and smoother processes to enhance the effectiveness of the CF. To this end, we have published a guidance note aiming at improving information sharing on our debt sustainability analysis to facilitate restructuring for ongoing cases.
- **Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR):** The GSDR, which we launched in February jointly with the WB under India's G20 presidency, has delivered tangible results in advancing a common understanding of debt challenges, including the role of multilateral development banks in providing concessional support. We continue to support this important initiative by organizing workshops and facilitating discussions on key issues,

such as comparability of treatment, cut-off dates, and the treatment of domestic debt in restructurings.

- **Debt restructuring, transparency, and sustainability:** We also continue to support enhancing creditor coordination to promote timely restoration of debt sustainability for all countries that need it, including vulnerable middle-income countries. To help manage debt risks and improve restructuring processes, we continue to work on improving *public debt transparency* and *fiscal risk management*. At the same time, we are exploring *reform options* to promote the IMF's capacity to support countries undertaking debt restructurings. Together with the WB, we will initiate a multiyear *Review of the LIC Debt Sustainability Framework* to enhance our analysis of debt vulnerabilities and to support restructuring processes where needed.

Together with the WB and other partners, we are undertaking a Domestic Resource Mobilization Initiative. This initiative will cover the mobilization of public resources and private savings to help EMDEs progress on advancing their development goals, including those on climate change. *Domestic public resource mobilization* benefits from our work on [building tax capacity](#), improving public spending efficiency, and strengthening fiscal institutions. To this end, we are launching a new CD fund under the *Global Public Finance Initiative* that will combine our leading expertise on public revenue and public spending under one roof. We are also working, together with the WB, on *developing domestic capital markets*. In parallel, our policy support to members and work on advancing digital solutions will bolster the *economic environment* and [digital infrastructure](#).

Our CD helps our members strengthen economic institutions and build resilience. We continue to strengthen integration between CD and surveillance and lending and to focus our technical assistance and training on areas that are of macro-critical relevance to our members, especially LICs and fragile and conflict-affected states. The ongoing *Review of the Fund's CD Strategy* aims to further improve CD outcomes by assessing the effectiveness of our CD, modernizing its delivery, enhancing its strategic and prioritization frameworks, and ensuring commensurate funding, where we rely on our stronger members. We are also enhancing CD delivery on public financial management, improving *cross-border payments* (jointly with the WB), and supporting countries' considerations to introduce CBDCs (through a *CBDC Handbook* and tailored CD).

To be able to deliver effectively for our membership, we continue to improve our internal practices and staff diversity. We are implementing our Enterprise Risk Management framework that allows for effective identification, assessment, and treatment of

enterprise risks. We are also implementing the recommendations of the Institutional Safeguards Review to ensure robust mechanisms for our institutional governance and analytical integrity. And we are reviewing our policies on Transparency and Article IV Delays to bolster traction and accountability. The strength of the IMF comes from its talented and diverse employees. With inclusion as one of our core values, we are committed to making strides in gender and regional representation. We are also exploring options to improve voice and representation within the Executive Board, including by adding a third chair for sub-Saharan Africa.


In today's fragile and increasingly fragmented world, the IMF remains committed to bringing countries together to solve global challenges.

For nearly 80 years, the IMF has served the membership not only with advice and financial lifelines but also with its convening power to bring our members around one table to safeguard the common good the institution provides. Given the scale of challenges facing our world, this ability to forge consensus on complex issues is ever more critical. This also requires close collaboration with other international institutions. For instance, our recent [joint statement with the WB](#) highlights our commitment to leverage our respective expertise to support our members' development goals and to ensure that the benefits of sustainable economic growth are fairly distributed. In our fast-moving world, we are keen to adapt to remain a strong institution not just for today but also for tomorrow and look forward to continued strong engagement of our dedicated staff with our members, stakeholders, and civil society to jointly shape our future.



SURVEILLANCE

62
Article IV
consultations



3 Financial
System Stability
Assessments

FSAP

Publications on Climate, Digital, Inclusion



64
Climate
Change



105
Digital
Money



13
Inclusion
and Gender

6.3 million visitors

to flagship publications, blogs, *F&D*,
and Country Focus webpages



IMF data dashboards

188,574 visits to
Climate Change Indicators


46,908 visits to SDR Tracker

77,265 visits to Vaccine
Supply Tracker

Note: April 2023 to September 2023; SDR = Special Drawing Right.

LENDING


\$20.8 billion was approved for **14** countries:
total financial assistance since Apr 1, 2023



10
of which
have a
PRGT
facility


Note: FCL = Flexible Credit Line; PLL = Precautionary and Liquidity Line; RCF = Rapid Credit Facility; RFI = Rapid Financing Instrument; SLL = Short-term Liquidity Line.

RST, PRGT and CCRT Fundraising



Note: CCRT = Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust; PRGT = Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust; RST = Resilience and Sustainability Trust, SDR = Special Drawing Right.

Use of 2021 \$650 Billion SDR Allocation



Note: The full tracker is available on IMF.org, and the data reflect Staff Reports published for 138 out of 190 members as of June 2023; Reserves include maintaining the allocation as reserve holdings; Fiscal includes priority spending (e.g., health and social spending), as well as debt management operations; EFN = External Financing Needs; Channeling includes SDR channeling to countries in need, mainly through PRGT and RST.

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

1,290
single country CD
projects*




to **165**
countries

69%
to **FCS, LICs,**
and **small states**



Direct CD Delivery in FY24*



**Number of
CD projects on**



Climate 82



Digital 44

Microlearning**
via YouTube

1,186,286 views

273 videos

15,136 subscribers

**IMF Online
Learning*****

180,000 active users

190 countries

6 languages

Note: * May 2023 to September 2023; ** March 2020 to September 2023; *** Since the launch of Online Learning Program (2013) to September 2023; CD = Capacity Development; FCS = Fragile and Conflict-affected State; LIC = Low-income Country.

OUTSTANDING CREDIT AND COMMITMENTS

(as of the end of September 2023; in billions of SDRs)¹

GENERAL RESOURCES ACCOUNT FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

	CURRENT PROGRAM SIZE	OUTSTANDING CREDIT ²
MEMBERS WITH CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS		
Stand-By Arrangements (SBA)		
Armenia, Republic of	0.13	0.32
Georgia	0.21	0.46
Kosovo	0.08	0.04
Pakistan	2.25	5.97
Serbia, Republic of	1.90	0.95
Extended Fund Facility (EFF)		
Argentina	31.91	33.08
Bangladesh	1.65	0.55
Barbados	0.09	0.35
Benin	0.32	0.26
Cameroon	0.32	0.25
Costa Rica	1.24	1.19
Côte d'Ivoire	1.73	1.12
Egypt, Arab Republic of	2.35	12.39
Gabon	0.39	0.72
Honduras	0.42	0.31
Jordan	1.15	1.44
Kenya	1.48	0.98
Mauritania	0.04	0.01
Moldova, Republic of	0.40	0.33
Papua New Guinea	0.46	0.04
Senegal	0.76	0.68
Seychelles	0.04	0.09
Sri Lanka	2.29	0.98
Suriname	0.38	0.16
Ukraine	11.61	8.75
Flexible Credit Line (FCL)		
Chile	13.95	-
Colombia	7.16	3.75
Mexico	35.65	-
Morocco	3.73	1.50
Peru	4.00	-
Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)		
Jamaica	0.73	0.45
North Macedonia, Republic of	0.41	0.21
Total Current Arrangements	129.21	
o/w Undrawn Balance ³ (A)	92.60	
Total Outstanding Credit (B)		77.31
MEMBERS WITHOUT CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS		
Total Outstanding Credit (C)		19.11
Other Upper Credit Tranche (UCT)		
o/w Ecuador	5.59	
o/w Angola	3.15	
o/w Tunisia	0.88	
Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)		
o/w South Africa	3.05	
o/w Nigeria	2.15	
o/w Tunisia	0.48	
TOTAL GRA COMMITMENTS (A)+(B)+(C)		189.02

TOTAL LENDING COMMITMENTS =
SDR 218.59 BILLION

POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH TRUST FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

	CURRENT PROGRAM SIZE	OUTSTANDING CREDIT ²
MEMBERS WITH CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS		
Extended Credit Facility (ECF)		
Bangladesh	0.82	0.41
Benin	0.16	0.32
Burkina Faso	0.23	0.30
Burundi	0.20	0.10
Cabo Verde	0.05	0.05
Cameroon	0.16	0.79
Central African Republic	0.14	0.20
Chad	0.39	0.54
Comoros	0.03	0.01
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	1.07	1.29
Congo, Republic of	0.32	0.26
Côte d'Ivoire	0.87	0.68
Ghana	2.24	1.67
Guinea-Bissau	0.03	0.04
Honduras	0.21	0.17
Kenya	0.74	1.08
Liberia	0.16	0.18
Madagascar, Republic of	0.22	0.66
Mauritania, Islamic Republic of	0.02	0.24
Moldova, Republic of	0.20	0.22
Mozambique	0.34	0.48
Nepal	0.28	0.29
Niger	0.20	0.37
Papua New Guinea	0.23	0.29
Senegal	0.38	0.36
Sierra Leone	0.12	0.36
Somalia	0.25	0.25
Tanzania, United Republic of	0.80	0.63
Uganda	0.72	0.90
Zambia	0.98	0.28
Total Current Arrangements	12.56	
o/w Undrawn Balance ³ (D)	7.54	
Total Outstanding Credit (E)		13.42
MEMBERS WITHOUT CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS		
Total Outstanding Credit (F)		4.27
Other Upper Credit Tranche (UCT)		
o/w Sudan	0.99	
o/w Togo	0.24	
o/w Mali	0.23	
Rapid Credit Facility (RCF)		
o/w South Sudan, Republic of	0.25	
o/w Malawi	0.21	
o/w Haiti	0.19	
TOTAL PRGT COMMITMENTS (D)+(E)+(F)		25.22
RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY TRUST ARRANGEMENTS		
Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF)		
Bangladesh	1.00	-
Barbados	0.14	0.01
Costa Rica	0.55	-
Jamaica	0.57	0.19
Kenya	0.41	-
Kosovo	0.06	-
Morocco	1.00	-
Niger	0.10	-
Rwanda	0.24	0.07
Senegal	0.24	-
Seychelles	0.03	-
TOTAL RST COMMITMENTS (G)	4.36	

FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE GENERAL DEPARTMENT

(as of end-FY23, in billions of US dollars)^{1,2}

Total Assets	687	Total Liabilities, Reserves, Retained Earnings, and Resources	687
Currencies	608	Borrowings	2
o/w Usable currencies	372	Quota	642
o/w Credit outstanding	130	Other liabilities	3
SDR holdings	30	Reserves of the General Resources Account	38
Investments	38	Retained earnings of the Investment Account	3
Other assets (including gold)	10		

FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE CONCESSIONAL LENDING AND DEBT RELIEF TRUSTS

(as of the end of FY23; in billions of US dollars)^{1,2}

	PRGT	PRGT-HIPC	CCRT		PRGT	PRGT-HIPC	CCRT
Total Assets	36	0.5	0.2	Total Liabilities and Resources	36	0.5	0.2
o/w Cash and cash equivalents and investments	14	0.5	0.2	o/w Borrowings	25	0.1	0.1
o/w Loans receivable	22	-	-	o/w Resources	11	0.4	0.1

IMF'S LENDING CAPACITY

(as of the end of FY23; in billions of US dollars)^{1,2,3}



CONSOLIDATED OPERATIONAL INCOME AND EXPENSES IN SELECTED YEARS

(in millions of US dollars; unless otherwise noted)⁶

	FY22	FY23
A. Operational income	3,402	3,938
Lending income (including surcharges)	3,696	3,510
Non-lending income/(loss)	(293)	428
o/w Investment income/(loss)	(313)	285
B. Expenses	1,376	1,504
Net administrative expenses	1,180	1,293
o/w Personnel	1,106	1,182
Other ⁷	196	211
C. Net operational income (A-B)	2,026	2,434
Memorandum items:		
Net administrative budget in FY23 dollars ⁸	1,272	1,295
SDR interest rate (end of period)	0.49	3.75
Gross spending on:		
Country Operations	555	641
Lending	159	178
Surveillance	254	255
CD-Fund financed	39	59
CD-Externally financed	104	150
Multilateral surveillance & Global Cooperation/Standards	173	174
Fund governance & Fund Finances	149	151
Corporate Functions	386	405

Note: CD = Capacity Development; o/w = of which; SDR = Special Drawing Right.

¹ Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

² Figures in US dollars based on an exchange rate of 1.34701/SDR as of April 30, 2023.

³ The IMF's lending capacity is calculated after setting aside a liquidity buffer of 20 percent and considering that only resources of members and participants with strong external positions are used for lending.

⁴ New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). The current five-year period of NAB effectiveness runs from January 2021 through December 2025.

⁵ Bilateral Borrowing Agreements (BBAs). The 2020 Borrowing Agreements have an initial term through the end of 2023 and are extendable for a further year through the end of 2024 with creditors' consent.

⁶ Figures in US dollars based on average exchange rates for respective years (\$1.41/SDR for FY22, \$1.32/SDR for FY23).

⁷ Net difference between Expenses and Net administrative budget.

⁸ Deflated with the global external deflator (a price index applied to the administrative budget, formulated in real terms, to obtain the nominal budget).

Note: o/w = of which; SDR = Special Drawing Right.

¹ Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

² Includes outstanding credit under expired arrangements and outright disbursements.

³ Available balance not yet drawn under current arrangements.