

Fiscal Risk Analysis & Management

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Fiscal Affair Department IMF-JICA Conference

FISCAL RISKS, FISCAL SPACE, AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

February 2017



FAD

Outline of Presentation

- I. Why Fiscal Risks Matter
- II. Characteristics of Fiscal Risk
- III. Fiscal Risks in LICs
- IV. Understanding & Management of Fiscal Risks
- V. Strengthening Fiscal Risk Analysis & Mitigation
- VI. Conclusions


I. Why Fiscal Risks Matter

a. Public Debt Forecasts for Advanced Economies



Advanced Economies: Public Debt

(2007-2016, Percent of GDP)




I. Why Fiscal Risks Matter

b. Public Debt Forecasts for Emerging Economies



Emerging Economies, Excluding China: Public Debt

(2007-2016, Percent of GDP)



I. Why Fiscal Risks Matter c. How Fiscal Risks Impact on Fiscal Outcomes



Unexpected Increase in General Government Debt (percent of GDP, 2007-2010)


(percent of GDP, 2007-2010)												
	FRA	DEU	NLD	ESP	PRT	GBR	USA	GRC	IRL	ISL	AVE*	Issues Revealed by the Crisis
Underlying fiscal position	1.7	3.2	-2.4	1.8	11.3	3.7	8.1	16.3	1.3	10.9	6.0	Unreported
Revisions to 2007 deficit & debt	1.7	1.8	-0.9	-0.1	0.1	1.5	7.1	2.5	1.6	4.0	4.7 -	Deficits
Changes to government boundary	-0.7	1.4	-0.2	0.6	9.4	1.9	0.9	11.2	-0.1	2.5	1.1 -	SoEs & PPPs
Cash-accrual adjustments	0.7	0.0	-1.3	1.3	1.7	0.3	0.0	2.6	-0.2	4.5	0.2 -	Arrears
Exogenous shocks	8.4	12.8	14.2	15.4	8.1	17.0	6.3	40.0	60.2	39.5	9.8	
Macroeconomic shocks	8.3	4.7	5.2	13.0	4.4	8.9	3.8	38.4	35.7	-3.3	6.0 -	Macroeconomic Risks
Financial sector interventions	0.0	8.1	9.0	2.5	3.6	8.1	2.5	1.6	24.5	42.8	3.8	Contingent Liabilities
Policy changes	2.3	3.8	1.9	4.9	4.7	1.1	6.4	-8.0	-9.9	-4.3	4.7	Stimulus / Consolidation
Other factors	2.1	-0.3	6.5	1.9	3.7	6.2	8.3	-6.7	7.5	21.6	5.9	Concomaction
Total Unforecast Increase in Debt	14.4	19.5	20.2	24.0	27.8	28.0	29.1	41.7	59.1	67.7	26.4	

^{*} GDP-weighted average





Size and likelihood of fiscal shocks by type




Source: Bova et al. (2016)

b. Fiscal risks are biased toward the downside



Forecast Error for General Government Debt in Y+3 (2000-13 average as % of GDP, actual-forecast)

(2000-13 average as % of GDP, actual-forecast)




Source: European Commission 4

c. Fiscal risks are non-linear




Typical Fiscal Reaction to Macro shocks

Expenditure Variation (percent of GDP)




Revenue Variation (percent of GDP)



d. Fiscal risks are highly correlated




Contingent Liability Realizations




Source: Bova et al. (2016)


e. With broader implications








Years Before or After Contingent Liability Realization






III. Fiscal Risks in LICs

a. Main sources of Contingent Liabilities in LIC's






III. Fiscal Risks in LICs

b. Materialized Contingent Liabilities in LICs





1/ 3.2 percent of GDP for 2015 and 2.1 percent of GDP for 2016. The amount covers only the cost that the government acknowledges.

Source: Managing Fiscal Risks in Low-income Countries" (forthcoming WP): Baum, Hodge, Mineshima, Moreno Badia, and Tapsoba (2017).

IV. Understanding and Management of Fiscal Risks

a. Fiscal Transparency Code



Risk Disclosure & Analysis

- Macroeconomic Risks
- Specific Fiscal Risks
- Long-Term Sustainability

Risk Management

- Budgetary Contingencies
- Asset and Liability Management
- Guarantees, PPPs and Financial Sector
- Natural Resources and Environmental


Fiscal Coordination

- Sub-National Governments
- Public Corporations

IV. Understanding & Management of Fiscal Risks b. Balance sheet data has improved



Coverage of Balance Sheet Data (GFS)




Source: COFA Database

IV. Understanding & Management of Fiscal Risksc. Balance sheet data has improved



Coverage of Balance Sheet Data (GFS)




Source: COFA Database

IV. Understanding & Management of Fiscal Risks d. Disclosure of risks remains qualitative



Contingent Liabilities




Source: IMF Staff Estimates

IV. Understanding & Management of Fiscal Risks


e. Mitigation efforts are ad hoc and fragmented




Direct controls and limits on exposure




Transfer or sharing of risks



Regulations, incentives, and other measures



Budget provisioning




V. Strengthening Fiscal Risk Analysis & Mitigation:

a. Fiscal Stress Test – debt and liquidity






(Percent of GDP)



Liquidity: Gross Financing

(Percent of GDP)



Source: IMF Staff Estimates


V. Strengthening Fiscal Risk Analysis & Mitigation:

250 500 750 1,000

b. Fiscal Stress Test – solvency and fiscal burden




Fiscal Burden: Interest Cost



Solvency: Net Financial Worth

(Percent of 2017 GDP)



-1,000-750 -500 -250 0

Comprehensive Balance Sheet


(Percent of 2017 baseline GDP)

	Baseline	Shock
Financial assets	903.5	811.1
Currency and deposits	9.2	9.0
Loans	8.5	8.4
Shares and other equities	17.9	9.0
Other accounts receivable	7.0	7.0
NPV Revenues	860.2	777.0
Liabilities	942.9	918.6
Securities other than shares	21.8	42.8
Loans	20.4	27.3
Insurance technical reserves	18.0	18.1
Other accounts payable	7.4	7.4
NPV Expenditures	875.3	823.0
Net Financial Worth	-39.4	-107.6
Existing Net Financial Worth	-24.3	-61.6
Future discounted deficits	-15.1	-46.0

V. Strengthening Fiscal Risk Analysis & Mitigation:

c. Fiscal Risk Management Toolkit





VI. Conclusions a. Fiscal risk analysis



- Low capacity countries should focus on
 - macro-fiscal sensitivity analysis
 - financial balance sheet
 - disclosing explicit contingent liabilities
- Intermediate capacity countries should prioritize
 - alternative macro-fiscal scenarios
 - full balance sheets
 - disclosing all contingent liabilities
- High capacity countries should concentrate on
 - disclosing the size and probability of contingent liability realizations
 - periodic fiscal stress tests

VI. Conclusions

b. Fiscal risk management



- All countries should strengthen their institutional arrangements for monitoring and managing risks
- Low capacity countries should look to strengthen direct controls and centralize approval of explicit contingent liabilities
- Intermediate capacity countries should prioritize more effective use of risk mitigation and transfer tools
- Advanced capacity countries should build risk exposure into fiscal plans