#### 12<sup>th</sup> IMF Statistical Forum

# A ON THE ECONOMY

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# The impact of artificial intelligence on output and inflation

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Views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank for International Settlements.

## The rise of artificial intelligence

- AI has the potential to be "the most important general-purpose technology of our era" (Brynjolfsson et al (2023))
- Recent inroads of generative AI in everyday applications have triggered hopes of widespread efficiency gains
  - Productivity gains for workers (Brynjolfsson et al (2023); Noy and Zhang (2023); Peng et al (2023))
  - Improvements in sales & employment growth, productivity & innovation for firms (Yang (2022); Czarnitzki et al (2023), Babina et al (2024))
- By transforming occupational tasks, altering corporate strategies, and affecting production efficiency, AI may have significant consequences for labour markets, firms, and whole industries
  - Broad agreement: positive for productivity (1-1.5% range), GPT


## Research question and methodological approach

 What are the effects of AI on aggregate output and inflation, as well as on output in different sectors?


### Outline

- Construct industry-level measure of exposure to AI (AIIE) at the 2-digit NAICS level, building on Felten et al (2021)
- Calibrate multi-sector macroeconomic model in which AI is a positive productivity shock with a differential impact across sectors
  - Allocate the shock across sectors using the AIIE measure
- Investigate effects on macro-aggregates & sectors; use model for counterfactual analyses
  - Effects of AI could "unanticipated" or "anticipated" by agents


## Al increases GDP, consumption and investment (unanticipated)



## Initially disinflationary, AI over time leads to inflation




## When anticipated, investment takes time to pick up...





## ... and the dynamics of inflation, output gap and rates differ



## The impact of AI across industries





Figure 9: Long-run increase in industry value added


- Output rises in all sectors: general purpose tech
- Variation across industries
- Some industry groups clearly benefit more than others

## Important to account for general equilibrium effects




 No direct mapping between initial industry exposure to AI & long run increase in value added

## Important to account for general equilibrium effects




- No direct mapping between initial industry exposure to AI & long run increase in value added
- Sectors with largest increase in output see largest declines in prices ...

## Important to account for general equilibrium effects




- No direct mapping between initial industry exposure to AI & long run increase in value added
- Sectors with largest increase in output see largest declines in prices ...
- … and in hours worked

## Counterfactual #1: Exploring industry variation on the effect of AI



- Recall: little variation across sectors from AIIE baseline calibration
  - Counterfactual: AI raises productivity in only one sector
- Where AI shock is concentrated matters, especially for inflation
  - Role for production linkages

## Counterfactual #2: general purpose vs factor-specific technology



Instead of GPT, have AI be either L- or K-augmenting

• Not much difference w.r.t. baseline, quantitatively & qualitatively

## Conclusion

- First multisector macro model that studies impact of AI on macro outcomes & the effects across industries
  - Grounded on granular measure of impact of AI across occupations & industry aggregation based on production structure
- From counterfactuals: focus more on use of industry output (proximity to final demand & linkages) rather than industry factorintensity
  - Where AI shock concentrates matters, especially for path of inflation
  - → More research needed here!
- Lots of caveats!
  - But a useful tool to ground our thinking while remaining open

## Thank you for your time & attention!

Further reading

- BIS Annual Economic Report Chapter III (2024): "Artificial intelligence and the economy: implications for central banks"
- Aldasoro, I, O Armantier, S Doerr, L Gambacorta and T Oliviero (2024a): "Survey evidence on gen AI and households: job prospects amid trust concerns", *BIS Bulletin*, no 86, April.
- (2024b): "The gen AI gender gap", Economics Letters, forthcoming.
- Aldasoro, I, S Doerr, L Gambacorta, G Gelos and D Rees (2024): "Artificial intelligence, labour markets and inflation", mimeo.
- Aldasoro, I, S Doerr, L Gambacorta, S Notra, T Oliviero and D Whyte (2024): "Generative artificial intelligence and cybersecurity in central banking", *BIS Papers*, no 145, May.
- Aldasoro, I, L Gambacorta, A Korinek, V Shreeti and M Stein (2024): "Intelligent financial system: how AI is transforming finance", *BIS Working Papers*, no 1193.
- Aquilina, M, D Araujo, G Gelos, T Park and F Perez-Cruz (2024): "Harnessing artificial intelligence for monitoring financial markets", *BIS Working Papers*, forthcoming.
- Araujo, D, S Doerr, L Gambacorta and B Tissot (2024): "Artificial intelligence in central banking", *BIS Bulletin*, no 84, January.
- Cornelli, G, J Frost and S Mishra (2023): "Artificial intelligence, services globalisation and income inequality", *BIS Working Papers*, no 1135, October.
- Gambacorta, L, B Kwon, T Park, P Patelli and S Zhu (2024): "CB-LMs: language models for central banking", *BIS Working Papers*, forthcoming.
- Gambacorta, L, H Qiu, D Rees and S Shian (2024): "Generative AI and labour productivity: a field experiment on code programming", mimeo.
- Park T, H S Shin and H Williams (2024): "Mapping the space of economic ideas with LLMs", *BIS Working Papers*, forthcoming.
- Perez-Cruz, F and H S Shin (2024): "Testing the cognitive limits of large language models", BIS Bulletin, no 83, January


## ANNEX



## Index of impact of AI by industry (AIIE, Felten et al (2021))

- 1. Survey: 10 AI applications covering AI's most likely use cases are linked to a list of 52 workplace abilities
  - For each ability, survey respondents indicate whether they think the respective AI application can be used
  - Results in relatedness measure for each occupation-ability combination ranging from 0 (no relation) to 1 (high relation)
- 2. Each ability's exposure = sum of the relatedness value across all AI applications, ranges from 0 (no exp) to 10 (high exp)
- 3. Each occupation's exposure to AI (AIOE) = average across 52 abilities' exposures to AI, weighted by abilities' prevalence in each occupation
- 4. Aggregate to industry level (AIIE) based on occupations' employment shares within each two-digit industry


## Artificial Intelligence occupation exposure (AIOE)



 Lowest-scoring mostly highdegree of physical effort

 Highest exposure mostly white collar requiring advanced degrees

## Artificial intelligence industry exposure (AIIE)



- Highest: finance & insurance, management companies
- Lowest: agriculture, forestry & fishing, transportation & warehousing

## The model

BIS


- Quantitative multi-industry macroeconomic model (Rees (2020))
  - Households (HH): CES consumption/labour bundles
  - Industries w/ many firms producing differentiated goods under monopolistic competition; 2-stage production w/ intermediate inputs; Ind-specific TFP
    - Capital/labour intensive; consumption/investment/intermediate goods
  - Government: purchases goods & services from firms & transfers resources between HH
  - *Central bank*: adjusts policy rate based on Taylor-type rule
- Calibrate using US input-output tables & values from literature
- Use AllE to allocate +TFP across industries, under aggregation constraint, assuming Al boosts TFP growth for 10 years
- Effects of AI could "unanticipated" or "anticipated" by agents

## What do we know about HH expectations regarding AI?

### Highway to automation or stairway to job security? Gen AI and job prospects

In per cent

Graph 2




Panel A reports the average responses to the following questions: 1 "What do you think are the chances that artificial intelligence will increase your productivity at work?", 2 "What do you think are the chances that artificial intelligence will help you find new job opportunities?", 3 "What do you think are the chances that you will lose your current job because of artificial intelligence tools?" and 4 "What do you think are the chances that your salary in your current job will decrease because of artificial intelligence tools?" Respondents could indicate their assessment on a scale of 0 to 100%. Panel B reports average probabilities and 95% confidence intervals by household groups to questions 1 (red dot) and 2 (blue cross). Panel C reports average probabilities and 95% confidence intervals by household groups to questions 3 (red dot) and 4 (blue cross).

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Survey of Consumers Expectations; authors' calculations.

Aldasoro et al (2024a): "Survey evidence on gen AI and households: job prospects amid trust concerns", BIS Bulletin #86. Aldasoro et al (2024b): "The gen AI gender gap", Economics Letters, forthcoming.



## Decomposition of value added across industries






Figure 3: Simple model 1 – Cross-industry differences in production technologies




Figure 5: Simple model 1



Figure 4: Simple model 2 – Differences in the use of industry output





Figure 6: Simple model 2

## Value-added increases less in labour-intensive industries



## Calibration

Table 1:	Calibration	of key	parameters
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Parameter	Description	Value
β	Discount rate	0.99
h	Habits	0.70
Spp	Investment adjustment cost	3.00
$\eta$	Elasticity of substitution in demand CES	0.90
ζ	Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour	0.95
$\varphi$	Elasticity of substitution between intermediates and capital / labour	0.60
$\psi$	Elasticity of substitution between intermediates	0.40
u	Frisch labour supply elasticity	2.00
$arepsilon_w$	Labour supply elasticity across industries	5.00
$\delta$	Depreciation rate	0.02
$ ho_r$	Taylor rule - autoregressive parameter	0.80
$\phi_{\pi}$	Taylor rule - response to inflation	1.50
$\phi_{gap}$	Taylor rule - response to output gap	0.25
$ heta_{sticky}$	Calvo - sticky price sectors	0.80
$\theta_{semi-flex}$	Calvo - semi-flexible price sectors	0.50
$ heta_{flex}$	Calvo - flexible price sectors	0.25
$\chi_p$	Price indexation	0.20
$\theta_w$	Calvo - wages	0.75

Note: Sticky price sectors are Agriculture and Mining; Semi-flexible price sectors are Utilities, Manufacturing, Retail trade, Wholesale trade and Transport.

## Function forms of production functions

• Gross output:

$$\underbrace{Y_{j,t}}_{\text{Gross output}} = \underbrace{A_{j,t}}_{\text{TFP}} \begin{bmatrix} \omega_{y,j}^{\frac{1}{\varphi}} & \underbrace{f_{j,t}}^{\frac{\varphi-1}{\varphi}} \\ Labour + \\ capital bundle \end{bmatrix}^{\frac{1}{\varphi}} + (1 - \omega_{j,y})^{\frac{1}{\varphi}} & \underbrace{x_{j,t}}^{\frac{\varphi-1}{\varphi}} \\ \text{Intermediate} \\ \text{inputs} \end{bmatrix}^{\frac{\varphi}{\varphi-1}}$$

• Labour + capital bundle

$$\underbrace{f_{j,t}}_{\begin{array}{c}\text{Labour}+\\\text{capital bundle}\end{array}} = \begin{bmatrix} \omega_{n,j}^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} & \underbrace{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}}_{n,j} + (1-\omega_{n,j})^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} & \underbrace{\frac{\zeta-1}{\zeta}}_{n,j} \\ \underset{\begin{array}{c}\text{Labour}}{\text{Labour}} & \underset{\begin{array}{c}\text{Capital}\\\text{services}\end{array}} \end{bmatrix}^{\frac{\zeta}{\zeta-1}}$$