

# NEPAL

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#### STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2020 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

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Prepared by the staff of the International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association.

Joint Bank-Fund	Nepal Debt Sustainability Analysis
Risk of external debt distress	Low
Overall risk of debt distress	Low
Granularity in the risk rating	Not Applicable
Application of judgment	No

The Debt Sustainability Analysis using the joint IMF/WB Debt Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries (LIC-DSF) shows that Nepal remains at low risk of debt distress for both the external and overall public debt. All debt and debt service indicators are projected to be well below their indicative threshold values under the baseline scenario as well as the stress tests. However, the analysis indicates that Nepal's public debt is projected to gradually increase over the medium-term owing to continuing fiscal and current account deficits, and that debt sustainability is vulnerable to export and economic growth shocks. These findings stress the importance of implementing reforms to increase the economy's resilience to external shocks and to encourage diversification. Further efforts to improve the domestic productivity and competitiveness and to enhance monitoring of risks related to contingent liabilities are necessary to ensure medium- to long-term debt sustainability.

## **PUBLIC DEBT COVERAGE**

1. The coverage of public debt in this analysis includes central and local governments' debts, government guarantees, and central bank borrowing. Nepal's provincial and local governments had no debt. Their borrowing framework is under consideration and should be monitored carefully. The Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB, Nepal's central bank) borrowed from the IMF through the Rapid Credit Facility and onlent the funds (about US\$50 million) to the government. Bond issuances by the central bank were only for the purpose of the monetary policy. Nepal's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) borrow abroad through the

central government, therefore included in the coverage of central government debt. The government has recently started providing guarantees for debts of SOEs.

Subsectors of the public sector	Check box
Central government	Х
2 State and local government	Х
Other elements in the general government	
a o/w: Social security fund	
o/w: Extra budgetary funds (EBFs)	Х
Guarantees (to other entities in the public and private sector, including to SOEs)	Х
7 Central bank (borrowed on behalf of the government)	Х
Non-guaranteed SOE debt	Х

## **BACKGROUND ON DEBT**

2. Nepal's total public debt is estimated at 30.1 percent of GDP at mid-2019. Following a prolonged decline, to 25 percent of GDP in mid-2015, Nepal's public debt rose to 30.2 percent of GDP at mid-2018. The public debt stock for July 2019 stayed at almost the same level as the previous fiscal year. Nepal's public debt remains low compared to other low-income countries.



**3. External public debt stood at 17 percent of GDP at mid-July 2019.** The external debt-to-GDP ratio declined slightly by 0.4 percentage point since mid-2018. The net present value (PV) of the external debt is estimated at about 12.2 percent of GDP due to the high degree of concessionality. Nepal's external

debt was owed mainly to multilateral creditors (89 percent of all external debt), such as the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) and the Asian Development Bank. Their loans had low interest rates (1 percent on average) and long maturities (26 years on average). For the bilateral loans, Japan was the largest bilateral creditor, followed by China, India, and Korea.

Nepal: Ex	ternal Public Debt, at	end FY2018/19 1	1/
	In millions of USts	In percent of	In percent of
	111 1111110115 01 0 355	GDP	external debt
Total external	5,366	17.0%	100%
Multilateral	4,760	15.1%	89%
AsDB	1,826	5.8%	34%
IDA	2,781	8.8%	52%
Bilateral	606	1.9%	11%
Paris Club	319	1.0%	6%
Non-Paris Club	287	0.9%	5%
Source: Nepalese auth 1/ Nepal's fiscal year st	orities; and IMF staff est tarts in mid-July. For exa	imates. ample, FY2018/19	covers mid-
July 2018 to mid-July	2019.		

4. Domestic public debt was 13.1 percent of GDP at mid-July 2019. About 32 percent of

domestic public debt is treasury bills with a maturity of up to 1 year (28-days, 91-days, 182-days, and 364-

day treasury bills), of which about a half is 364-day bills. Medium- to long-term debt comprises mostly development bonds with maturities of 3-15 years and interest rates of 3-6.5 percent per annum. All the domestic public debt was held by residents, so the analysis is currency-based.

Nepal: Pu	ublic Domestic Debt,	at end FY2018/1	9
	In billions of Nepalese rupees	In percent of GDP	In percent of domestic debt
Total domestic	453	13.1%	100%
Treasury bills	147	4.2%	32%
Treasury bonds	306	8.8%	68%
Development bonds	297	8.6%	66%
Others	9	0.3%	2%
Sources: Nepalese auth	orities; and IMF staff e	stimates.	

5. The stock of private external debt in Nepal has not been published by the authorities, but it is estimated to be very small. While the government and the NRB are encouraging commercial banks to access external loans to alleviate BOP pressures, bank external borrowing has been constrained by limited access and high relative cost. Regulations by the authorities—such as imposing a maximum spread limit (6- month Libor + 4%) on banks' foreign loans-hamper banks' ability to borrow overseas. So far, there has been very small foreign borrowing (about 0.1 percent of GDP at mid-July 2019) by the non-public sector. Reflecting recent government efforts to encourage foreign loans, private external debt is assumed to increase to 1 percent of GDP in the long term.

1	The country's coverage of public debt	The central, state, and l bank, governme	ocal government nt-guaranteed de	ts plus extra budgetary funds, central ebt, non-guaranteed SOE debt
		Defeat	Used for the	Reasons for deviations
		Detault	analysis	from the default settings
2	Other elements of the general government not captured in 1.	0 percent of GDP	0	
3	SoE's debt (guaranteed and not guaranteed by the government) 1/	2 percent of GDP	2.0	
4	PPP	35 percent of PPP stock	2.1 <sup>2/</sup>	
5	Financial market (the default value of 5 percent of GDP is the minimum value)	5 percent of GDP	5	
	Total (2+3+4+5) (in percent of GDP)		7.0	
1/ T	he default shock of 2% of GDP will be triggered for countries whose government-gua	aranteed debt is not fully ca	ptured under the	e country's public debt definition (1.).
Т	he Nepali government provided guarantee to the purchase of airline by SOE in FY 20	18/19, which is 1% of GDP.		
212	1 percent of GDP = 6.01 percent of GDP (PPP contracts as of 2017) * 35 percent of s	hock (default setting)		

6. The contingent liability stress test includes contingent liabilities stemming from SOE debt (2 percent of GDP), PPP projects (2.1 percent of GDP) and financial market (5 percent of GDP). PPP projects have not been formally compiled by the government. According to the PPI database of the World Bank, Nepal's PPP contracts are estimated to account for about 6 percent of GDP as of 2017. The Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) are major SOEs in Nepal. As of July-2019, the NOC and NEA's debt amounted to 3.3 percent of GDP. Their debts are all owed to the government, so are already included in the government's debt. The government provided a guarantee to the Nepal Airlines Corporations for the purchase of an airplane in FY2018/19, which is 1.0 percent of GDP.

## **BACKGROUND ON MACRO FORECASTS**

**7. Growth and inflation**: Growth continued to perform well for the past a couple of years. Due to strong performances in agriculture, reconstruction activities, and tourism, real GDP growth picked up to 7.1 percent in FY2018/19 from 6.7 percent in the previous fiscal year. In the mid- to long-term, it is expected to converge to potential growth of 5.3 percent. The inflation rate was 4.6 percent annually in FY2018/19 and rose to 6.0 percent at mid-July 2019 owing to a surge in food prices, but it is expected to stabilize at 5.3 percent over the medium-term.

Text Table 1. Macroeco	nomic ass	umptio	ons und	lerlying 1	he curr	ent and	previo	us DSA	1/	
	Pre	vious DS	A		Cu	Current vs. F	Previous			
	2017/18	МТ	LT	17/18	18/19	19/20	МТ	LT	МТ	LT
Real growth (%)	6.3	5.1	4.5	6.7	7.1	5.8	5.4	5.3	0.4	0.8
CPI (period average, %)	4.2	5.3	5.0	4.1	4.6	6.1	5.3	5.0	0.0	0.0
Revenues and grants (% GDP)	25.5	30.2	30.4	25.3	26.0	25.9	25.7	26.1	-4.6	-4.3
Grants (% GDP)	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.2	0.0	0.0
Primary expenditure (% GDP)	31.5	31.6	32.3	31.4	29.9	29.8	28.9	28.9	-2.7	-3.4
Net acquisition of non-financial assets (% GDP)	8.9	6.6	6.6	8.9	7.0	7.3	6.9	6.2	0.3	-0.4
Primary deficit (% GDP)	-6.0	-1.4	-1.9	-6.1	-3.9	-3.9	-3.2	-2.8	-1.8	-0.9
Net incurrence of liabilities (% GDP)	6.0	2.8	3.4	2.9	6.2	6.1	5.0	5.0	2.2	1.5
Net domestic financing (% GDP)	3.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	4.2	3.7	3.4	4.0	2.9	3.5
Exports of G&S (y/y growth)	14.4	9.1	7.9	14.4	2.5	7.6	9.6	9.6	0.5	1.7
Imports of G&S (y/y growth)	25.6	5.0	5.2	25.6	5.6	4.7	6.4	7.2	1.4	2.0
Remittances (y/y growth)	10.2	5.6	3.9	10.2	7.6	10.5	4.6	5.6	-1.0	1.6
Current account balance (% GDP)	-8.2	-7.2	-2.3	-8.1	-7.7	-5.2	-4.9	-4.0	2.2	-1.7

Note: MT (medium term) is the average over the next 5 years (2020/21-2024/25), and LT (long term) is the average over the following 7-20 years. Sources: Nepalese authorities; and IMF staff estimates

1/ Nepal's fiscal year starts in mid-July. For example, FY2019/20 runs from mid-July 2019 to mid-July 2020.

**8. External sector**: The current account deficit was still high at 7.7 percent of GDP in FY2018/19 owing to continued strong import growth. Export and foreign direct investment were still weak, with remittances (a quarter of GDP) helping to finance the large trade deficit. Gross official reserves have fallen to US\$8.5 billion in July 2019, from US\$ 9.3 billion at the end of previous fiscal year. However, the large current account deficit in FY2018/19 did not lead to a commensurate increase in external debt or decline in reserves, due to large positive net errors and omissions in the balance of payments (2.7 percent of GDP in FY2018/19). The current account deficit is projected to narrow over the medium-term with slowing import demand. External debt is expected to decrease gradually over the projection period, to 18.5 percent of GDP at mid-2020 and 12 percent of GDP by mid-2040.

**9. Fiscal**: The primary fiscal deficit outturn of the central government in FY2018/19 decreased to 4.0 percent of GDP from 6.1 percent of GDP in the previous year. Even though the FY2019/20 budget again targets an ambitious increase in spending, the primary fiscal deficit is projected at 3.9 percent of GDP in FY2019/20, taking into account spending capacity constraints. Over the medium-term, it is projected to decrease to 3.2 percent of GDP.

**10. Domestic debt**: The Nepalese government is expected to gradually increase domestic borrowing to meet its fiscal deficit. Domestic borrowing is expected to reach 4 percent of GDP annually, and the domestic debt stock is projected to increase from 13 percent to 35½ percent of GDP over the long-term, while external debt stock is projected to decrease to 11 percent of GDP over the projection period.

**11. Realism of baseline (figure 4)**: Cross country experience suggests that the baseline fiscal adjustment of Nepal (0.5 percentage point in 3 years) is feasible. Using alternative fiscal multipliers, growth would be higher than in the baseline scenario. Finally, contribution of public capital to GDP growth in the baseline projection is in line with historical experiences.

## COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION AND DETERMINATION OF SCENARIO STRESS TESTS

**12. Country classification**: In the revised debt sustainability framework (LIC-DSF), a composite indicator (CI) is used to capture the different factors affecting a country's debt carrying capacity. The CI captures the impacts of the different factors through a weighted average of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score, the country's real GDP growth, remittances, foreign exchange reserves, and world growth<sup>1</sup>. The calculation of the CI is based on 10-year averages of the variables, across 5 years of historical data and 5 years of projection. Nepal's CI score is calculated at 3.28, calculated based on the October 2019 World Economic Outlook and 2018 CPIA index, which lies in a range of *strong* rating, the same as last year.

Nepal: Debt Car	rying Capacity and	d Thresholds										
Deb	t Carrying Capacity											
Final	based on the	based										
TITICI	current vintage	on the previous										
Strong	Strong	Strong										
Strong	3.28	3.26										
Application thresholds												
External debt burder	n thresholds											
PV of debt in % of												
Exports		240										
GDP		55										
Debt service in % of												
Exports		21										
Revenue		23										
Total public debt be	nchmark											
PV of total public deb	t in % of GDP	70										

**13. Tailored stress tests**: The revised LIC-DSF includes stress tests to assess the sensitivity of projected debt burden indicators to changes in assumptions. In this analysis, all stress tests were kept at their default settings (historical average minus one standard deviation, or the baseline projection minus one standard deviation, whichever is lower) with additionally including tailored scenario stress test for Nepal. In order to reflect Nepal's vulnerability to natural disasters, such as the 2015 earthquakes, the natural disaster shock

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The details on the methodology can be found in the new LIC-DSF guidance note: <u>https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2018/02/14/pp122617guidance-note-on-lic-dsf</u>

was applied as one of the stress tests. A one-off shock of 10 percentage points of GDP to the debt-to-GDP ratio in the second year of the projection period (FY2020/21) is assumed, and real GDP growth and exports were lowered by 1.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively, in the year of the shock for the stress test.

## **EXTERNAL AND PUBLIC SUSTAINABILITY**

14. The external DSA shows that Nepal is at low risk of debt distress. Under the baseline scenario, the PV of external debt and debt service ratios are projected not to breach their respective thresholds and to remain stable over the projection period, even with the assumption of growing private external debt to 1 percent of GDP over the projection years. In the stress tests, the debt and debt service ratios also remain below the thresholds throughout the projection period.

**15. Stress tests suggest vulnerability to export shock.** The export shock is identified as the most extreme one, leading to a rise of the ratios larger than for other shocks, such as real GDP growth, fiscal primary balance, current transfers/FDI flows, national currency depreciation, and natural disaster. Under the export shock scenario, the PV of public external debt-to-export ratio would increase to 213 percent at mid-2022, which is not far below the threshold value (240 percent), but stabilize onwards.

**16.** The risk of public debt (external + domestic) distress is also low. Public debt is projected to gradually increase from 30 percent of GDP at July 2018/19 to around 46 percent of GDP in FY2039/40 under the baseline scenario. The PV of the debt-to-GDP ratio is analyzed to remain stable at 38 percent of GDP over the projection period, which is well below the 70 percent benchmark. Debt service-to revenue ratio is projected to rise over the projection period to 36 percent, owing to increasing domestic borrowing, but to remain below 40 percent in 2029/30.

**17. Public debt is most vulnerable to a growth shock.** A growth shock (one standard deviation in 2020/21 from the baseline) would lead to a rise of the PV of debt-to-GDP ratio to 55 percent in 2029/30. Debt service-to-revenue ratio is also affected most by a growth shock, which is calculated at around 53 percent in 2029/30.

## **VIEWS OF THE AUTHORITIES**

**18.** The authorities broadly agreed with the assessment of the DSA. They stressed that Nepal's public debt risk has been reduced over the past decade thanks to the government's effective management of public finances. In addition, in the context of fiscal federalism, the authorities have been taking steps to enhance public debt management. The new Public Debt Management bill was submitted to the Parliament and the Public Debt Management Office (PDMO) was established in FY 2018/19 to manage Nepal's public debt in an integrated manner. The PDMO will prepare guidelines to support subnational governments in their appropriate management of borrowings and debts. While the authorities concurred with the team's projection that the share of domestic financing out of total government financing would increase over time, they stressed that the size of domestic financing could be further increased with the continued growth of Nepal's economy.

## CONCLUSION

**19. Nepal remains at low risk of external and overall debt distress.** Both in the baseline scenario and in the stress tests, none of debt burden indicators breach the indicative threshold values. However, baseline projections and the standard stress tests show increasing risks for the projection period. Nepal's public debt is projected to gradually increase over the medium-term owing to continuing fiscal and current account deficits. Stress tests indicate that Nepal's debt sustainability remains vulnerable to shocks to exports and economic growth. To build up Nepal's resilience to these shocks, the Nepalese authorities should continue to make efforts to improve the domestic productivity and competitiveness through stepping up quality investment in infrastructure, as well as streamlining regulations and bureaucratic processes. It is also important to pursue rigorous analysis of the risks related to contingent liabilities. Closing the data gap by compiling PPP projects and private sector external debt would help future debt sustainability analysis. The authorities will also need to make significant progress in implementing a medium-term debt strategy and developing the government bond market to facilitate greater domestic financing. Finally, improvements are needed in subnational governments' public financial management and reporting, along with the implementation of a prudent framework for subnational borrowing.

		Table 1.	Nepal: E	xternal	Debt Su	stainabi	lity Fram	nework, B	aseline Sce	enario, 201	7-2040		
					(In percer	nt of GDP,	unless othe	rwise indica	ited)			_	
	Actual				Proj	ections				Ave	rage 8/	-	
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2030	2040	Historical	Projections	_	
External debt (nominal) 1/	17.1	18.5	18.8	18.9	19.0	19.0	18.8	16.8	11.8	18.7	18.3	Definition of external/domestic debt	Currency-based
of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG)	17.0	18.3	18.6	18.7	18.7	18.7	18.4	16.2	10.8	18.7	17.9	is there a material difference between the	
												two criteria?	No
Change in external debt	-0.2	1.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-0.6				
Identified net debt-creating flows	6.4	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.1	2.9	1.9	1.6	-2.6	2.9		
Non-interest current account deficit	7.6	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.2	3.4	2.8	-0.6	4.2		
Deficit in balance of goods and services	37.5	34.6	33.4	32.4	31.5	30.6	29.6	25.2	14.2	29.8	29.7		
Exports	8.7	8.4	8.4	8.5	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.8	9.1			Debt Accumulation	
Imports	40.2	42.9	41.8	40.9	40.1 25.6	39.2	38.3	34.0	23.3	20.2	24.1	3.0	53
of which official	-28.7	-28.2	-27.3	-26.4	-25.0	-24.9	-24.0	-20.5	-15.3	-29.2	-24.1		
Other surrent account flows (negative = net inflow)	-1.0	-1.1	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-1.1	-1.1	-12	-12	25	- 53
Net EDL (negative = inflow)	- 1.3	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-0.7	-1.2	-1.5	··· \	55
Endogenous debt dynamics 2/	-0.4	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.0	-0.7	-0.7	-0.4	-0.0		
Contribution from nominal interest rate	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1			2.0	53
Contribution from real GDP growth	-12	-0.9	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9	_0.2	-0.9	-0.8	-0.6			· · ·	
Contribution from price and exchange rate changes	0.2	0.5	1.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0			1.5	- 52
Residual 3/	-6.6	-2.4	-3.2	-3.3	-3.2	-3.1	-3.1	-2.4	-2.3	1.4	-2.9		
of which: exceptional financing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			1.0	- 52
Sustainability indicators												05	<b>5</b> 2
PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio	12.2	12.2	12.2	12 1	12.0	11 9	11.6	10.0	67			0.5	JE
PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio	140.6	145.6	144 5	142.5	140.2	137 4	133.8	113.6	73.4				
PPG debt service-to-exports ratio	8.0	79	7.5	7.4	7.5	7.8	7.4	6.5	44			0.0	52
PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio	2.8	27	2.6	2.6	27	2.8	2.6	24	17			2020 2022 2024 2026 2	2028 2030
Gross external financing need (Million of U.S. dollars)	2427.8	1829.9	1908.9	2058.8	2228.8	2354.2	2449.2	3038.8	6619.7			Debt Assumulation	
,													600)
Key macroeconomic assumptions												Grant-equivalent financing (% of	GDP)
Real GDP growth (in percent)	7.1	6.0	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	4.9	5.4	—— Grant element of new borrowing	(% right scale)
GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent)	-1.3	4.8	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.5	4.3	3.6		
Effective interest rate (percent) 4/	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.9	External debt (nom	inal) 1/
Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	2.5	7.7	10.2	9.9	10.0	9.5	9.9	9.3	9.4	5.8	9.4	= of which: Drivate	
Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	5.6	3.3	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.6	6.4	6.6	12.9	6.3	20	
Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent)		52.6	52.5	52.5	52.6	52.5	52.5	52.5	52.4		52.5	19	
Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP)	24.8	24.6	24.5	24.4	24.1	24.2	24.1	24.0	24.1	19.3	24.2	15	
Aid flows (in Million of US dollars) 5/	368.3	933.8	1012.9	1050.0	1131.6	1185.1	1237.3	1537.4	2898.6			19	
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 6/		2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	1.9	1.5		2.3	18	
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 6/		66.5	70.8	71.7	71.7	72.3	73.2	75.3	84.6		72.4	18	
Nominal GDP (Million of US dollars)	30690.3	34080.9	37381.9	40846.7	44498.5	48374.3	52868.1	81362.5	192701.7			17	1 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Nominal dollar GDP growth	5.7	11.0	9.7	9.3	8.9	8.7	9.3	9.0	9.0	9.4	9.3		
Memorandum items:												17	
PV of external debt 7/	12 3	12.4	12.4	12.3	12.3	12.2	12.0	10.6	7.7			16	
In percent of exports	142.3	147.8	147.2	145.7	143.8	141.5	138.3	120.3	84.4			16	
Total external debt service-to-exports ratio	8.0	9.6	9,6	10.0	10.6	11.3	11.3	12.6	14.6			15	
PV of PPG external debt (in Million of US dollars)	3734.3	4163.6	4551.6	4934.0	5339.7	5734.3	6133.9	8136.4	12851.1				
(PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent)		1.4	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.2			2020 2022 2024 2025	2020 2020
Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio	7.8	3.6	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.5	3.8	3.5			2020 2022 2024 2026	2028 2030

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.

2/ Derived as [r - g - p(1+g)]/(1+g+p+gp) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and p = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.

3/ Includes exceptional financing (ie. changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.

The residuals in this table are mainly related to reserve drawdown and net errors and omissions. For example, there were reserve drawdown of 4.2% of GDP and positive net E&Os of 2.7% of GDP in FY2018/19.

4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.

5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.

6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).

7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.

8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

-	Actual				Projections					Ave	rage 6/	-	
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2030	2040	Historical	Projections		
Public sector debt 1/	30.1	33.7	35.7	37.4	39.0	40.3	41.1	43.6	46.3	30.6	40.1		6
of which: external debt	17.0	18.3	18.6	18.7	18.7	18.7	18.4	16.2	10.8	18.7	17.9	debt	based
	13.1	15.4	17.1	18.8	20.3	21.6	22.6	27.4	35.5				
Change in public sector debt	-0.2	3.6	2.0	1./	1.6	1.3	8.0	0.4	0.0	2.0	0.5	Is there a material difference	N-
Identified debt-creating flows	8.0	1.8	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.2	-0.1	-0.5	-2.0	0.5	between the two criteria?	NO
Primary deficit	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.5	0.5	3.0		
Revenue and grants	26.0	25.8	26.0	25.8	25.5	25.6	25.5	25.2	25.3	21.3	25.5		. ,
of which: grants	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.2			Public sector debt	1/
Primary (noninterest) expenditure	30.0	29.8	29.7	29.2	28.9	28.6	28.3	27.8	27.7	21.9	28.5	= of which: local currency dono	minated
Automatic debt dynamics	-3.2	-2.1	-2.3	-2.4	-2.4	-2.4	-2.6	-2.7	-3.0			of which, focal-currency deno	minateu
Contribution from interest rate/growth differential	-2.5	-2.1	-2.3	-2.4	-2.4	-2.4	-2.6	-2.7	-3.0			of which: foreign-currency de	nominated
of which: contribution from average real interest rate	-0.5	-0.4	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.4	-0.6	-0.6	-0.6				
of which: contribution from real GDP growth	-2.0	-1.7	-1.0	-1.9	-1.9	-2.0	-2.0	-2.2	-2.3			50	
Other identified data meeting flows	-0.7											40	
Other Identified debt-creating flows	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	35	
Privatization receipts (negative)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			30	
Recognition of contingent liabilities (e.g., bank recapitalization)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			25	
Other data method other)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			20	
Desidual 7/	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	15	
Residual //	-0.9	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.9	0.7	5	
Sustainability indicators												0	
PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio 2/	24.9	27.8	29.5	31.0	32.4	33.6	34.4	37.6	42.3			2020 2022 2024 2026	2028 2030
PV of public debt-to-revenue and grants ratio	95.7	107.4	113.4	120.2	126.9	131.3	134.8	149.1	167.4				
Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio 3/	24.4	26.3	21.6	22.4	25.0	27.9	30.4	35.8	45.4				
Gross financing need 4/	10.3	10.7	9.3	9.2	9.7	10.1	10.6	11.6	13.9			of which: held by reside	ents
Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions												of which: held by non-re	esidents
Real GDP growth (in percent)	7.1	6.0	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	4.9	5.4	1	
Average nominal interest rate on external debt (in percent)	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	1	
Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent)	-2.6	-1.9	-1.8	-1.7	-1.5	-1.2	-1.8	-1.5	-1.5	-3.2	-1.6		
Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation)	-4.7									-2.2		1	
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent)	6.8	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.6	5.3	5.9	5.6	5.6	8.1	5.7	n.a.	
Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent)	2.2	5.2	5.4	3.8	4.1	4.2	4.5	5.3	5.3	10.6	4.7	0	
Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 5/	4.1	0.3	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.2	2.5	3.5	1.8	0	
D)/ of contingent lightlities (not included in public costor debt)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0				

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Coverage of debt: The central, state, and local governments plus extra budgetary funds, central Bank, government-guaranteed debt, non-guaranteed SOE debt. Definition of external debt is Currency-based.

2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.

3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.

4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.

5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ((-): a primary surplus), which would stabilizes the debt ratio only in the year in question.

6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

7/ The residuals in this table are mainly related to net acquisition of financial assets. For example, the projection of net acquisition of financial assets in FY2019/20 is 1.6% of GDP.







Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2030. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.





Note of the sector of						Proje	ections	1/				
UNICADEUN		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	20
baseline12121212121212111111101011. Bey windles at her hearical averages in 2020-2010 //1212107530-2-3-5411. Bed DP group1213		PV of debt-to (	GDP ratio	,								
AlternationNote of the state of	Baseline	12	12	12	12	12	12	11	11	11	10	1
It by watching at the heaterial average in 2005-2009 //III <td>A. Alternative Scenarios</td> <td></td>	A. Alternative Scenarios											
and Coll base Coll <td>41. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/</td> <td>12</td> <td>10</td> <td>7</td> <td>5</td> <td>3</td> <td>0</td> <td>-2</td> <td>-3</td> <td>-5</td> <td>-6</td> <td>-</td>	41. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	12	10	7	5	3	0	-2	-3	-5	-6	-
31. Beil Offgrowich       12       13       13       13       13       13       13       13       12       14       14         32. Animary balance       12       14	3. Bound Tests											
4Mutan 10<	31. Real GDP growth	12	13	13	13	13	13	12	12	12	11	1
ab Ober Solver121416 <td>32. Primary balance</td> <td>12</td> <td>12</td> <td>13</td> <td>13</td> <td>13</td> <td>12</td> <td>12</td> <td>12</td> <td>11</td> <td>11</td> <td></td>	32. Primary balance	12	12	13	13	13	12	12	12	11	11	
Six Operation       12       15       10 <td>ss. Exports B4. Other flows 3/</td> <td>12</td> <td>15</td> <td>14</td> <td>14</td> <td>15</td> <td>15</td> <td>15</td> <td>14</td> <td>12</td> <td>13</td> <td></td>	ss. Exports B4. Other flows 3/	12	15	14	14	15	15	15	14	12	13	
BitCombine of 19-131213	35. Depreciation	12	15	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	9	
C. Alionetrice origenet sabilities1213 <td>36. Combination of B1-B5</td> <td>12</td> <td>15</td> <td>16</td> <td>16</td> <td>15</td> <td>15</td> <td>15</td> <td>14</td> <td>14</td> <td>13</td> <td>1</td>	36. Combination of B1-B5	12	15	16	16	15	15	15	14	14	13	1
1.1       1.1       1.3       1	C. Tailored Tests											
a. n.a.	C1. Combined contingent liabilities	12	13	13	13	13	13	13	12	12	12	Ĩ
CA       Nak       Na	.2. Natural disaster	12 na	13 n.a.	13 n.a.	13 na	13 n.a.	13 na	13 n.a.	13 n.a.	13 na	12 na	n
Proceeding       55	C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.
PV of debute to export ratio         PV         <	Fhreshold	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	5
State         State <th< td=""><td></td><td>DV of dobt to ov</td><td>norte rol</td><td>in .</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>-</td></th<>		DV of dobt to ov	norte rol	in .								-
Allong variables at their hototrical averages in 2020-2030 2/i       i <td< td=""><td>Baseline</td><td>146</td><td>144</td><td>143</td><td>140</td><td>137</td><td>134</td><td>130</td><td>126</td><td>122</td><td>118</td><td>11</td></td<>	Baseline	146	144	143	140	137	134	130	126	122	118	11
14. key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/       146       114       84       56       30       6       -18       -56       -71       -         8. nonof trsis	A. Alternative Scenarios	110		115				150	.20			
Bround Tests       146       144       143       140       137       134       130       126       122       118       132       131       130       126       122       118       131       134       140       137       134       130       126       122       118       131       134       130       126       127       13       130       130       130       130       130       137       131       130       137       131       130       137       131       130       137       130       137       130       137       130       137       130       146       146       163       150       147       144       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       137       134       140       147       143       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141       141	<ol> <li>Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/</li> </ol>	146	114	84	56	30	6	-18	-38	-56	-71	-8
14. Beat Gog prosech         146         144         149         137         139         126         12         118         127         14         147         149         147         149         147         149         147         149         147         149         147         121         210         146         144         149         147         121         140         147         121         140         147         121         140         177         173         167         167         173         157         164         170         198         180         181         170         198         180         181         180         184         160         157         164         167         190         180         180         184         180         184         180         184         180         184         180         184         180         184         180	R Round Tasts											
B2. Prinary balance1461471491471461811811311211311211313112113131121131311211313112113131	B1. Real GDP growth	146	144	143	140	137	134	130	126	122	118	11
38. Eports       146       174       213       209       204       179       172       170       172       170       172       170	32. Primary balance	146	147	149	147	145	142	138	135	131	127	12
34. Other flows 3/       146       168       189       179       173       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       17       18       18       181       17       18       181       17       18       181       17       18       181       17       18       181       17       181       180       181       17       181       180       181       17       181       180       17       181       180       181       180       170       181       180       170       181       180       170       181       180       180       181       180       181       180       170       181       180	B3. Exports	146	174	213	209	204	198	192	186	179	172	16
is Depretation of 81-85 is Combination of 81-85 is Depretation of 81-85 is Dep	B4. Other flows 3/	146	168	189	184	179	173	167	162	155	148	14
ac. consistance of a los       i.o.	35. Depreciation R6. Combination of B1_B5	146	144	95 170	95 198	94 193	93 188	91	89 175	87	86 161	15
1. Combined liabilities:         146         153         154         152         150         147         144         140         157         133         15           2. Natural disaster         146         159         160         160         158         153         150         147         143         1           2. Natural disaster         1.a.         n.a.         n		140	107	170	150	155	100	101	175	105	101	
22. Natural disaster       146       159       160       100       100       105       153       150       140       143       1         23. Commodity price       na	C. Lailored Lests     C. Combined contingent liabilities	146	153	154	152	150	147	144	140	137	133	12
3.3. Organ of ly price       na       <	22. Natural disaster	146	159	160	160	158	155	153	150	147	143	13
2.4. Market Enancing       n.a.       n.a. <td< td=""><td>C3. Commodity price</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a.</td><td>n.a</td></td<>	C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a
Preschold       240     <	24. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a
Baseline       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       8       8       7       8       8       8       8       8       8       8       8       8       8       8	Threshold	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	24
Baseline       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       7       7       7       7       7         A. Mervariables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/       8       8       7       7       6       6       5       5       3       2         B. Bound Tests       8       7       7       8       8       7		Debt service-to-e	xports ra	tio								
A Alternative Scenarios 4. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/1 8. Sound Tests 8. Real GDP growth 7. Rea	Baseline	8	7	7	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	
8. Bound Tests       8.       7       7       8       7	A. Alternative Scenarios	8	8	7	7	6	6	5	5	3	2	
3. Real GDP growth       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       8       7		J. J	0			0	0	5	5	5	-	
31. Real GDP growth       8       7       7       8       8       7       7       7       7         32. Primary balance       8       7       7       8       8       7       8       8       7       7       7       7         33. Exports       8       9       10	3. Bound Tests		_	_			_	_	_	_	_	
32. Priority balance       8       7       8       3       7       8       7       7       7       7         33. Exports       8       7	31. Real GDP growth	8	7	7	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	
3. Open for size       3       3       7       8       8       8       8       8       8       8       9       10       9       2       10       11       <	32. Primary balance	8	/ 9	10	8 10	8	10	10	10	10	10	1
35. Depreciation       8       7	34. Other flows 3/	8	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	9	
86. Combination of B1-B5       8       8       9       10       9       9       9       10       9         2. Tailored Tests       .       .       .       8       7	35. Depreciation	8	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	5	
C. Tailored Tests       8       7       8       7       7       7         23. Commodity price       n.a.	36. Combination of B1-B5	8	8	9	10	10	9	9	9	10	9	
C1 Combined contingent liabilities       8       8       7       8	2. Tailored Tests											
2.4. Natural unsaster       8	C1. Combined contingent liabilities	8	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	
A. Atta.       Ita.	22. Natural disaster	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	
Internation       Internation <thinternation< th=""> <thinternation< th=""></thinternation<></thinternation<>	-3. Commonly price	n.a. n.a	n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a. n.a.	n.a.	n. n.
Itneshold       21												-
Baseline       3         <th colspan="</td> <td>Threshold</td> <td>21</td> <td>2</td>	Threshold	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	2
Baseline       3<		Debt service-to-re	evenue ra	tio								
A. Alternative Scenarios A1. key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/ B. Bound Tests 31. Real GDP growth 32. Primary balance 33. 33. 33. 33. 33. 33. 33. 33. 33. 33.	Baseline	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	
8. Bound Tests         8. Real GDP growth       3	<ol> <li>Alternative Scenarios</li> <li>Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/</li> </ol>	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	
B. Bound Tests         13. Real GDP growth       3												
1. Near laber growth       3	3. Bound Tests	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	
3. Exports       3	32. Primary balance	5	3	3	3	3	3	3 2	3	3	3	
34. Other flows 3/       3	33. Exports	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
95. Depreciation       3	34. Other flows 3/	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
ya. Combinedium on on on-body     3	35. Depreciation	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	
L'allored lests L'Autored lest		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
.r. comuneu comungent inabilities     3<	C. Tailored Tests	-	~	~		~	~	-		~	-	
33. Commodity price         na.	2. Londined contingent liabilities	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
C4. Market Financing n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.	23. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.
<b>Fhreshold</b> 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23	24. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.
								22	22	22	22	

Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
 Includes official and private transfers and FDI.

	2020	2024	2022	2022	Proj	ections 1/	2026	2027	2020	2020	202
	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	PV	of Debt-	to-GDP R	atio							
Baseline	28	29	31	32	34	34	35	36	36	37	38
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	28	26	25	24	23	22	22	21	20	20	19
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	28	32	37	40	43	46	48	50	51	53	55
B2. Primary balance	28	32	36	37	38	38	39	39	39	40	40
B5. Exports R4. Other flows 2/	20	20	25	26	27	20	20	20	20	50 40	35
B5. Depreciation	20	32	30	30	37	30	30	30	30	30	40
B6. Combination of B1-B5	28	30	32	33	34	34	35	36	36	37	37
C Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	28	38	39	39	40	40	40	41	41	41	41
C2. Natural disaster	28	39	40	41	42	43	43	43	44	44	45
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a
TOTAL public debt benchmark	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
	PV c	of Debt-to	-Revenue	Ratio							
Baseline	107	113	120	127	131	135	139	141	144	147	149
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	107	101	97	94	90	88	86	83	81	80	78
P. Pound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	107	122	142	157	168	177	187	195	203	210	216
B2. Primary balance	107	123	139	145	148	150	153	154	156	158	159
B3. Exports	107	116	126	133	137	140	144	146	149	151	153
B4. Other flows 3/	107	121	136	142	146	148	152	154	156	157	159
B5. Depreciation	107	118	116	119	120	120	120	120	119	119	119
B6. Combination of B1-B5	107	117	125	129	132	135	138	141	143	145	147
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	107	145	149	154	156	158	160	161	162	163	164
C2. Natural disaster	107	151	156	162	165	167	170	172	173	175	177
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Debt	Service-to	o-Revenue	Ratio							
Baseline	26	22	22	25	28	30	32	32	33	34	36
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2020-2030 2/	26	21	18	18	19	19	20	18	18	18	18
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	26	23	26	31	36	40	44	45	47	50	52
B2. Primary balance	26	22	26	31	32	34	36	36	37	38	38
B3. Exports	26	22	22	25	28	31	32	32	33	35	36
B4. Other flows 3/	26	22	22	25	28	31	33	32	33	35	37
B5. Depreciation	26	20	22	22	26	28	30	30	30	32	33
B6. Combination of B1-B5	26	21	22	26	28	31	32	32	33	34	36
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	26	22	34	32	34	36	38	38	39	39	39
C2. Natural disaster	26	22	36	34	36	38	40	40	41	42	42
C3. Commodity price	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.
2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.
3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.